In his "an ambiguity in the "sophist"," gregory vlastos showed that statements about forms in the central section of the "sophist" may be either 'ordinary' or 'pauline' predications. This paper refutes vlastos's claim that plato was "utterly unaware" of this ambiguity. 255c-e is taken to be the crucial passage here. This paper adapts the interpretation given by michael frede of this passage and shows that the sense of plato's partaking- terms (which are used to analyze statements about forms) switches from (...) a 'pauline' to an 'ordinary' usage at a definite point in the text which falls at the end of the crucial passage. the context and content of the passage determine that the switch is deliberate on plato's part. An analysis of an earlier passage, 250a-e, confirms this point. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

ONE of the central characteristics of Plato's later metaphysics is his view that Forms can participate in other Forms. At least part of what the Sophist demonstrates is that though not every Form participates in every other, every Form participates in some Forms, and that there are some Forms in which all Forms participate. This paper considers some of the reasons for this development, and some of the issues raised by it.

A major problem in the interpretation of Plato's metaphysics is the question of whether he abandoned self-predication as a result of the Third Man Argument in the Parmenides. In this paper I will argue that the answer to this question must be 'no' because the self-predication assumption is still present in the Sophist.