Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. (1 other version)Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading.Alvin I. Goldman - 2006 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which starts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   321 citations  
  • Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences.Karsten R. Stueber - 2006 - Bradford.
    In this timely and wide-ranging study, Karsten Stueber argues that empathy is epistemically central for our folk-psychological understanding of other agents--that it is something we cannot do without in order to gain understanding of other minds. Setting his argument in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind and the interdisciplinary debate about the nature of our mindreading abilities, Stueber counters objections raised by some in the philosophy of social science and argues that it is time to rehabilitate the empathy thesis.Empathy, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   120 citations  
  • Dissecting the Neural Mechanisms Mediating Empathy.Jean Decety - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (1):92-108.
    Empathy is thought to play a key role in motivating prosocial behavior, guiding our preferences and behavioral responses, and providing the affective and motivational base for moral development. While these abilities have traditionally been examined using behavioral methods, recent work in evolutionary biology, developmental and cognitive neuroscience has begun to shed light on the neural circuitry that instantiate them. The purpose of this article is to critically examine the current knowledge in the field of affective neuroscience and provide an integrative (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Mirrors in the Brain: How our minds share actions and emotions.Giacomo Rizzolatti & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    When we witness a great actor, musician, or sportsperson performing, we share something of their experience. Only recently has it become clear just how this sharing of experience is realised within the human brain. 'Mirrors in the brain' provides an accessible overview of mirror neurons, written by the man who first discovered them.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   73 citations  
  • Imagination, Empathy, and Moral Deliberation: The Case of Imaginative Resistence.Karsten R. Stueber - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):156-180.
    This essay develops a new account of the phenomenon of imaginative resistance. Imaginative resistance is best conceived of as a limited phenomenon. It occurs when we try to engage imaginatively with different moral worlds that are insufficiently articulated so that they do not allow us either to quarantine our imaginative engagement from our normal moral attitudes or to agree with the expressed moral judgment from the perspective of moral deliberation. Imaginative resistance thus reveals the central epistemic importance that empathy plays (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Let’s Be Flexible: Our Interpretive/Explanatory Toolbox, or In Praise of Using a Range of Tools.David Henderson - 2011 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (2):261-299.
    This paper explores the role and limits of cognitive simulation in understanding or explaining others. In simulation, one puts one's own cognitive processes to work on pretend input similar to that one supposes that the other plausibly had. Such a process is highly useful. However, it is also limited in important ways. Several limitations fall out from the various forms of cognitive diversity. Some of this diversity results from cultural differences, or from differences in individuals' cognitive biographies. Such diversity is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Intentionalism, Intentional Realism, and Empathy.Karsten Stueber - 2009 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 3 (3):290-307.
    Contemporary philosophers of history and interpretation theorists very often deny the thesis of intentional realism, because they reject intentionalism or the thesis that an agent's or author's intentions are relevant for the interpretive practice of the human sciences. I will defend intentional realism by showing why it is wrong to whole-heartedly reject intentionalism and by clarifying the logical relation between intentionalism and intentional realism. I will do so by discussing the two central arguments against intentionalism; the argument from the perspective (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Folk psychology as narrative practice.Daniel D. Hutto - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6 - 8.
    There has been a long-standing interest in the putative roles that various so-called ‘theory of mind’ abilities might play in enabling us to understand and enjoy narratives. Of late, as our understanding of the complexity and diversity of everyday psychological capacities has become more nuanced and variegated, new possibilities have been articulated: (i) that our capacity for a sophisticated, everyday understanding of actions in terms of reason (our folk psychology) may itself be best characterized as a kind of narrative practice (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • The Work of the Imagination.Paul L. Harris - 2000 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    This book demonstrates how children's imagination makes a continuing contribution to their cognitive and emotional development.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   161 citations  
  • Empathy.Karsten Stueber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Despite its linguistic roots in ancient Greek, the concept of empathy is of recent intellectual heritage. Yet its history has been varied and colorful, a fact that is also mirrored in the multiplicity of definitions associated with the empathy concept in a number of different scientific and non-scientific discourses. In its philosophical heyday at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, empathy had been hailed as the primary means for gaining knowledge of other minds and as the method (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • 2. reasons, generalizations, empathy, and narratives: The epistemic structure of action explanation.Karsten R. Stueber - 2008 - History and Theory 47 (1):31–43.
