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  1. Functional relations of disconnected hemispheres with the brain stem, and with each other: monkey and man.Colwyn Trevarthen - 1974 - In Marcel Kinsbourne & Wallace Lynn Smith (eds.), Hemispheric Disconnection and Cerebral Function. Charles C. pp. 187--207.
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  • Attention and consciousness: two distinct brain processes.Christof Koch & Naotsugu Tsuchiya - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (1):16-22.
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  • The unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (6):277-300.
    According to conventional wisdom, the split-brain syndrome puts paid to the thesis that consciousness is necessarily unified. The aim of this paper is to challenge that view. I argue both that disunity models of the split-brain are highly problematic, and that there is much to recommend a model of the split-brain—the switch model—according to which split-brain patients retain a fully unified consciousness at all times. Although the task of examining the unity of consciousness through the lens of the split-brain syndrome (...)
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  • The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach.Christof Koch - 2004 - Roberts & Company.
    In "The Quest for Consciousness," Caltech neuroscientist Christof Koch explores the biological basis of consciousness.
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  • Forebrain commissurotomy and conscious awareness.Roger W. Sperry - 1977 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2 (June):101-26.
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  • Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework.Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):1-37.
    This introductory chapter attempts to clarify the philosophical, empirical, and theoretical bases on which a cognitive neuroscience approach to consciousness can be founded. We isolate three major empirical observations that any theory of consciousness should incorporate, namely (1) a considerable amount of processing is possible without consciousness, (2) attention is a prerequisite of consciousness, and (3) consciousness is required for some specific cognitive tasks, including those that require durable information maintenance, novel combinations of operations, or the spontaneous generation of intentional (...)
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  • (2 other versions)On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  • Unity and objectivity.Susan L. Hurley - 1996 - In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. British Academy. pp. 49--77.
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  • Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity.Michael Tye - 2003 - MIT Press.
    In Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity, Michael Tye takes on the thorny issue of the unity of consciousness and answers these important questions: What exactly is the unity of consciousness? Can a single person have a divided consciousness? What is a single person? Tye argues that unity is a fundamental part of human consciousness -- something so basic to everyday experience that it is easy to overlook. For example, when we hear the sound of waves crashing on a beach (...)
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  • Consciousness in Action.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    In this important book, Susan Hurley sheds new light on consciousness by examining its relationships to action from various angles. She assesses the role of agency in the unity of a conscious perspective, and argues that perception and action are more deeply interdependent than we usually assume. A standard view conceives perception as input from world to mind and action as output from mind to world, with the serious business of thought in between. Hurley criticizes this picture, and considers how (...)
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  • In the theatre of consciousness: Global workspace theory, a rigorous scientific theory of consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4):292-309.
    Can we make progress exploring consciousness? Or is it forever beyond human reach? In science we never know the ultimate outcome of the journey. We can only take whatever steps our current knowledge affords. This paper explores today's evidence from the viewpoint of Global Workspace theory. First, we ask what kind of evidence has the most direct bearing on the question. The answer given here is ‘contrastive analysis’ -- a set of paired comparisons between similar conscious and unconscious processes. This (...)
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  • Inattentional Blindness.Arien Mack & Irvin Rock - 1998 - MIT Press. Edited by Richard D. Wright.
    Arien Mack and Irvin Rock make the radical claim that there is no conscious perception of the visual world without attention to it.
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  • Toward a neurobiological theory of consciousness.Francis Crick & Christof Koch - 1990 - Seminars in the Neurosciences 2:263-275.
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  • Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness.Thomas Nagel - 1971 - Synthese 22 (3-4):396-413.
    There has been considerable optimism recently, among philosophers and neuroscientists, concerning the prospect for major discoveries about the neurophysiological basis of mind. The support for this optimism has been extremely abstract and general. I wish to present some grounds ..
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  • Mind, Brain and the Quantum: The Compound "I".Michael Lockwood - 1989 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
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  • The case for mental duality: Evidence from split-brain data and other considerations.Roland Puccetti - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (1):93-123.
    Contrary to received opinion among philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, conscious duality as a principle of brain organization is neither incoherent nor demonstrably false. The present paper begins by reviewing the history of the theory and its anatomical basis and defending it against the claim that it rests upon an arbitrary decision as to what constitutes the biological substratum of mind or person.
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  • Manifestations and implications of shifting hemi-inattention in commissurotomy patients.J. Levy - 1977 - Advances in Neurology 18:83-92.
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  • Consciousness and persons: Unity and identity, Michael Tye. Cambridge, ma, and London, uk.Eric T. Olson - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):500–503.
    There is much to admire in this book. It is written in a pleasingly straightforward style, and offers insight on a wide range of important issues.
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  • (1 other version)Consciousness, mind, self: The implications of the split-brain studies.Larry W. Dewitt - 1976 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):41-47.
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  • Conflicting communication in a split-brain patient: Support for dual consciousness.V. Mark - 1996 - In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & Alwyn Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness: The First Tucson Discussions and Debates. MIT Press. pp. 189--196.
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  • Are we explaining consciousness yet?Daniel C. Dennett - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):221-37.
    Theorists are converging from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, but there are residual confusions to be dissolved. In particular, theorists must resist the temptation to see global accessibility as the cause of consciousness (as if consciousness were some other, further condition); rather, it is consciousness. A useful metaphor for keeping this elusive idea in focus is that consciousness is rather like fame in the brain. It is not a privileged medium of (...)
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  • Neural events and perceptual awareness.Nancy Kanwisher - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):89-113.
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  • A neurofunctional theory of visual consciousness.Jesse Prinz - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):243-59.
    This paper develops an empirically motivated theory of visual consciousness. It begins by outlining neuropsychological support for Jackendoff's (1987) hypothesis that visual consciousness involves mental representations at an intermediate level of processing. It then supplements that hypothesis with the further requirement that attention, which can come under the direction of high level representations, is also necessary for consciousness. The resulting theory is shown to have a number of philosophical consequences. If correct, higher-order thought accounts, the multiple drafts account, and the (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Availability: The cognitive basis of experience?David J. Chalmers - 2001 - In Mark Rowlands (ed.), The Nature of Consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 148-149.
    [[This was written as a commentary on Ned Block 's paper "On A Confusion about a Function of Consciousness" . It appeared in _Behavioral_ _and Brain Sciences_ 20:148-9, 1997, and also in the collection _The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates_ edited by Block, Flanagan, and Guzeldere. ]].
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  • Attention versus consciousness: A distinction with a difference.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2003 - In Naoyuki Osaka (ed.), Neural Basis of Consciousness. John Benjamins. pp. 105.
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