Both in his pre-critical writings and in his critical works, Kant criticizes the Wolffian tradition for its use of the mathematical method in philosophy. The chapter argues that the apparent unambiguousness of this opposition between Kant and Wolff notwithstanding, the problem of ascertaining the relationship between Kant’s and Wolff’s methods in philosophy cannot be dismissed so quickly. Only a close consideration of Kant’s different remarks on Wolff’s approach and a comparison of the methods that Wolff and Kant actually used in (...) philosophy can allow us to determine when Kant’s criticisms are justified and where the differences in their methodological proposals for philosophy actually lie. We see that Kant’s account of philosophical method in fact has some elements in common with the Wolffian paradigm, even though there are also relevant differences. (shrink)

In this paper the possibility of comparing some speculative positions of Leibniz and Wolff concerning Logic and Theory of Knowledge is considered on the basis of a reading of the Deutsche Logik especially as it refers to Leibniz. The affinities and above all the diversities of the conclusion, to which the two philosophers come, emerge from this reading. Theoretical presuppositions, such as the reduction of the critical exigency to Wolff's method or the method of analysis in Leibniz, are to be (...) seen against Cartesian teaching. While undeniably ignoring the most original acquisitions of Leibniz' Logik and Theory of Knowledge, from the symbolic assumption to implicit thoughts, and under the influence of English empiricism, Wolff elaborates a complex notion of experience which aims at its own autonomous validity. (shrink)