    It has become something of a consensus among philosophers of history that historians, in contrast to natural scientists, explain in a narrative fashion. Unfortunately, philosophers of history have not said much about how it is that narratives have explanatory power. they do, however, maintain that a narrative’s explanatory power is sui generis and independent of our empathetic or reenactive capacities and of our knowledge of law-like generalizations. In this article I will show that this consensus is mistaken at least in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Interpretation psychologized.Alvin I. Goldman - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (3):161-85.
    The aim of this paper is to study interpretation, specifically, to work toward an account of interpretation that seems descriptively and explanatorily correct. No account of interpretation can be philosophically helpful, I submit, if it is incompatible with a correct account of what people actually do when they interpret others. My question, then, is: how does the (naive) interpreter arrive at his/her judgments about the mental attitudes of others? Philosophers who have addressed this question have not, in my view, been (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   365 citations  
  • The limits of spectatorial folk psychology.Daniel D. Hutto - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):548-73.
    It is almost universally agreed that the main business of commonsense psychology is that of providing generally reliable predictions and explanations of the actions of others. In line with this, it is also generally assumed that we are normally at theoretical remove from others such that we are always ascribing causally efficacious mental states to them for the purpose of prediction, explanation and control. Building on the work of those who regard our primary intersubjective interactions as a form of 'embodied (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   104 citations  
  • Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology.Gregory Currie & Ian Ravenscroft - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Christoph Hoerl.
    Recreative Minds develops a philosophical theory of imagination that draws upon the latest work in psychology. This theory illuminates the use of imagination in coming to terms with art, its role in enabling us to live as social beings, and the psychological consequences of disordered imagination. The authors offer a lucid exploration of a fascinating subject.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   246 citations  
  • Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice.Shaun Gallagher & Daniel D. Hutto - 2008 - In J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha & E. Itkonen (eds.), The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity. John Benjamins. pp. 17–38.
    We argue that theory-of-mind (ToM) approaches, such as “theory theory” and “simulation theory”, are both problematic and not needed. They account for neither our primary and pervasive way of engaging with others nor the true basis of our folk psychological understanding, even when narrowly construed. Developmental evidence shows that young infants are capable of grasping the purposeful intentions of others through the perception of bodily movements, gestures, facial expressions etc. Trevarthen’s notion of primary intersubjectivity can provide a theoretical framework for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   189 citations  
  • Social systems.Heidi L. Maibom - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):557 – 578.
    It used to be thought that folk psychology is the only game in town. Focusing merely on what people do will not allow you to predict what they are likely to do next. For that, you must consider their beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Recent evidence from developmental psychology and fMRI studies indicates that this conclusion was premature. We parse motion in an environment as behavior of a particular type, and behavior thus construed can feature in systematizations that we know. Building (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • (1 other version)Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds.Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich - 2003 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephen P. Stich.
    The everyday capacity to understand the mind, or 'mindreading', plays an enormous role in our ordinary lives. Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich provide a detailed and integrated account of the intricate web of mental components underlying this fascinating and multifarious skill. The imagination, they argue, is essential to understanding others, and there are special cognitive mechanisms for understanding oneself. The account that emerges has broad implications for longstanding philosophical debates over the status of folk psychology. Mindreading is another trailblazing volume (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   422 citations  
  • Narrative and Folk Psychology.Daniel D. Hutto (ed.) - 2009 - Imprint Academic.
    Folk psychology refers to our everyday practice of making sense of actions, both our own and those of others, in terms of reasons. This volume, which is a special issue of the _Journal of Consciousness Studies_, brings together new work by scholars from a range of disciplines whose aim is to clarify, develop and challenge the claim that folk psychology may be importantly -- perhaps even constitutively -- related to narrative practices. This book is part of a wider project by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Mindblindness. An essay on autism and theory of mind, Cambridge, Mass, MITPTCSS, tradiit. Dautismo e la lettura della mente, Roma.S. Baron-Cohen - forthcoming - Astrolabio.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   400 citations  
  • Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons.Daniel D. Hutto - 2008 - Bradford.
