Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. (1 other version)Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
    This essay challenges the widely accepted principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. The author considers situations in which there are sufficient conditions for a certain choice or action to be performed by someone, So that it is impossible for the person to choose or to do otherwise, But in which these conditions do not in any way bring it about that the person chooses or acts as he (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1081 citations  
  • Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1976 - The Monist 59 (2):204-217.
    Judith Jarvis Thomson; Killing, Letting Die, and The Trolley Problem, The Monist, Volume 59, Issue 2, 1 April 1976, Pages 204–217, https://doi.org/10.5840/monis.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   337 citations  
  • Responsibility and inevitability.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1991 - Ethics 101 (2):258-278.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Making a Difference in a Deterministic World.Carolina Sartorio - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (2):189-214.
    Some philosophers have claimed that causally determined agents are not morally responsible because they cannot make a difference in the world. A recent response by philosophers who defend the compatibility of determinism and responsibility has been to concede that causally determined agents are incapable of making a difference, but to argue that responsibility is not grounded in difference making. These compatibilists have rested such a claim on Frankfurt cases—cases where agents are intuitively responsible for acts that they couldn’t have failed (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • A new asymmetry between actions and omissions.Carolina Sartorio - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):460–482.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • A challenge for Frankfurt-style compatibilists.Philip Swenson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1279-1285.
    The principle of alternative possibilities tells us that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if he could have done otherwise. Frankfurt-style cases provide an extremely influential challenge to the PAP . And Frankfurt-style compatibilists are motivated to accept compatibilism about responsibility and determinism in part due to FSCs. But there is a significant tension between our judgments about responsibility in FSCs and our judgments about responsibility in certain omissions cases. This tension has thus far largely been treated (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Ability and responsibility for omissions.Randolph Clarke - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):195 - 208.
    Most philosophers now accept that an agent may be responsible for an action even though she could not have acted otherwise. However, many who accept such a view about responsibility for actions nevertheless maintain that, when it comes to omissions, an agent is responsible only if she could have done what she omitted to do. If this Principle of Possible Action (PPA), as it is sometimes called, is correct, then there is an important asymmetry between what is required for responsibility (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Omissions, Responsibility, and Symmetry.Randolph Clarke - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):594-624.
    It is widely held that one can be responsible for doing something that one was unable to avoid doing. This paper focuses primarily on the question of whether one can be responsible for not doing something that one was unable to do. The paper begins with an examination of the account of responsibility for omissions offered by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, arguing that in many cases it yields mistaken verdicts. An alternative account is sketched that jibes with and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • An alleged asymmetry between actions and omissions.Harry Frankfurt - 1994 - Ethics 104 (3):620-623.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Compatibilists could have done otherwise: Responsibility and negative agency.Alison Mclntyre - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (3):453-488.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Moral responsibility and omissions.Jeremy Byrd - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):56–67.
    Frankfurt-type examples seem to show that agents can be morally responsible for their actions and omissions even if they could not have done otherwise. Fischer and Ravizza's influential account of moral responsibility is largely based on such examples. I examine a problem with their account of responsibility in cases where we fail to act. The solution to this problem has a surprising and far reaching implication concerning the construction of successful Frankfurt-type examples. I argue that the role of the counterfactual (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Responsibility and the Kinds of Freedom.John Martin Fischer - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):203 - 228.
    In this paper I seek to identify different sorts of freedom putatively linked to moral responsibility; I then explore the relationship between such notions of freedom and the Consequence Argument, on the one hand, and the Frankfurt-examples, on the other. I focus (in part) on a dilemma: if a compatibilist adopts a broadly speaking "conditional" understanding of freedom in reply to the Consequence Argument, such a theorist becomes vulnerable in a salient way to the Frankfurt-examples.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Replies. [REVIEW]John Martin Fischer - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):267-278.
    I am very grateful to the thoughtful and probing critical discussions by the nine authors who have discussed themes from my two collections, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, and Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. In this essay I seek to respond to some of the points raised in these essays. I am unable to address all of the critiques, but I have certainly learned a great deal from these extremely insightful and generous papers, and I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations