They are correct that punctuated equilibria apply to sexually reproducing organisms and that morphological evolutionary change is regarded as largely (if not exclusively) correlated with speciation events. However, they err in suggesting that we attribute stasis strictly to "developmental constraints," which represent only one of a set of possible mechanisms that we have suggested for the causes of stasis. Others include habitat tracking and the internal structure of species themselves [for example, (2)].

The present edition provides a detailed and accessible discussion ofhis theories and adds an account of the immediate responses to the book on publication.

Biologists and philosophers have long recognized the importance of species, yet species concepts serve two masters, evolutionary theory on the one hand and taxonomy on the other. Much of present-day evolutionary and systematic biology has confounded these two roles primarily through use of the biological species concept. Theories require entities that are real, discrete, irreducible, and comparable. Within the neo-Darwinian synthesis, however, biological species have been treated as real or subjectively delimited entities, discrete or nondiscrete, and they are often capable (...) of being decomposed into other, smaller units. Because of this, biological species are generally not comparable across different groups of organisms, which implies that the ontological structure of evolutionary theory requires modification. Some biologists, including proponents of the biological species concept, have argued that no species concept is universally applicable across all organisms. Such a view means, however, that the history of life cannot be embraced by a common theory of ancestry and descent if that theory uses species as its entities.These ontological and biological difficulties can be alleviated if species are defined in terms of evolutionary units. The latter are irreducible clusters of reproductively cohesive organisms that are diagnosably distinct from other such clusters. Unlike biological species, which can include two or more evolutionary units, these phylogenetic species are discrete entities in space and time and capable of being compared from one group to the next. (shrink)

Ernst Mayr''s scientific career continues strongly 70 years after he published his first scientific paper in 1923. He is primarily a naturalist and ornithologist which has influenced his basic approach in science and later in philosophy and history of science. Mayr studied at the Natural History Museum in Berlin with Professor E. Stresemann, a leader in the most progressive school of avian systematics of the time. The contracts gained through Stresemann were central to Mayr''s participation in a three year expedition (...) to New Guinea and The Solomons, and the offer of a position in the Department of Ornithology, American Museum of Natural History, beginning in 1931. At the AMNH, Mayr was able to blend the best of the academic traditions of Europe with those of North America in developing a unified research program in biodiversity embracing systematics, biogeography and nomenclature. His tasks at the AMNH were to curate and study the huge collections amassed by the Whitney South Sea Expedition plus the just purchased Rothschild collection of birds. These studies provided Mayr with the empirical foundation essential for his 1942Systematics and the Origin of Species and his subsequent theoretical work in evolutionary biology as well as all his later work in the philosophy and history of science. Without a detailed understanding of Mayr''s empirical systematic and biogeographic work, one cannot possibly comprehend fully his immense contributions to evolutionary biology and his later analyses in the philosophy and history of science. (shrink)

Attempts to indentify the fundamental concepts of language, argues that the study of language reveals hidden facts about the mind, and looks at the impact of propaganda.

For more than six decades, and for thousands of students, Introduction to Logic has been the gold standard in introductory logic texts. In this 15th Edition, Carl Cohen and Victor Rodych update Irving M. Copi's classic text, improving on its many strengths and introducing new and helpful material that will greatly assist both students and instructors.

I defend a view of the species category, pluralistic realism, which is designed to do justice to the insights of many different groups of systematists. After arguing that species are sets and not individuals, I proceed to outline briefly some defects of the biological species concept. I draw the general moral that similar shortcomings arise for other popular views of the nature of species. These shortcomings arise because the legitimate interests of biology are diverse, and these diverse interests are reflected (...) in different legitimate approaches to the classification of organisms. In the final section, I show briefly how the pluralistic approach can help to illuminate some areas of biological and philosophical dispute. (shrink)

