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  1. Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain.Antonio R. Damasio - 1994 - Putnam.
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  • Self-Location and Agency.Bill Brewer - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):17-34.
    We perceive things in the external world as spatially located both with respect to each other and to ourselves, such that they are in principle accessible from where we seem to be. I hear the door bang behind me; I feel the pen on the desk over to my right; and I see you walking beneath the line of pictures, from left to right in front of me. By displaying these spatial relations between its objects and us, the perceivers, perception (...)
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  • Emotional Cognitive Steps Towards Consciousness.Will N. Browne & Richard J. Hussey - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (2):203-211.
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  • The Mindsized Mashup Mind Isn't Supersized After All.Susan A. J. Stuart - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):174-183.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  • Aplasic Phantoms and the Mirror Neuron System: An Enactive, Developmental Perspective.Rachel Wood & Susan A. J. Stuart - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):487-504.
    Phantom limb experiences demonstrate an unexpected degree of fragility inherent in our self-perceptions. This is perhaps most extreme when congenitally absent limbs are experienced as phantoms. Aplasic phantoms highlight fundamental questions about the physiological bases of self-experience and the ontogeny of a physical, embodied sense of the self. Some of the most intriguing of these questions concern the role of mirror neurons in supporting the development of self–other mappings and hence the emergence of phantom experiences of congenitally absent limbs. In (...)
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  • Horizontal Intentionality and Transcendental Intersubjectivity.Dan Zahavi - 1997 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (2):304-321.
    Through an investigation of Husserl's concept of horizontal intentionality, the article basically argues that the horizon is intrinsically intersubjective, and that it entails an implicit reference to the intentions of possible Others. Against this background it is argued that our perceptual experience of an embodied Other, our factual encounter with the Other, is not the most basic and fundamental type of intersubjectivity. On the contrary, it presupposes a type of intersubjectivity which belongs a priori to the structure of constituting subjectivity.
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  • Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons From the Biology of Consciousness.Alva Noë - 2009 - Hill & Wang.
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  • Conscious Machines: Memory, Melody and Muscular Imagination. [REVIEW]Susan A. J. Stuart - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):37-51.
    A great deal of effort has been, and continues to be, devoted to developing consciousness artificially (A small selection of the many authors writing in this area includes: Cotterill (J Conscious Stud 2:290–311, 1995 , 1998 ), Haikonen ( 2003 ), Aleksander and Dunmall (J Conscious Stud 10:7–18, 2003 ), Sloman ( 2004 , 2005 ), Aleksander ( 2005 ), Holland and Knight ( 2006 ), and Chella and Manzotti ( 2007 )), and yet a similar amount of effort has (...)
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  • The Potential for Consciousness of Artificial Systems.David Gamez - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (2):213-223.
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  • The Rainbow of Emotions: At the Crossroads of Neurobiology and Phenomenology. [REVIEW]Natalie Depraz - 2008 - Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):237-259.
    This contribution seeks to explicitly articulate two directions of a continuous phenomenal field: (1) the genesis of intersubjectivity in its bodily basis (both organic and phylogenetic); and (2) the re-investment of the organic basis (both bodily and cellular) as a self-transcendence. We hope to recast the debate about the explanatory gap by suggesting a new way to approach the mind-body and Leib/Körper problems: with a heart-centered model instead of a brain-centered model. By asking how the physiological dynamics of heart and (...)
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  • The Self as an Embedded Agent.Chris Dobbyn & Susan A. J. Stuart - 2003 - Minds and Machines 13 (2):187-201.
    In this paper we consider the concept of a self-aware agent. In cognitive science agents are seen as embodied and interactively situated in worlds. We analyse the meanings attached to these terms in cognitive science and robotics, proposing a set of conditions for situatedness and embodiment, and examine the claim that internal representational schemas are largely unnecessary for intelligent behaviour in animats. We maintain that current situated and embodied animats cannot be ascribed even minimal self-awareness, and offer a six point (...)
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  • Resilient Architectures to Facilitate Both Functional Consciousness and Phenomenal Consciousness in Machines.Uma Ramamurthy & Stan Franklin - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (2):243-253.
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  • Qualia and Conscious Machines.Pentti O. A. Haikonen - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (2):225-234.
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  • The Philosophical Issue in Machine Consciousness.Piotr Boltuc - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):155-176.
    The truly philosophical issue in machine conscioiusness is whether machines can have 'hard consciounsess'. Criteria for hard consciousness are higher than for phenomenal consciousness, since the latter incorporates first-person functional consciousness.
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  • Functional Embodied Imagination and Episodic Memory.Owen Holland & Hugo Gravato Marques - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (2):245-259.
    The phenomenon of episodic memory has been studied for over 30 years, but it is only recently that its constructive nature has been shown to be closely linked to the processes underpinning imagination. This paper builds on recent work by the authors in developing architectures for a form of imagination suitable for use in artifacts, and considers how these architectures might be extended to provide a form of episodic memory.
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  • The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.Edmund Husserl - 1970 - Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
    In this book, which remained unfinished at his death, Husserl attempts to forge a union between phenomenology and existentialism.
