- Mind, Value, and Reality.John Mcdowell - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):242-249.details
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Ceteris Paribus Lost.John Earman, John T. Roberts & Sheldon Smith - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (3):281-301.details
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Mind, Reason and Imagination: Selected Essays in Philosophy of Mind and Language.Jane Heal - 2003 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Essays on Actions and Events: Philosophical Essays Volume 1.Donald Davidson - 1970 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.details
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Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays.Jaegwon Kim - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):579-607.details
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Problems of rationality.Donald Davidson (ed.) - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Provisoes: A problem concerning the inferential function of scientific theories.Carl Gustav Hempel - 1988 - Erkenntnis 28 (2):147 - 164.details
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"Ceteris Paribus", There Is No Problem of Provisos.John Earman & John T. Roberts - 1999 - Synthese 118 (3):439 - 478.details
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(2 other versions)Where do laws of nature come from?Nancy Cartwright - 1997 - Dialectica 51 (1):65–78.details
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In Favor of Laws that Are Not C eteris Paribus After All.Nancy Cartwright - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (3):425Ð439.details
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When Other Things Aren’t Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity.Paul Pietroski & Georges Rey - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):81-110.details
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Folk psychology as simulation.Robert M. Gordon - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):158-71.details
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Interpretation psychologized.Alvin I. Goldman - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (3):161-85.details
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Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1996 - MIT Press.details
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Supervenience and mind: selected philosophical essays.Jaegwon Kim - 1993 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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Thinking causes.Donald Davidson - 1995 - In Pascal Engel (ed.), Mental causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 1993--3.details
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Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press. Edited by Margaret A. Boden.details
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Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Who's Afraid of Ceteris-Paribus Laws? Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Them.Marc Lange - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (3):407-423.details
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Reasons and the first person.Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 67--87.details
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(2 other versions)On the Very idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 1984 - In Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 183-198.details
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Natural laws and the problem of provisos.Marc Lange - 1993 - Erkenntnis 38 (2):233Ð248.details
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Ceteris paribus laws.Stephen Schiffer - 1991 - Mind 100 (397):1-17.details
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You can fool some of the people all of the time, everything else being equal: Hedged laws and psychological explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Mind 100 (397):19-34.details
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Anomalism, uncodifiability, and psychophysical relations.William Child - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (2):215-245.details
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There is No Such Thing as a Ceteris Paribus Law.James Woodward - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (3):303Ð328.details
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Explanation and invariance in the special sciences.James Woodward - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2):197-254.details
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(1 other version)Who’s Afraid of C eteris-Paribus Laws? Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Them.Marc Lange - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (3):407-423.details
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Can supervenience and "non-strict laws" save anomalous monism?Jaegwon Kim - 1995 - In Pascal Engel (ed.), Mental causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 19--26.details
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(1 other version)Vindicating Intentional Realism: A Review of Jerry Fodor's "Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind". [REVIEW]Frances Egan - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):59-61.details
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(2 other versions)Where Do Laws of Nature Come From?Nancy Cartwright - 1997 - Dialectica 51 (1):65-78.details
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(1 other version)Turing's Test.Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Who is Fooled.Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Philosophical Foundations of the Social Sciences: Analyzing Controversies in Social Research.Raimo Tuomela - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):1086-1090.details
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