Many modern commentators on inertial phenomena hold (or just assume) that there is no "problem of inertia", on the grounds that either (a) no explanation is needed for such phenomena or (b) the explanation is already at hand. My purpose here is to comment on both views, defending the thesis that the problem is real and still unsolved.

Quantum theory is our deepest theory of the nature of matter. It is a theory that, notoriously, produces results which challenge the laws of classical logic and suggests that the physical world is illogical. This book gives a critical review of work on the foundations of quantum mechanics at a level accessible to non-experts. Assuming his readers have some background in mathematics and physics, Peter Gibbins focuses on the questions of whether the results of quantum theory require us to abandon (...) classical logic and whether quantum logic can resolve the paradoxes produced by quantum mechanics. He argues that quantum logic does not dispose of the problems faced by classical logic, that no reasonable interpretation of quantum mechanics in terms of 'hidden variables' can be found, and that after all these years quantum mechanics remains a mystery to us. Particles and Paradoxes provides a much-needed and valuable introduction to the philosophy of quantum mechanics and, at the same time, an example of just what it is to do the philosophy of physics. (shrink)

I argue that to the extent to which philosophical theories of objective probability have offered theoretically adequate conceptions of objective probability , they have failed to satisfy a methodological standard -- roughly, a requirement to the effect that the conception offered be specified with the precision appropriate for a physical interpretation of an abstract formal calculus and be fully explicated in terms of concepts, objects or phenomena understood independently of the idea of physical probability. The significance of this, and of (...) the suggested methodological standard, is then briefly discussed. (shrink)

This paper pursues the question, To what extent does the propensity approach to probability contribute to plausible solutions to various anomalies which occur in quantum mechanics? The position I shall defend is that of the three interpretations — the frequency, the subjective, and the propensity — only the third accommodates the possibility, in principle, of providing a realistic interpretation of ontic indeterminism. If these considerations are correct, then they lend support to Popper's contention that the propensity construction tends to remove (...) (at least some of) the mystery from quantum phenomena. (shrink)

I argue that to the extent to which philosophical theories of objective probability have offered theoretically adequateconceptions of objective probability (in connection with such desiderata as causal and explanatory significance, applicability to single cases, etc.), they have failed to satisfy amethodological standard — roughly, a requirement to the effect that the conception offered be specified with the precision appropriate for a physical interpretation of an abstract formal calculus and be fully explicated in terms of concepts, objects or phenomena understood independently (...) of the idea of physical probability. The significance of this, and of the suggested methodological standard, is then briefly discussed. (shrink)