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  • Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension.Andy Clark (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Introduction : brainbound versus extended -- From embodiment to cognitive extension -- The active body -- The negotiable body -- Material symbols -- World, Incorporated -- Boundary disputes -- Mind re-bound -- The cure for cognitive hiccups (HEMC, HEC, HEMC ...) -- Rediscovering the brain -- The limits of embodiment -- Painting, planning, and perceiving -- Disentangling embodiment -- Conclusions : mind-sized bites.
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  • Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
    "Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us," writes Alva Noe. "It is something we do." In Action in Perception, Noe argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought — that ...
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  • Synthetic Phenomenology.Ron Chrisley - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):53-70.
    The term \synthetic phenomenology" refers to: 1) any attempt to characterize the phenomenal states possessed, or modeled by, an artefact ; or 2) any attempt to use an artefact to help specify phenomenal states. The notion of synthetic phenomenology is clari¯ed, and distinguished from some related notions. It is argued that much work in machine consciousness would bene¯t from being more cognizant of the need for synthetic phenomenology of the ¯rst type, and of the possible forms it may take. It (...)
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  • The Primacy of Movement.Maxine Sheets-Johnstone - 2004 - Springer.
    chapter 1 Neandertals Experience shows the problem of the mind cannot be solved by attacking the citadel itself. — the mind is function of body. ...
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  • The Roots of Morality.Maxine Sheets-Johnstone - 2008 - Pennsylvania State University Press.
    This book argues the case for a foundationalist ethics centrally based on an empirical understanding of human nature. For Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, “an ethics formulated on the foundations of anything other than human nature, hence on anything other than an identification of pan-cultural human realities, lacks solid empirical moorings. It easily loses itself in isolated hypotheticals, reductionist scenarios, or theoretical abstractions—in the prisoner’s dilemma, selfish genes, dedicated brain modules, evolutionary altruism, or psychological egoism, for example—or it easily becomes itself an ethical (...)
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  • Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind.Gerald M. Edelman - 1992 - Penguin Books.
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  • The Primacy of the Body, Not the Primacy of Perception.E. T. Gendlin - 1992 - Man and World 25 (3-4):341-353.
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  • Synthetic Phenomenology:Exploiting Embodiment to Specify the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience.Ron Chrisley & J. Parthemore - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):44-58.
    Not all research in machine consciousness aims to instantiate phenomenal states in artefacts. For example, one can use artefacts that do not themselves have phenomenal states, merely to simulate or model organisms that do. Nevertheless, one might refer to all of these pursuits -- instantiating, simulating or modelling phenomenal states in an artefact -- as 'synthetic phenomenality'. But there is another way in which artificial agents (be they simulated or real) may play a crucial role in understanding or creating consciousness: (...)
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  • Enchanted Looms: Conscious Networks in Brains and Computers.Rodney M. J. Cotterill - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    The title of this book was inspired by a passage in Charles Sherrington's Man on his Nature.
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  • The Cognitive Approach to Conscious Machines.Pentti O. A. Haikonen - 2003 - Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.
    This books is a must for anyone interested in consciousness research and the latest ideas in the forthcoming technology of mind.
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  • Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Emotions and bodily feelings -- Existential feelings -- The phenomenology of touch -- Body and world -- Feeling and belief in the Capgras delusion -- Feelings of deadness and depersonalization -- Existential feeling in schizophrenia -- What William James really said -- Stance, feeling, and belief -- Pathologies of existential feeling.
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  • Looking for Spinoza Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain.Antonio R. Damasio - 2003
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  • Machine Consciousness: Cognitive and Kinaesthetic Imagination.Susan A. J. Stuart - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):141-153.
    Machine consciousness exists already in organic systems and it is only a matter of time -- and some agreement -- before it will be realised in reverse-engineered organic systems and forward- engineered inorganic systems. The agreement must be over the preconditions that must first be met if the enterprise is to be successful, and it is these preconditions, for instance, being a socially-embedded, structurally-coupled and dynamic, goal-directed entity that organises its perceptual input and enacts its world through the application of (...)
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  • The Embodied Self: Theories, Hunches and Robot Models.Tom Ziemke - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):167-179.
    Many theories and models of machine consciousness emphasize the role of embodiment. However, there are different interpretations of exactly what kind of embodiment would be required for an artifact to be at least potentially conscious. This paper contrasts the sensorimotor approach, which holds that consciousness emerges from the mastery of sensorimotor knowledge resulting from the interaction between agent and environment, with the view that the living body's homeostatic regulation is crucial to self and consciousness.
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  • The World in My Mind, My Mind in the World.Igor L. Aleksander - 2005 - Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.
    Ifeel that Iam apartof, but separatefrom an 'out there' world. 2. Ifeel that my perception of the world mingles with feelings of past experience. 3. My experienceof the world is selective and purposeful. 4. I am thinking ahead allthe timeintrying ...
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  • Artificial Consciousness.Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti - 2007 - Imprint Academic.
    And why is there a subjective component to experience?). It is easy to see that the separation between Weak and Strong Artificial Consciousness mirrors the separation between the easy problems and the hard problems of consciousness.
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  • The Role of the Self Process in Embodied Machine Consciousness.Owen Holland, Rob Knight & Richard Newcombe - 2007 - In Antonio Chella & Riccardo Manzotti (eds.), Artificial Consciousness. Imprint Academic. pp. 156-173.
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