Focusing on contemporary debates in moral and political theory, Situating the Self argues that a non-relative ethics, binding on us in virtue of out humanity, is still a philosophically viable project. This intersting new book should be read by all those concerned with the problems of critical theory, the analysis of modernity, and contemporary ethics, as well as students and professionals in philosophy, sociology and political science.

While some lament the slide of Western culture into relativism and nihilism and others celebrate the trend as a liberating sort of progress, Charles Taylor calls on us to face the moral and political crises of our time, and to make the most ...

abstract As history shows, some human beings are capable of acting very immorally. 1 Technological advance and consequent exponential growth in cognitive power means that even rare evil individuals can act with catastrophic effect. The advance of science makes biological, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction easier and easier to fabricate and, thus, increases the probability that they will come into the hands of small terrorist groups and deranged individuals. Cognitive enhancement by means of drugs, implants and biological (including (...) genetic) interventions could thus accelerate the advance of science, or its application, and so increase the risk of the development or misuse of weapons of mass destruction. We argue that this is a reason which speaks against the desirability of cognitive enhancement, and the consequent speedier growth of knowledge, if it is not accompanied by an extensive moral enhancement of humankind. We review the possibilities for moral enhancement by biomedical and genetic means and conclude that, though it should be possible in principle, it is in practice probably distant. There is thus a reason not to support cognitive enhancement in the foreseeable future. However, we grant that there are also reasons in its favour, but we do not attempt to settle the balance between these reasons for and against. Rather, we conclude that if research into cognitive enhancement continues, as it is likely to, it must be accompanied by research into moral enhancement. (shrink)

Prominent thinkers such as Jurgen Habermas and Michael Sandel are warning that biomedical enhancements will undermine fundamental political values. Yet whether biomedical enhancements will undermine such values depends on how biomedical enhancements will function, how they will be administered and to whom. Since only few enhancements are obtainable, it is difficult to tell whether these predictions are sound. Nevertheless, such warnings are extremely valuable. As a society we must, at the very least, be aware of developments that could have harmful (...) consequences. Indeed, if important values were to be jeopardized, we should take appropriate measures to protect them. This paper focuses on four central values: solidarity, personal responsibility, equality and autonomy. It delineates the conditions under which biomedical enhancements would undermine these values. It also details the circumstances under which these values would be unaffected by enhancements as well as those under which they would be promoted. Specifying these conditions is valuable; it would enable society to prepare appropriate ethical guidelines and policy responses in advance. (shrink)

Prominent thinkers such as Jurgen Habermas and Michael Sandel are warning that biomedical enhancements will undermine fundamental political values. Yet whether biomedical enhancements will undermine such values depends on how biomedical enhancements will function, how they will be administered and to whom. Since only few enhancements are obtainable, it is difficult to tell whether these predictions are sound. Nevertheless, such warnings are extremely valuable. As a society we must, at the very least, be aware of developments that could have harmful (...) consequences. Indeed, if important values were to be jeopardized, we should take appropriate measures to protect them. This paper focuses on four central values: solidarity, personal responsibility, equality and autonomy. It delineates the conditions under which biomedical enhancements would undermine these values. It also details the circumstances under which these values would be unaffected by enhancements as well as those under which they would be promoted. Specifying these conditions is valuable; it would enable society to prepare appropriate ethical guidelines and policy responses in advance. (shrink)

The hypothesis that anatomically modern homo sapiens could have undergone changes akin to those observed in domesticated animals has been contemplated in the biological sciences for at least 150 years. The idea had already plagued philosophers such as Rousseau, who considered the civilisation of man as going against human nature, and eventually.

Many people feel uneasy about enhancement technologies, yet have a hard time explaining why. This unease is often less with the technologies themselves than about the desires and aspirations that they express. I suggest here that we can diagnose the source of that unease by looking at three themes that emerge in Taylor’s writings about the making of the modern self: the importance of social recognition, the ethics of authenticity, and the rise of instrumental reason.

