In "Rethinking Research Ethics," Rosamond Rhodes argues that everyone has a responsibility to participate in research ethics programs (Rhodes 2005). After discussing the moral underpinnings upon which such a claim might rest, this article brings up two concerns in response to Rhodes' claim. The first worry is pragmatic: Rhodes argues that the focus in research ethics should be on the hypothetical consent of idealized moral agents, an approach that is constrained by practical considerations. The second objection is that, in most (...) research studies, participants are paid, which undermines the accusation of free-riding for non-participants. (shrink)

Because of the important benefits that biomedical research offers to humans, some have argued that people have a general moral obligation to participate in research. Although the defense of such a putative moral duty has raised controversy, few scholars, on either side of the debate, have attended to the social context in which research takes place and where such an obligation will be discharged. By reflecting on the social context in which a presumed duty to participate in research will obtain, (...) this article shows that decontextualized discussions of this putative moral obligation are problematic. (shrink)

Like many trained in philosophy, we greatly value the work of those scholars with the courage to espouse contrarian views, particularly when the ideas in dispute lie at the very heart of entrenched...

Despite the prominence of healthcare-relatedconcerns in public debate, the ground remainsinfertile for the idea of conscripting citizensinto medical research. Reluctance to entertainthe thought of a system where nearly everyonecould be selected for service might reflectuncertainty about what the project wouldinvolve. There might also be a fear that themore crucial issue is how to protect researchsubjects within current, voluntary systems. Nodoubt reluctance to explore a system ofuniversal service results from the common hopethat each of us might avoid research in anycapacity besides (...) researcher. A system of fullcivic participation might, however, avoid manyof the usual objections. Ethics regulations,including informed-consent guidelines, couldfor the most part remain in force. Though thesystem would compel people to serve, it couldremain responsive to principles of autonomy andjustice if it centered on broad publiceducation, community representation, and alottery-type selection process. The systemcould draw from the largest possiblecross-section of society, and offer conscriptsthe widest possible range of service. In thisway, a compulsory system might reconcile theexpectations about healthcare with researchneeds. (shrink)

Patients participating in the shared benefits of publicly funded health care enjoy the benefits of treatments tested on previous patients. Future patients similarly depend on treatments tested on present patients. Since properly designed research assumes that the treatments being studied are—so far as is known at the outset—equivalent in therapeutic value, no one is clinically disadvantaged merely by taking part in research, provided the research involves administering active treatments to all participants. This paper argues that, because no other practical or (...) moral considerations count decisively against so doing, we could and should oblige patients to agree to receive indicated treatment within the terms of any concurrent research protocols. This ensures their treatment will benefit not only themselves but also future patients through contributing to new knowledge. By analogy with the paying of income tax, patients should not be allowed to “veto” their social responsibility to take part in clinical research. (shrink)

‘Supererogation’ is the notion of going beyond the call of duty. The concept of supererogation has received scrutiny in ethical theory, as well as clinical bioethics. Yet, there has been little attention paid to supererogation in research ethics. Supererogation is examined in this paper from three perspectives: (1) a summary of two analyses of ‘supererogation’ in moral theory, as well as an examination as to whether acts of supererogation exist; (2) a discussion of supererogation in clinical practice, including arguments that (...) both physicians and patients can practice acts of supererogation; (3) a discussion as to why researchers, qua researchers, are not routinely recognized to perform acts of supererogation, while at the same time the very nature of research subject participation involves supererogation. The article concludes by considering three examples of supererogation on the part of researchers, with a plea that researchers’ supererogatory actions be recognized as such. (shrink)