Introduction to Logic is a proven textbook that has been honed through the collaborative efforts of many scholars over the last five decades. Its scrupulous attention to detail and precision in exposition and explanation is matched by the greatest accuracy in all associated detail. In addition, it continues to capture student interest through its personalized human setting and current examples. The 14th Edition of Introduction to Logic, written by Copi, Cohen & McMahon, is dedicated to the many thousands of students (...) and their teachers - at hundreds of universities in the United States and around the world - who have used its fundamental methods and techniques of correct reasoning in their everyday lives. (shrink)

The cladistic species concept proposed by Ridley (1989) rests on an undefined notion of speciation and its meaning is thus indeterminate. If the cladistic concept is made determinate through the definition of speciation, then it reduces to a form of whatever species concept is implicit in the definition of speciation and fails to be a truly alternative species concept. The cladistic formalism advocated by Ridley is designed to ensure that species are monophyletic, that they are objectively real entities, and that (...) they are individuals. It is argued that species need not be monophyletic in order to be real entities, and that ancestor-descendant relations are not the only relations that confer individuality on entities. The species problem is recast in terms of a futile quest for a definition of that single kind of entity to which the term species should uniquely apply. (shrink)

In theOrigin of Species, Charles Darwin (1809–82) briefly drew an analogy between languages and species, suggesting that the genealogical relationships between languages provide a model for discussing the descent and modification of species. Further, he suggested that just as languages often contain some vestige of earlier speech, for example silent, unpronounced letters, so the rudimentary organs of animals can provide clues about genealogy and descent.

Gayon's recent claim that Buffon developed a concept of species as physical individuals is critically examined and rejected. Also critically examined and rejected is Gayon's more central thesis that as a consequence of his analysis of Buffon's species concept, and also of Darwin's species concept, it is clear that modern evolutionary theory does not require species to be physical individuals. While I agree with Gayon's conclusion that modern evolutionary theory does not require species to be physical individuals, I disagree with (...) his reasons and instead provide logical rather than historical reasons for the same conclusion. (shrink)

The correct explanation of why species, in evolutionary theory, are individuals and not classes is the cladistic species concept. The cladistic species concept defines species as the group of organisms between two speciation events, or between one speciation event and one extinction event, or (for living species) that are descended from a speciation event. It is a theoretical concept, and therefore has the virtue of distinguishing clearly the theoretical nature of species from the practical criteria by which species may be (...) recognized at any one time. Ecological or biological (reproductive) criteria may help in the practical recognition of species. Ecological and biological species concepts are also needed to explain why cladistic species exist as distinct lineages, and to explain what exactly takes place during a speciation event. The ecological and biological species concepts work only as sub-theories of the cladistic species concept and if taken by themselves independently of cladism they are liable to blunder. The biological species concept neither provides a better explanation of species indivudualism than the ecological species concept, nor, taken by itself, can the biological species concept even be reconciled with species individualism. Taking the individuality of species seriously requires subordinating the biological, to the cladistic, species concept. (shrink)

With his customary incisiveness, W. V. Quine presents logic as the product of two factors, truth and grammar-but argues against the doctrine that the logical truths are true because of grammar or language. Rather, in presenting a general theory of grammar and discussing the boundaries and possible extensions of logic, Quine argues that logic is not a mere matter of words.

The concept of individuality as applied to species, an important advance in the philosophy of evolutionary biology, is nevertheless in need of refinement. Four important subparts of this concept must be recognized: spatial boundaries, temporal boundaries, integration, and cohesion. Not all species necessarily meet all of these. Two very different types of pluralism have been advocated with respect to species, only one of which is satisfactory. An often unrecognized distinction between grouping and ranking components of any species concept is necessary. (...) A phylogenetic species concept is advocated that uses a grouping criterion of monophyly in a cladistic sense, and a ranking criterion based on those causal processes that are most important in producing and maintaining lineages in a particular case. Such causal processes can include actual interbreeding, selective constraints, and developmental canalization. The widespread use of the biological species concept is flawed for two reasons: because of a failure to distinguish grouping from ranking criteria and because of an unwarranted emphasis on the importance of interbreeding as a universal causal factor controlling evolutionary diversification. The potential to interbreed is not in itself a process; it is instead a result of a diversity of processes which result in shared selective environments and common developmental programs. These types of processes act in both sexual and asexual organisms, thus the phylogenetic species concept can reflect an underlying unity that the biological species concept can not. (shrink)

The species category is defined as thesmallest historical individual within which there is a parental pattern of ancestry and descent. The use of historical individual in this definition is consistent with the prevailing notion that speciesper se are not involved in processes — they are effects, not effectors. Reproductive isolation distinguishes biparental historical species from their parts, and it provides a basis for understanding the nature of the evidence used to discover historical individuals.