Opponents of biomedical enhancement often claim that, even if such enhancement would benefit the enhanced, it would harm others. But this objection looks unpersuasive when the enhancement in question is a moral enhancement — an enhancement that will expectably leave the enhanced person with morally better motives than she had previously. In this article I (1) describe one type of psychological alteration that would plausibly qualify as a moral enhancement, (2) argue that we will, in the medium-term future, probably be (...) able to induce such alterations via biomedical intervention, and (3) defend future engagement in such moral enhancements against possible objections. My aim is to present this kind of moral enhancement as a counter-example to the view that biomedical enhancement is always morally impermissible. (shrink)

In this pathbreaking study, Axel Honneth argues that "the struggle for recognition" is, and should be, at the center of social conflicts. Moving smoothly between moral philosophy and social theory, Honneth offers insights into such issues as the social forms of recognition and nonrecognition, the moral basis of interaction in human conflicts, the relation between the recognition model and conceptions of modernity, the normative basis of social theory, and the possibility of mediating between Hegel and Kant.

"Anyone concerned by the swirling academic and political debates over identity politics, multiculturalism, and what could bring us together in divisive times should read Jodi Dean's welcome argument for reconstructing a conscious, deliberative solidarity. With insightful engagement with scholars as diverse as Judith Butler, Cornel West, Jurgen Habermas, and Lynet Uttal, Dean models the kind of dialogue she advocates."--Martha Minow, author of Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law "Solidarity of Strangers is an impressive achievement. Dean works to (...) move political theory beyond the poststructuralist/Habermasian divide as she offers a discourse ethics that accounts for difference and a universalism that does not abandon specificities."--Shane Phelan, author of Getting Specific: Postmodern Lesbian Politics "Dean offers a strong, original, and humane defense of universalist ideals against doubts--which she deeply grasps and sympathetically arrays--of the compatibility of such ideals with a respect for difference."--Frank Michelman, Harvard Law School "Dean has a real gift for weaving personal narrative, current events, law, and high theory. Her complicated and important argument attempts to move behond the either/or of identity politics and its critics via a creative reevaluation of universalism premised on difference and plurality. A very important book."--Judith Grant, University of Southern California, author of Fundamental Feminism: Contesting the Core Concepts of Feminist Theory "Calling for inspiration on Habermas, George Herbert Mead, and their critics, Dean challenges conventional interpretive constraints on law and theory, aiming to open up contestable spaces to democratic practices. She offers the ideal of reflective solidarity as a vehicle for reclaiming a qualified notion of universality for feminism. This controversial move will no doubt provoke debate, requiring readers to think through the link between our epistemological convictions and our political commitments."--Kathy Ferguson, author of The Man Question: Visions of Subjectivity in Feminist Theory. (shrink)

In this pathbreaking study, Axel Honneth argues that "the struggle for recognition" is, and should be, at the center of social conflicts.

In this article, I analyse the possible impact of human enhancement on social and moral relations, particularly the alleged threat on social solidarity and collective responsibility for vulnerable individuals in our society. The article starts with a short philosophical reflection on human enhancement technologies, followed by an analysis of the communitarian critique of human enhancement solidarity as a threat to solidarity. It continues with a discussion of the access to human enhancement technologies and the impact on disadvantaged groups seen from (...) the perspective of distributive justice as well as from the idea of humanitarian solidarity. An important part of the article discusses the idea of solidarity as a concept that expressed the relation of responsibility and recognition of identities and the impact human enhancement may have on this relation. Finally, I will introduce the concept of ‘reflective solidarity’ which argues that individualisation and solidarity do not oppose each other as claimed by communitarian authors. In the conclusion, I will argue that human enhancement technologies are not necessarily resulting in social fragmentation and diminished social responsibility if they are introduced in a reflective approach which pays attention to individual autonomy and social values at the same time. (shrink)

What's wrong with designer children, bionic athletes, and genetic engineering.