For some time now I have been arguing that Fichte's theory can be read as circular, antifoundationalist, and systematic, and further arguing that it is the source of an epistemological revolution in philosophy. Fichte and most of his interpreters mainly see him as carrying forward the critical philosophy. But I see him as breaking with it in crucial ways in a profoundly innovative theory. The aim of this paper is to pull together aspects of this argument in a single place (...) in order to describe Fichte's theory as I see it, using a wider range of texts than I have so far employed, drawing consequences that follow from my interpretation and responding to recent criticism of it. In so doing, I intend to reaffirm my conviction that the interest of Fichte's theory is not merely archival, something historians of philosophy are interested in because they cannot do philosophy, or something that philosophers might concern themselves with when they are not concerned with philosophy, but directly relevant to the contemporary discussion. But as I see it, the contemporary relevance of the Fichtean view largely depends on an unorthodox, anti-foundationalist reading of it. For if it is read in an orthodox, Cartesian, foundationalist manner, favored by most writers on Fichte, it has nothing or almost nothing to contribute to our increasingly anti-foundationalist debate on knowledge. (shrink)

Weyl's inclination toward constructivism in the foundations of mathematics runs through his entire career, starting with Das Kontinuum. Why was Weyl inclined toward constructivism? I argue that Weyl's general views on foundations were shaped by a type of transcendental idealism in which it is held that mathematical knowledge must be founded on intuition. Kant and Fichte had an impact on Weyl but HusserFs transcendental idealism was even more influential. I discuss Weyl's views on vicious circularity, existence claims, meaning, the continuum (...) and choice sequences, and the intuitive-symbolic distinction against the background of his transcendental idealism and general intuitionism. (shrink)

Der weit gereiste Henrik Steffens schildert im vierten Band seiner zehnbändigen Autobiographie Was ich erlebte eine Begegnung mit Fichte gegen Ende des Jahres 1793.