    Established wisdom in cognitive science holds that the everyday folk psychological abilities of humans -- our capacity to understand intentional actions performed for reasons -- are inherited from our evolutionary forebears. In _Folk Psychological Narratives_, Daniel Hutto challenges this view and argues for the sociocultural basis of this familiar ability. He makes a detailed case for the idea that the way we make sense of intentional actions essentially involves the construction of narratives about particular persons. Moreover he argues that children (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   232 citations  
  • Expression and empathy.Dan Zahavi - 2007 - In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. New York: Springer Press. pp. 25--40.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • What do mirror neurons contribute to human social cognition?Pierre Jacob - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (2):190–223.
    According to an influential view, one function of mirror neurons (MNs), first discovered in the brain of monkeys, is to underlie third-person mindreading. This view relies on two assumptions: the activity of MNs in an observer’s brain matches (simulates or resonates with) that of MNs in an agent’s brain and this resonance process retrodictively generates a representation of the agent’s intention from a perception of her movement. In this paper, I criticize both assumptions and I argue instead that the activity (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   102 citations  
  • It’s in your nature: a pluralistic folk psychology.Kristin Andrews - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):13 - 29.
    I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical to beliefs or desires, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • To What Extent is the Experience of Empathy Mediated by Shared Neural Circuits?Jean Decety - 2010 - Emotion Review 2 (3):204-207.
    This paper selectively reviews the neurophysiological evidence for shared neural circuits (supposedly implemented by mirror neurons) as the mechanism underlying empathy. I will argue that while the mirror neuron system plays a role in motor resonance, it is not possible to conclude that this system is critically involved in emotion recognition, and there is little evidence for its role in empathy and sympathy. In addition, there is modest support from neurological observations that lesion of the regions involved in the mirror (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Empathy, Embodiment and Interpersonal Understanding: From Lipps to Schutz.Dan Zahavi - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):285-306.
    When it comes to understanding the nature of social cognition, we have—according to the standard view—a choice between the simulation theory, the theory-theory or some hybrid between the two. The aim of this paper is to argue that there are, in fact, other options available, and that one such option has been articulated by various thinkers belonging to the phenomenological tradition. More specifically, the paper will contrast Lipps' account of empathy—an account that has recently undergone something of a revival in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  • Mirroring, simulating and mindreading.Alvin I. Goldman - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (2):235-252.
    Pierre Jacob (2008) raises several problems for the alleged link between mirroring and mindreading. This response argues that the best mirroring-mindreading thesis would claim that mirror processes cause, rather than constitute, selected acts of mindreading. Second, the best current evidence for mirror-based mindreading is not found in the motoric domain but in the domains of emotion and sensation, where the evidence (ignored by Jacob) is substantial. Finally, simulation theory should distinguish low-level simulation (mirroring) and high-level simulation (involving pretense or imagination). (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Logical and phenomenological arguments against simulation theory.Shaun Gallagher - 2007 - In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. New York: Springer Press. pp. 63--78.
    Theory theorists conceive of social cognition as a theoretical and observational enterprise rather than a practical and interactive one. According to them, we do our best to explain other people's actions and mental experience by appealing to folk psychology as a kind of rule book that serves to guide our observations through our puzzling encounters with others. Seemingly, for them, most of our encounters count as puzzling, and other people are always in need of explanation. By contrast, simulation theorists do (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Work of the Imagination.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):414-418.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   89 citations  
  • Mind, Reason and Imagination: Selected Essays in Philosophy of Mind and Language.Jane Heal - 2003 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Recent philosophy of mind has had a mistaken conception of the nature of psychological concepts. It has assumed too much similarity between psychological judgments and those of natural science and has thus overlooked the fact that other people are not just objects whose thoughts we may try to predict and control but fellow creatures with whom we talk and co-operate. In this collection of essays, Jane Heal argues that central to our ability to arrive at views about others' thoughts is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • The Narrative Practice Hypothesis and Externalist Theory Theory: For Compatibility, Against Collapse.Marc Slors - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6-8.
    What defence does the Narrative Practice Hypothesis have against the charge that it is a covert form of externalist theory theory ? I discuss and reject Dan Hutto's own strategies and argue that the NPH remains vulnerable to a threat of collapse into externalist TT as long as narrative folk-psychological explanation is differentiated from simple belief-desire explanation merely by a degree of complexity, subtlety and/or context-sensitivity. It is entirely plausible, however, that there is a more principled distinction between these two (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations