In this volume, Bimal K. Matilal blends knowledge contained in original Sanskrit texts and modern philosophical terminology in interpreting and reconstructing early philosophical theories, highlighting the critical and analytical nature of the Indian philosophical tradition.

In this clear, concise account, Siderits makes the Buddhist tradition accessible to a Western audience, offering generous selections from the canonical Buddhist texts and providing an engaging, analytical introduction to the basic tenets of Buddhist thought.

Original in content and approach, Philosophy in Classical India focuses on the rational principles of Indian philosophical theory, rather than the mysticism usually associated with it. Ganeri explores the philosophical projects of a number of major Indian philosophers and looks into the methods of rational inquiry deployed within these projects. In so doing, he illuminates a network of mutual reference and criticism, influence and response, in which reason is simultaneously used constructively and to call itself into question.

Buddhist philosophy in India in the early sixth century C. E. took an important tum away from the traditional methods of explaining and systematizing the teachings in Siitra literature that were attributed to the Buddha. The new direction in which several Indian Buddhist philosophers began to move was that of following reasoning to its natural conclusions, regardless whether the conclusions conflicted with traditional teachings. The central figure in this new movement was DiIinaga, a native of South India who found his (...) way to the centre of Buddhist education at Nalanda, studied the treatises that were learned by the Buddhist intellectuals of his day, and eventually wrote works of his own that formed the core of a distinctly new school of Buddhist thought. Inasmuch as virtually every Indian philosopher after the sixth century had either to reject Dirinaga's methods or build upon the foundations provided by his investigations into logic, epistemology and language, his influence on the evolution of Indian philosophy was considerable, and indeed some familiarity with Dirinaga's arguments and conclusions is indispensable for anyone who wishes to understand the historical development of Indian thought. Moreover, since the approach to Buddhism that grew out of Dirinaga's meditations on language and the limits of knowledge dominated the minds of many of the scholars who took Buddhism to Tibet, some familiarity with Dirinaga is also essential to those who wish to understand the intellectual infrastructure of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy and practice. (shrink)

When we understand that something is a pot, is it because of one property that all pots share? This seems unlikely, but without this common essence, it is difficult to see how we could teach someone to use the word "pot" or to see something as _a_ pot. The Buddhist apoha theory tries to resolve this dilemma, first, by rejecting properties such as "potness" and, then, by claiming that the element uniting all pots is their very difference from all non-pots. (...) In other words, when we seek out a pot, we select an object that is not a non-pot, and we repeat this practice with all other items and expressions. Writing from the vantage points of history, philosophy, and cognitive science, the contributors to this volume clarify the nominalist apoha theory and explore the relationship between apoha and the scientific study of human cognition. They engage throughout in a lively debate over the theory's legitimacy. Classical Indian philosophers challenged the apoha theory's legitimacy, believing instead in the existence of enduring essences. Seeking to settle this controversy, essays explore whether apoha offers new and workable solutions to problems in the scientific study of human cognition. They show that the work of generations of Indian philosophers can add much toward the resolution of persistent conundrums in analytic philosophy and cognitive science. (shrink)

Most modern analytic philosophers have ignored works of Indian philosophy such as Vasubandhu's 'Treasury of Metaphysics'. This neglect is unjustified. The account of the nature of the physical world given in the 'Treasury' is a one-category ontology of dharmas, which are simple, momentary tropes. They include basic physical tropes, the most fundamental level of the physical world, as well as higher-level tropes, including sensible properties such as colours, which are known as derived form. I argue that the relationship between the (...) basic physical tropes and derived form is one of supervenience. Vasubandhu's theory is a powerful and flexible one, which can be adapted so as to be consistent with modern science. (shrink)

“...a theory of meaning for a particular language should be conceived by a philosopher as describing the practice of linguistic interchange by speakers of the language without taking it as already understood what it is to have a language at all: that is what, by imagining such a theory, we are trying to make explict." – Michael Dummer (2004: 31).

The last work of the eminent philosopher Bimal Krishna Matilal, this book traces the origins of logical theory in India.

The great Buddhist writer Santaraksita (725-88) was central to the Buddhist traditions spread into Tibet. He and his disciple Kamalasila were among the most influential thinkers in classical India. They debated ideas not only within the Buddhist tradition but also with exegetes of other Indian religions, and they both traveled and nurtured Buddhism in Tibet during its infancy there. Their views, however, have been notoriously hard to classify. The present volume examines Santaraksita's encyclopedic Tattvasamgraha and Kamalasila's detailed commentary on that (...) text in his Panjika, two works that have historically been presented together. The works cover all conceivable problems in Buddhist thought and portray Buddhism as a supremely rational faith. One hotly debated topic of their time was omniscience -- infinite, all-compassing knowledge -- whether it was possible and whether one could defensibly claim it as a quality of the Buddha. (shrink)

Dreyfus examines the central ideas of Dharmakīrti, one of the most important Indian Buddhist philosophers, and their reception among Tibetan thinkers. During the golden age of ancient Indian civilization, Dharmakīrti articulated and defended Buddhist philosophical principles. He did so more systematically than anyone before his time (the seventh century CE) and was followed by a rich tradition of profound thinkers in India and Tibet. This work presents a detailed picture of this Buddhist tradition and its relevance to the history of (...) human ideas. Its perspective is mostly philosophical, but it also uses historical considerations as they relate to the evolution of ideas. (shrink)

The work of 6th century Indian logician Dharmakirti is explored in detail in series of twelve articles analyzing deviant logic, subject failure, andther important aspects of the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist logical tradition.riginal.