I defend a view of the species category, pluralistic realism, which is designed to do justice to the insights of many different groups of systematists. After arguing that species are sets and not individuals, I proceed to outline briefly some defects of the biological species concept. I draw the general moral that similar shortcomings arise for other popular views of the nature of species. These shortcomings arise because the legitimate interests of biology are diverse, and these diverse interests are reflected (...) in different legitimate approaches to the classification of organisms. In the final section, I show briefly how the pluralistic approach can help to illuminate some areas of biological and philosophical dispute. (shrink)

Biological species have been treated traditionally as spatiotemporally unrestricted classes. If they are to perform the function which they do in the evolutionary process, they must be spatiotemporally localized individuals, historical entities. Reinterpreting biological species as historical entities solves several important anomalies in biology, in philosophy of biology, and within philosophy itself. It also has important implications for any attempt to present an "evolutionary" analysis of science and for sciences such as anthropology which are devoted to the study of single (...) species. (shrink)

I adopt a cladistic view of species, and explore the possibility that there exists an equally valuable cladistic view of organismic traits. This suggestion seems to run counter to the stress on functional views of biological traits in recent work in philosophy and psychology. I show how the tension between these two views can be defused with a multilevel view of biological explanation. Despite the attractions of this compromise, I conclude that we must reject it, and adopt an essentially cladistic (...) conception of biological traits. (shrink)

This paper takes up the cause of species pluralism. An argument for species pluralism is provided and standard monist objections to pluralism are answered. A new form of species pluralism is developed and shown to be an improvement over previous forms. This paper also offers a general foundation on which to base a pluralistic approach to biological classification.

A coherent treatment of the flow of ideas throughout Darwin's works, this volume presents a unified theoretical system that explains Darwin's investigations, evaluating the literature from a historical, scientific, and philosophical perspective.

