In Intricate Ethics, Kamm questions the moral importance of some non-consequentialist distinctions and then introduces and argues for the moral importance of ...

We are often faced with choices that involve the weighing of people's lives against each other, or the weighing of lives against other good things. These are choices both for individuals and for societies. A person who is terminally ill may have to choose between palliative care and more aggressive treatment, which will give her a longer life but at some cost in suffering. We have to choose between the convenience to ourselves of road and air travel, and the lives (...) of the future people who will be killed by the global warming we cause, through violent weather, tropical disease, and heat waves. We also make choices that affect how many lives there will be in the future: as individuals we choose how many children to have, and societies choose tax policies that influence people's choices about having children. These are all problems of weighing lives. How should we weigh lives? Weighing Lives develops a theoretical basis for answering this practical question. It extends the work and methods of Broome's earlier book Weighing Goods to cover the questions of life and death. Difficult problems come up in the process. In particular, Weighing Lives tackles the well-recognized, awkward problems of the ethics of population. It carefully examines the common intuition that adding people to the population is ethically neutral - neither a good nor a bad thing - but eventually concludes this intuition cannot be fitted into a coherent theory of value. In the course of its argument, Weighing Lives examines many of the issues of contemporary moral theory: the nature of consequentialism and teleology; the transitivity, continuity, and vagueness of betterness; the quantitative conception of wellbeing; the notion of a life worth living; the badness of death; and others. This is a work of philosophy, but one of its distinctive features is that it adopts some of the precise methods of economic theory (without introducing complex mathematics). Not only philosophers, but also economists and political theorists concerned with the practical question of valuing life, should find the book's conclusions highly significant to their work. (shrink)

In "Futurc Generations: Further Problems,"‘ and Part Four of Reasons and Persons} Derek Pariit raises many perplexing questions. Although some think his ingenious arguments little more than delightful puzzles, I believe they challenge some of our deepest beliefs. In this article, I examine some of Pariit’s arguments, focusing mainly on "The Mere Addition Paradox." If my analysis is correct, Parfit’s arguments have extremely interesting and important implications that not even Pariit rcalized. In Part I, I present ParHt’s argument for the (...) Merc Addition Paradox, and show that given Pa.rHt’s assumptions, a radical conclusion seems t0 follow; the notion of "bctter th2m"—indced, even the notion of "aH things.. (shrink)

In "Equality, Priority, and Compassion," Roger Crisp rejects both egalitarianism and prioritarianism. Crisp contends that our concern for those who are badly off is best accounted for by appealing to "a sufficiency principle" based -- indirectly, via the notion of an impartial spectator -- on compassion for those who are badly off" (p. 745). A key example of Crisp's is the Beverly Hills case (discussed below). This example is directed against prioritarianism, but it also threatens egalitarianism. In this article, I (...) respond to the Beverly Hills case. I also challenge the wide person-affecting principle and Crisp's welfarist restriction, which some believe underlie the Levelling Down Objection against egalitarianism. My aim in this article is to defend egalitarianism by illuminating both its nature and appeal. (shrink)

Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...) that most of us will find very disturbing. (shrink)

