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  1. (6 other versions)Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
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  • Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?D. M. Armstrong - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (4):417.
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  • Mr. Clark's Definition of 'Knowledge'.John Turk Saunders & Narayan Champawat - 1964 - Analysis 25 (1):8 - 9.
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  • Report on Analysis 'Problem' no. 19.Colin Radford - 1983 - Analysis 43 (3):113 - 115.
    If I am looking at myself in a mirror I am directly facing, do I see myself looking at myself? If so, do I also see myself looking at myself looking at myself – and so on?
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  • (4 other versions)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
    Edmund Gettier is Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. This short piece, published in 1963, seemed to many decisively to refute an otherwise attractive analysis of knowledge. It stimulated a renewed effort, still ongoing, to clarify exactly what knowledge comprises.
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  • Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
    This paper deals with the truth-Conditions and the logic for vague languages. The use of supervaluations and of classical logic is defended; and other approaches are criticized. The truth-Conditions are extended to a language that contains a definitely-Operator and that is subject to higher order vagueness.
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  • An unsolved puzzle about knowledge.Thomas Tymoczko - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (137):437-458.
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  • Conditional blindspots and the knowledge squeeze: A solution to the prediction paradox.Roy A. Sorensen - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):126 – 135.
    (1984). Conditional blindspots and the knowledge squeeze: A solution to the prediction paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 126-135.
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  • Knowing and telling.Colin Radford - 1969 - Philosophical Review 78 (3):326-336.
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  • Sexual perversion.Thomas Nagel - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (1):5-17.
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  • Common knowledge.Jane Heal - 1978 - Philosophical Quarterly 28 (111):116-131.
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  • Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions.H. Paul Grice - 1969 - Philosophical Review 78 (2):147-177.
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  • Excluders.Roland Hall - 1959 - Analysis 20 (1):1 - 7.
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  • Evidence one does not possess.William G. Lycan - 1977 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (2):114 – 126.
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  • The sorites paradox.James Cargile - 1969 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (3):193-202.
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  • Reasoning and Evidence One Does Not Possess1.Gilbert Harman - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):163-182.
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  • Is there a good argument against the incorrigibility thesis?Frank Jackson - 1973 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):51-62.
    "the incorrigibility thesis", The thesis that it is logically impossible to be mistaken about such things as whether I am now in pain or am seeing or seeming to see something red, Is very widely supposed to be false. I consider the arguments designed to show this, And argue that they all fail.
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  • Truth, belief, and vagueness.Kenton F. Machina - 1976 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (1):47-78.
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  • Infinity and vagueness.David H. Sanford - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (4):520-535.
    Many philosophic arguments concerned with infinite series depend on the mutual inconsistency of statements of the following five forms: (1) something exists which has R to something; (2) R is asymmetric; (3) R is transitive; (4) for any x which has R to something, there is something which has R to x; (5) only finitely many things are related by R. Such arguments are suspect if the two-place relation R in question involves any conceptual vagueness or inexactness. Traditional sorites arguments (...)
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  • Mr. Clark's definition of 'knowledge'.John Turk Saunders & Alonso Church - 1964 - Analysis 25 (1):8.
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  • Skepticism and universalizability.Jonathan E. Adler - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (3):143-156.
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  • Analysing" `know(s) that.Colin Radford - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 20 (80):222-229.
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  • (3 other versions)Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1974 - Philosophy 50 (194):483-485.
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