Part I: History 1. Origins: A Brief History of Research on Speciation, Stewart H. Berlocher Part II: Species Concepts 2. Linking Evolutionary Pattern and Process: The Relevance of Species Concepts for the Study of Speciation, Richard G. Harrison 3. Species and Speciation: Geography, Population Structure, Ecology, and Gene Trees, Alan R. Templeton 4. Species and the Diversity of Natural Groups, Kerry L. Shaw 5. The General Lineage Concept of Species, Species Criteria, and the Process of Speciation: A Conceptual Unification and (...) Terminological Recommendations, Kevin de Queiroz Part III: Geography, Ecology, and Population Structure 6. Theory and Models of Sympatric Speciation, Paul A. Johnson and Urban Gullberg 7. On the Sympatric Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, Alexey S. Kondrashov, Lev Yu. Yampolsky, and Svetlana A. Shabalina 8. Can Symatric Speciation via Host of Habitat Shift be Proven from Phylogenetic and Biogeographic Evidence?, Steward H. Berlocher 9. Ecological Causes of Speciation, Dolph Schluter 10. The Apple Maggot Fly, Rhagoletis Pomonella: Flies in the Face of Conventional Wisdom about Speciation, Jeffrey L. Feder 11. Evolution of Insect-Plant Associations: Sensory Perception and Receptor Modifications Direct Food Specialization and Host Shifts in Phytophagous Insects, Steph B. J. Menkin and P. Roessignh 12. The Evolution of Edaphic Endemics, Mark R. Macnair and Mike Gardner 13. The Relative Rate of Sympatric and Allopatric Speciation in Fishes: Tests Using DNA Sequence Divergence between Sister Species and among Clades, Amy R. McCune and Nathan R. Lovejoy 14. The First Stage of Speciation as Seen in Organisms Separated by the Isthmus of Panama, H.A. Lessios 15. Rivers, Refuges, and Ridges: The Geography of Speciation of Amazonian Mammals, James L. Patton and Maria Nazareth F. da Silva Part IV: Reproductive Barriers 16. Songs, Preproductive Isolation, and Speciation in Cryptic Species of Insects: A Case Study Using Green Lacewings, Marta Martinez Wells and Charles S. Henry 17. Reproductive Isolation in Sonoran Desert Drosophila: Testing the Limits of the Rules, Therese Ann Markow and Gregory D. Hocutt 18. Wolbachia and Speciation, John H. Werren 19. Intergenomic Conflict, Interlocus Antagonistic Coevolution, and he Evolution of Reproductive Isolation, William R. Rice 20. Species Formation and the Evolution of Gamete Recognition Loci, Stephen R. Palumbi 21. The Evolution of Barriers to Fertilization Between Closely Related Organisms, Daniel J. Howard, Marta Reece, Pamela G. Gregory, Jiming Chu, Michael L. Cain Part V: The Genetics of Speciation 22. The Genetics of Sexual Isolation, Michael G. Ritchie and Stephen D. F. Phillips 23. Sex Linkage and Speciation in Lepidoptera, Dorothy Pashley Prowell 24. The Role of Chromosomal Change in Speciation, Franco Spirito 25. The Genetics of Hybrid Male Sterility in Drosophila, Horacio Fachal Naveira and Xulio Rodriguez Maside 26. Subtle is Nature: The Genetics of Species Differentiation and Speciation, Chung-I Wu and Hope Hollocher 27. The Genetics of Speciation: Promises and Prospects of Quantitative Trait Locus Mapping, Sara Via and David J. Hawthorne Part VI: Hybrid Zones and Speciation 28. What Do Hybrid Zones in General, and the Chorthippus parallelus Zone in Particular, Tell Us about Speciation?, Roger Butlin 29. Paradigm Lost Natural Hubridization and Evolutionary Innovations, Machael L. Arnold and Simon K. Emms 30. Mimicry and Warning Color at the Boundary Between Races and Species, James Mallet, W. Owen McMillan, and Chris D. Jiggins 31. Hybridization and Speciation in Darwin’s Finches: The Role of Sexual Imprinting on a Culturally Transmitted Trait, B. Rosemary Grant and Peter R. Grant Part VII: Perspectives 32. The Conceptual Radicalization of an Evolutionary Biologist, Guy L. Bush 33. Unanswered Questions and Future Directions in the Study of Speciation, Daniel J. Howard. (shrink)

Historically, naturalists who propose theories of evolution, including Darwin and Wallace, have done so in order to explain the apparent relationship of natural classification. This book begins by exploring the intimate historical relationship between patterns of classification and patterns of phylogeny. It is a circular argument, however, to use the data for classification and the concept of homology as evidence for evolution, when evolution is the theory explaining the phenomenon of natural classification. Alec Panchen presents other evidence for evolution in (...) the form of a historically-based but rigorously logical argument. This is then followed by a history of methods of classification and phylogeny reconstruction including current mathematical and molecular techniques. The author makes the important claim that if the hierarchical pattern of classification is a real phenomenon, then biology is unique as a science in making taxonomic statements. This conclusion is reached by way of historical reviews of theories of evolutionary mechanism and the philosophy of science as applied to biology. (shrink)

In the Preface of Animal Species and Evolution (1963), I wrote that it was "an attempt to summarize and review critically what we know about the biology and genetics of animal species and their role in evolution." The result was a volume of XIV ...

Argues for the primacy of the phylogenetic system as the general reference system in biology. This book, first published in 1966, generated significant controversy and opened possibilities for evolutionary biology.

Supplemented by interviews with four of the major participants in the debate--Ray Jackendoff, George Lakoff, Paul Postal and John Robert Ross--this book shows that the paradigm which has dominated American linguistics for the last twenty...