Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time.E. J. Lowe - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Jonathan Lowe argues that metaphysics should be restored to a central position in philosophy, as the most fundamental form of rational inquiry, whose findings underpin those of all other disciplines. He portrays metaphysics as charting the possibilities of existence, by idetifying the categories of being and the relations of ontological dependency between entities of different categories. He proceeds to set out a unified and original metaphysical system: he defends a substance ontology, according to which the existence of the world s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   269 citations  
  • Truth and ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Truth and Ontology concludes that some truths do not depend on being in any substantive way at all.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   236 citations  
  • The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time.Edward Jonathan Lowe - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.
    Jonathan Lowe argues that metaphysics should be restored to a central position in philosophy, as the most fundamental form of inquiry, whose findings underpin those of all other disciplines. He portrays metaphysics as charting the possibilities of existence, by identifying the categories of being and the relations between them. He sets out his own original metaphysical system, within which he seeks to answer many of the deepest questions in philosophy. 'a very rich book... deserves to be read carefully by anyone (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   235 citations  
  • Presentism and properties.John Bigelow - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:35-52.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   224 citations  
  • Presentism and the grounding objection.Thomas M. Crisp - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):90–109.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   155 citations  
  • The privileged present : Defending an "a-theory" of time.Dean Zimmerman - 2008 - In Theodore Sider, John P. Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary debates in metaphysics. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 211--225.
    Uncorrected Proof; please cite published version.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   94 citations  
  • (1 other version)Time.Ned Markosian - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Discussions of the nature of time, and of various issues related to time, have always featured prominently in philosophy, but they have been especially important since the beginning of the 20th Century. This article contains a brief overview of some of the main topics in the philosophy of time — Fatalism; Reductionism and Platonism with respect to time; the topology of time; McTaggart's arguments; The A Theory and The B Theory; Presentism, Eternalism, and The Growing Universe Theory; time travel; and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  • (1 other version)Time.Ned Markosian - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2014.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  • Presentism and truth-making.Jonathan Tallant - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (3):407-416.
    Here, I defend the view that there is no sensible way to pin a truth-maker objection on presentism. First, I suggest that if we adopt truth-maker maximalism then the presentist can requisition appropriate ontological resources with impunity. Second, if we deny maximalism, then the presentist can sensibly restrict the truth-maker principle in order to avoid the demand for truth-makers for talk about the non-present.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  • A new problem for the A-theory of time.Simon Prosser - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):494-498.
    : I offer a new approach to the increasingly convoluted debate between the A- and B-theories of time, the ‘tensed’ and ‘tenseless’ theories. It is often assumed that the B-theory faces more difficulties than the A-theory in explaining the apparently tensed features of temporal experience. I argue that the A-theory cannot explain these features at all, because on any physicalist or supervenience theory of the mind, in which the nature of experience is fixed by the physical state of the world, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • McGinn on existence.Peter Vaninwagen - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):36-58.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • (1 other version)McGinn on Existence.Inwagen Peter van - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):36 - 58.
    I compare the theory of existence and being (and of non-existence and non-being) presented in Colin McGinn's 'Logical Properties' with those of well known predecessors such as Quine, Frege and Meinong. More recently, neo-Meinongians have held that being and existence are different concepts, and that although nothing lach bang, there are things which do not exist; possibilists have held that there are mere possibilia, things which possibly exist but do not actually exist. I examine a thesis advanced by McGinn which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • The Ontology of Time.L. Nathan Oaklander - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):622-624.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • The tenseless theory of time.J. J. C. Smart - 2008 - In Theodore Sider, John P. Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary debates in metaphysics. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 226--38.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Presentists may say goodbye to A-properties.Joshua Rasmussen - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):270-276.
    Philosophers of time say that if presentism is true (i.e. if reality is comprised solely of presently existing things), then a complete description of reality must contain tensed terms, such as ‘was’, ‘presently is’ and ‘will be’. I counter this viewpoint by explaining how the presentist may de-tense our talk about times. I argue, furthermore, that, since the A-theory of time denies the success of any such de-tensing strategy, presentism is not a version of the A-theory – contrary to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Endurantism and timeless worlds.Nikk Effingham & Joseph Melia - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):140-147.
    A paper against Ted Sider's argument for perdurantism on the grounds of timeless worlds.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations