In "What is it Like to be a Bat?" Thomas Nagel argues that we cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat or presently understand how physicalism might be true. Both arguments have been seriously misunderstood. I defend them against various objections, point out a problem with the argument against physicalism, and show how the problem can be solved.

In “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Thomas Nagel argues that we cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat or presently understand how physicalism might be true. Both arguments have been seriously misunderstood. I defend them against various objections, point out a problem with the argument against physicalism, and show how the problem can be solved.

There is general acknowledgement that both the anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex are implicated in reinforcement-guided decision making, and emotion and social behaviour. Despite the interest that these areas generate in both the cognitive neuroscience laboratory and the psychiatric clinic, ideas about the distinctive contributions made by each have only recently begun to emerge. This reflects an increasing understanding of the component processes that underlie reinforcement- guided decision making, such as the representation of reinforcement expectations, the exploration, updating and representation (...) of action values, and the appreciation that choices are guided not just by the prospect of reward but also by the costs that action entails. Evidence is emerging to suggest that the anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex make distinct contributions to each of these aspects of decision making. (shrink)

When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches _vehicle_ and _process_ theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space (...) for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are _dissociable_, and on the other, by the _classical_ computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of _connectionism; _and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: _phenomenal experience consists in the explicit_ _representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks_.. (shrink)

...the problem of...how cognition...is possible at all...can never be answered on the basis of a prior knowledge of the transcendent [i.e. the external, spatio-temporal, empirical]...no matter whence the knowledge or the judgments are borrowed, not even if they are taken from the exact sciences.... It will not do to draw conclusions from existences of which one knows but which one cannot "see". "Seeing" does not lend itself to demonstration or deduction. [Husserl 1964a, pp. 2-3].

Linking the process of rational decision making to emotions, an award-winning scientist who has done extensive research with brain-damaged patients notes the dependence of thought processes on feelings and the body's survival-oriented regulators. 50,000 first printing.

Milner and Goodale's model of the primate cortical visual system has been justly influential in shaping recent empirical and theoretical work on the neural basis of conscious vision. In this commentary I examine the extent to which their model accounts for recent neuropsychological findings from patients with visual neglect and extinction, two profound disorders of visual consciousness that arise after unilateral brain damage. I begin by outlining two key claims from their model: first, that the characteristic loss of awareness for (...) contralesional sensory inputs in neglect reflects disruption of ventral, object-recognition processes, rather than dorsal processes as has commonly been thought; and second, that extinction of the more contralesional of two concurrent stimulus events is primarily a disorder of orienting and action-related attention arising from damage to the dorsal, visuomotor stream. I then present recent findings that cast some doubt on these claims. Visual neglect arising from damage to the inferior parietal lobe can involve a significant visuomotor impairment, independent of any perceptual deficit. Moreover, visual extinction can be modulated by perceptual factors that are likely to call upon the ventral object-recognition stream. These findings suggest that neglect and extinction, two relatively common and striking disorders of consciousness, are not readily accommodated within Milner and Goodale's two visual streams model. (shrink)

Reading the philosophical literature on consciousness, one might get the idea that there is just one problem in consciousness studies, the hard problem. That would be a mistake. There are other problems; some are more tractable, but none are easy, and all interesting. The literature on the hard problem gives the impression that we have made little progress. Consciousness is just an excuse to work and re-work familiar positions on the mind-body problem. But progress is being made elsewhere. Researchers are (...) moving towards increasingly specific accounts of the neural basis of conscious experience. These efforts will leave some questions unanswered, but they are no less significant for that. (shrink)

Consciousness has resisted scientific explanation for centuries. The main problem in explaining consciousness is its subjectivity. Subjective systems may be adaptive. Humans can produce voluntary new or novel intentional (adaptive) action and such action is always accompanied by consciousness. Action normally arises from perception. Perception must be rerepresented in order to produce new or novel adaptive action. The internal explicit states produced by a widespread nonlinear emergent mechanism from perception have all the same properties as consciousness. Hence they may be (...) identical to consciousness. Consciousness is natural, material, and functional; utilized in the production of adaptive action. (shrink)

The study of preconscious versus conscious processing has an extensive history in cognitive psychology, dating back to the writings of William James. Much of the experimental work on this issue has focused on perception, conceived of as input analysis, and on the relation of consciousness to attentional processing. The present paper examines when input analysis becomes conscious from the perspectives of cognitive modelling, methodology, and a more detailed understanding of what is meant by "conscious processing." Current evidence suggests that perception (...) becomes conscious at a late-arising stage of focal-attentive processing concerned with information integration and dissemination. Reliable criteria for determining when perception becomes conscious combine the evidence of "first-person," phenomenological reports with "third-person" functional dissociations between preconscious and conscious processing. There are three, distinct senses in which a process may be said to be "conscious." It might be "conscious" (a) in the sense that one is conscious of the process, (b) in the sense that the operation of the process is accompanied by consciousness (of its results) and (c) in the sense that consciousness enters into or causally influences the process. Consciousness of familiar stimuli, rather than entering into input analysis, appears to follow it, in human information processing. Processes closely associated with the appearance of consciousness such as information integration and dissemination appear to operate unconsciously. Consequently, perception appears to be "conscious" only in sense (b). (shrink)

In this chapter we want to provide philosophical tools for understanding and reasoning about complex systems. Classical thinking, which is taught at most schools and universities, has several problems for coping with complexity. We review classical thinking and its drawbacks when dealing with complexity, for then presenting ways of thinking which allow the better understanding of complex systems. Examples illustrate the ideas presented. This chapter does not deal with specific tools and techniques for managing complex systems, but we try to (...) bring forth ideas that facilitate the thinking and speaking about complex systems. (shrink)

Most recent discussions of phenomenal consciousness are predicated on two deeply entrenched assumptions. The first is objectualism, the claim that what it is like to undergo an experience is something of which we are or can be aware in the having of that experience. The second is internalism, the claim that what it is like to undergo an experience is constituted by states, events and processes that are located inside the skins of experiencing subjects. This paper argues that both assumptions (...) should be rejected. What it is like to undergo an experience is not an object of consciousness but something that exists in the directing of consciousness towards objects. What it is like to undergo an experience is not something of which we are aware, but something in virtue of which we are aware. And there is little reason for supposing that the directing of consciousness towards its objects is something that occurs exclusively inside the skins of experiencing subjects. On the contrary, directing of consciousness towards its objects is often extended, involving acts of worldly probing and exploration. (shrink)