Abstract I argue that the traditional problem of evil mislocates the problem which confronts the theist. The real problem arises not from the evil in the world, but from the non-perfection of the world. Given that a perfect God could create only a perfect world, and given that the world is not in fact perfect, I construct an argument for atheism. I show that the argument is not open to the objections which theists standardly bring against the traditional objection from (...) evil. (shrink)

"Lectures on Philosophical Theology is an indispensable addition to Kant's works in English.

‘Adams worlds’ are possible worlds that contain no creature whose life is not worth living or whose life is overall worse than in any other possible world in which it would have existed. Creating an Adams world involves no wrongdoing or unkindness towards creatures on the part of the creator. I argue that the notion of an Adams world is of little value in theodicy. Theists are not only committed to thinking that this world was created without wrongdoing or unkindness (...) but also must rule out the possibility that the world might have been better had God not existed. Nor is there much reason, independent of the availability of a satisfactory theodicy, for believing that the actual world is an Adams world. The need for a theodicy constructed along Leibnizian lines, incorporating the claim that this world is the best possible, is thus reinforced. (shrink)

Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder suggest that it is possible for an omnipotent being, Jove, to create randomly a world from a continuum of ever more perfect possible worlds. They then go on to argue that Jove could be characterized as morally unsurpassable despite creating a surpassable world. I raise a number of problems for the view that Jove could be characterized as morally unsurpassable when he creates (randomly or not) a surpassable world.

Imagine that there exists a good, essentially omniscient and omnipotent being named Jove, and that there exists nothing else. No possible being is more powerful or knowledgable. Out of his goodness, Jove decides to create. Since he is all-powerful, there is nothing but the bounds of possibility to prevent him from getting what he wants. Unfortunately, as he holds before his mind the host of worlds, Jove sees that for each there is a better one. Although he can create any (...) of them, he can't create the best of them because there is no best. Faced with this predicament, Jove first sorts the worlds according to certain criteria. For example, he puts on his left worlds in which some inhabitants live lives that aren't worth living and on his right worlds in which every inhabitant's life is worth living; he puts on his left worlds in which some horrors fail to serve an outweighing good and on his right worlds in which no horror fails to serve an outweighing good. (We encourage the reader to use her own criteria.) Then he orders the right hand worlds according to their goodness and assigns to each a positive natural number, the worst of the lot receiving '1', the second worst '2', and so on. Next, he creates a very intricate device that, at the push of a button, will randomly select a number and produce the corresponding world. Jove pushes the button; the device hums and whirs and, finally, its digital display reads '777': world no. 777 comes into being. (shrink)

‘Rival creator’ arguments suggest that God must have created the best of all possible worlds. These arguments are analyzed and evaluated, and Leibniz’s position defended.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz possessed one of history's great minds. The German philosopher, mathematician, and logician invented calculus. His metaphysics bequeathed a set of problems and approaches that drove the course of Western philosophy, from Kant's eighteenth century until the present day. For over fifty years, the study of Leibniz has been a consistent passion for distinguished philosopher Nicholas Rescher. _On Leibniz_ offers eleven of his essays, written with signature clarity, exploring the aspects of Leibniz's work and life that still resonate (...) in the discipline of philosophy. Rescher's essays are snapshots of Leibniz, lucidly drawn case studies that explain the fundamentals of his ontology: the theory of possible worlds, the world's contingency, space-time frameworks, and intermonadic relationships. Several illuminating pieces reveal Leibniz as a substantial contributor to theories of knowledge. Discussions of his epistemology and methodology, its relationship to John Maynard Keynes and Talmudic scholarship, broaden the traditional view of Leibniz as a uniquely metaphysical thinker. Rescher also explores, in four absorbing biographical essays, Leibniz's scholarly development and professional career in historical context. As a "philosopher courtier" to the Hanoverian court, Leibniz was associated with the leading intellectuals and politicians of his era, including Spinoza, Huygens, Newton, Queen Sophie Charlotte, and Czar Peter the Great. A concluding essay holds up Leibniz's mode of philosophy as a role model for today's scholars. Rescher argues that many current problems can be effectively addressed with principles of process philosophy along lines inspired by Leibniz's monadology. _On Leibniz_ is essential reading for students of Leibniz and Rescher alike. (shrink)

Robert Merrihew Adams argues that it is permissible for a perfectly good moral agent to create a world less good than the best one she could create. He argues that God would exhibit the important virtue of grace in creating less than the best and that this virtue is incompatible with the merit considerations required by the standard of creating the best. In this paper I give three arguments for the compatibility of merit consideration and graciousness of God toward creation. (...) I conclude that grace would not release a perfect agent from responsibility to create the best. (shrink)

I present a novel argument for the position that a morally unsurpassable God must create the best world that He has the power to create. I show that grace-based considerations of the sort proposed by Robert Adams neither refute my argument nor establish that a morally unsurpassable God need not create the best. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my argument for the ‘no-best-world’ response to the problem of evil. (Published Online February 17 2004).