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Regimenting Reasons

Theoria 71 (3):203-214 (2005)

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  1. (1 other version)Reasons and motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.
    When we have a normative reason, and we act for that reason, it becomes our motivating reason. But we can have either kind of reason without having the other. Thus, if I jump into the canal, my motivating reason was provided by my belief; but I had no normative reason to jump. I merely thought I did. And, if I failed to notice that the canal was frozen, I had a reason not to jump that, because it was unknown to (...)
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  • Backgrounding desire.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (4):565-592.
    Granted that desire is always present in the genesis of human action, is it something on the presence of which the agent always reflects? I may act on a belief without coming to recognize that I have the belief. Can I act on a desire without recognizing that I have the desire? In particular, can the desire have a motivational presence in my decision making, figuring in the background, as it were, without appearing in the content of my deliberation, in (...)
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  • Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Philosophy 78 (305):414-425.
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  • (1 other version)Reasons and Motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (1):99-130.
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  • Reasons and motivation: John Broome.John Broome - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):131–146.
    Derek Parfit takes an externalist and cognitivist view about normative reasons. I shall explore this view and add some arguments that support it. But I shall also raise a doubt about it at the end.
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  • The psychological reality of reasons.Arthur W. Collins - 1997 - Ratio 10 (2):108–123.
    Action explanations like ‘I am heading to the ferry because the bridge is closed,’ are supposed to require restatement: ‘I am... because I believe the bridge is closed,’ because (i) the objective claim may be false though the intended explanation is correct, and (ii) because objective circumstances have to be cognitively mediated if they are to bear on action. This supposition is rejected here. Restatements cannot withdraw the objective claim without withdrawing the explanation. In the context of reason‐giving, belief statements (...)
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  • Critical notice of Michael Smith: The Moral Problem.Ingmar Persson - 1995 - Theoria 61 (2):143-158.
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