★正向心理學經典之作 ★?心流之父?契克森米哈伊、?正向心理學之父?塞利格曼等高度評價，國際媒體齊聲推薦！ 啟動你我內在如大象般強大的力量 我們的「心」，是頭放任的大象； 我們的「智」，是具備掌控能力的騎象人， 心與智往往意見相左，各行其是…… 如何破除人象的對峙、拉扯？ 如何引領大象找到人生幸福的方向？ 學會馭象，就能獲得 愛、工作、審美、管理、人際關係、靈性覺醒上的諸多能力！ 強納森．海德把人類思考了兩千多年的問題，歸結為十個假設，放在科學的天平上，探討到底哪些是真理，哪些是謬誤。他融合了心理學、哲學、倫理學、宗教以及人類學等學科知識，並且大量引用了古今中外的哲學、文學與宗 教中有關人心的看法，再用神經科學與社會心理學的研究成果來驗證關於古老的關於幸福的假設。 他認為，人的心理可分為兩半，一半像桀驁不馴的大象，另一半則是理性的騎象人，面對改變時，理智與情感的拉扯就像是「象與騎象人」。這種人象的對峙，不僅會影響我們的決策，也會削弱我們的幸福感。 當我們學會駕馭心中的大象，我們就整合了各個面向的自我，而能全心投入愛、工作、關係、智慧成長中，最終能騎著大象，去到自己心中嚮往的幸福天地。 各界推薦 有人說，尋找人生智慧，要從自己最意想不到的地方開始。 希望每位惜時如金的讀者都可以從《象與騎象人》這本智慧之作中收穫意想不到的感悟。本書無論哪個方面，都能為大家帶來裨益。──全球華人正向心理學協會主席、劍橋大學幸福研究院亞太主任 蘇德中 駕馭內在的力量並不容易，但它值得我們用一生探究和學習。──諮商心理師╱璞成心理學堂總監 蘇絢慧 我個人特別推薦第六章〈愛與依附〉及第九章〈靈性的覺醒〉，作者撰寫的方式具科學實證又能深入淺出，本書確為正向心理學經典之作。──高雄醫學大學正向心理學中心主任 吳相儀 要理解幸福，建議就從跟隨本書作者海德開始吧！──正向心理學之父 馬汀•塞利格曼（Martin E.P. Seligman） 這是一本重要的、可讀性特別強的作品，能給讀者帶來愉悅的享受。──心流之父米 哈里•契克森米哈伊（Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi） 這是一部令人欣喜的作品……是一部源於正向心理學運動、內容充實的智慧之作。──《自然》（Nature） 從來沒有哪本書能如此清晰、如此充滿智慧地展示出對人類境況的理解。──《衛報》（The Guardian） 這本書引人入勝、令人欣慰，充滿了人文關懷與情趣，它將古代文明的洞見與現代心理學知識巧妙地融合在了一起。──《泰晤士報》（The Times of London） 一項鼓舞人心、細緻入微的研究。 ──《人物》（People） 本書能夠引導我們把每一天過得更好，它的觀點新穎、嚴謹、令人鼓舞。──《圖書館雜誌》（ Library Journal ） 作者簡介 強納森．海德（Jonathan Haidt） 現居紐約市，是著名心理學家，在紐約大學史登商學院擔任倫理領導學教授，主要研究如何在組織中運用積極心理學和道德心理學，被稱為「21世紀最不該被忽視的心理學家」。 1992年獲得美國賓州大學社會心理學博士學位後，即於維吉尼亞大學任教十六年之久。自1999年，他活躍參與正向心理學相關的活動，並因而在2001年獲得「鄧普頓獎」（Templeton Prize），是正向心理學先鋒派領袖。 《象與騎象人》一書是他的思想精華，一出版就登上亞馬遜心理學類排行榜榜首，熱銷不墜，更榮獲來自媒體、學界、企業界的各方好評。 譯者簡介 李靜瑤 臺灣大學政治系國際關系組學士，輔仁大學翻譯學研究所碩士。譯有：《象與騎象人》《失竊的未來：生命的隱形浩劫》《億萬商戰》《60秒壓力管理》《百事達傳奇》等。.

Most people are skeptical of the claim that the expectation that a person would have a life that would be well worth living provides a reason to cause that person to exist. In this essay I argue that to cause such a person to exist would be to confer a benefit of a noncomparative kind and that there is a moral reason to bestow benefits of this kind. But this conclusion raises many problems, among which is that it must be (...) determined how the benefits conferred on people by causing them to exist weigh against comparable benefits conferred on existing people. In particular, might the reason to cause people to exist ever outweigh the reason to save the lives of existing people? (shrink)

This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value (...) is available. These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic and predictable errors. A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could improve judgements and decisions in situations of uncertainty. (shrink)

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