The present volume provides an annotated English translation of the last section of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (PVSV 164,24-176,16, ad stanzas 1.312-340), which includes his final assault on the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the authorlessness (apauruṣeyatva) of the Veda. Dharmakīrti draws out the apparently fatal consequences of this doctrine: If the Vedic scriptures are without an author, hence without an underlying intention, they can only be meaningless. Even if they have a meaning, it must be supersensible. But then, claiming that the leading Mīmāṃsaka (...) authorities - Jaimini, Śabara - possessed privileged cognitive access to its supersensible meaning is not an option, since the Mīmāṃsaka denies that humans have any supernatural form of knowledge. In short, Dharmakīrti forces his opponent to admit that the Veda is nothing but a mutus liber, a "mute book." Besides questioning the very possibility of Vedic hermeneutics under Mīmāṃsaka presuppositions, the passage translated contains interesting allusions to Dharmakīrti's linguistic theory, his views on scriptural authority, his critique of the Veda's reliability, and his understanding of the transmission of the Veda and Vedic śākhās ("schools", "recensions"). The section includes Dharmakīrti's polemics against a mysterious vṛddhamīmāṃsaka ("ancient Mīmāṃsaka"). An introduction (p. 7-21: "The Place of PVSV 164,24-176,16 in the work of Dharmakīrti," by V. Eltschinger), a synopsis of contents (p. 23-30) and two independent essays round off the volume. H. Krasser's "Logic in a Religious Context: Dharmakīrti in Defence of āgama" (p. 83-118) sheds new light on Dharmakīrti's conception of scriptural authority and its indebtedness to Dignāga. J. Taber's "Dharmakīrti and the Mīmāṃsakas in Conflict" (p. 119-149) explores the guiding principles of the Mīmāṃsā system of exegesis and assesses the relevance of Dharmakīrti's arguments against it. A general bibliography and various indices complete the volume."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

In the discussions concerning the date of Dharmakīrti, Jaina sources have never been seriously taken into account. They may, however, provide a valuable insight because Dharmakīrti both criticised and was criticised by Jaina thinkers. Two Jaina authors, Samantabhadra and Pūjyapāda Devanandin, may prove crucial in determining the actual dates of Dharmakīrti. The paper argues that Dharmakīrti directly influenced Samantabhadra in a number of ways, which sets the terminus ante quem for Dharmakīrti, and his traditional chronology has to be reconsidered in (...) the light of new findings. The paper suggests new dates for all the three authors. (shrink)

The proceedings volume of the Fourth International Dharmakirti Conference, held in Vienna in 2005, includes a collection of thirty-six essays devoted to the work of one of the most influential philosophers of India, the sixth-century Buddhist scholar Dharmakirti. It is the next volume in a series of Dharmakirti conference proceedings that includes, to date, Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition (Vienna 1991) and Dharmakirti's Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy (Vienna 1999). The papers in this volume present (...) research on the Buddhist logical and epistemological tradition in India and Tibet, including its cultural, philosophical and religious significance, and also emphasize the tradition's import on non-Buddhist philosophy and religion. They also report on some of the remarkable (and very important) new textual sources that have become available in recent years, namely, newly discovered Sanskrit texts by Dharmakirti and his followers. The contributions provide a rigorous and detailed overview of tlle astonishing Progress that has been made in understanding the work of Dharmakirti and his successors. Moreover, a number of essays break new ground by demonstrating various non-Buddhist contexts in which Dharmakirti's work was taken up and dealt with critically. (shrink)

The work is divided into two parts arranged into 26 chapters.

Intro -- Title -- Contents -- Publisher's Acknowledgment -- Introduction -- Madhyamaka's Promise as Philosophy -- 1. Trying to Be Fair -- 2. How Far Can a Mādhyamika Reform Customary Truth? Dismal Relativism, Fictionalism, Easy-Easy Truth, and the Alternatives -- Logic and Semantics -- 3. How Do Mādhyamikas Think? Notes on Jay Garfield, Graham Priest, and Paraconsistency -- 4. "How Do Mādhyamikas Think?" Revisited -- 5. Prasaṅga and Proof by Contradiction in Bhāviveka, Candrakīrti, and Dharmakīrti -- 6. Apoha Semantics: What (...) Did Bhāviveka Have to Do with It? -- 7. What Happened to the Third and Fourth Lemmas in the Tibetan Madhyamaka? -- Ethics and the Spiritual Path -- 8. Madhyamaka Buddhist Ethics -- 9. Reason, Irrationality, and Akrasia (Weakness of the Will) in Buddhism: Reflections upon Śāntideva's Arguments with Himself -- 10. Yogic Perception, Meditation, and Enlightenment: The Epistemological Issues in a Key Debate between Madhyamaka and Chan -- Madhyamaka in Contemporary Debates -- 11. On Minds, Dharmakīrti, and Madhyamaka -- 12. Serious, Lightweight, or Neither: Should Madhyamaka Go to Canberra? -- Notes on the Articles -- Abbreviations -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the Author -- Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism Titles Previously Published -- About Wisdom Publications -- Copyright. (shrink)

This book deals first with the historical and doctrinal foundations of Dharmakirti's religious philosophy. It points to a socio-historical context of Brahmanical hostility toward non- and anti-Vedic denominations (chapter 1), new patterns of Buddhist self-diction (chapter 2), reinvented models of theoretical and apologetical rationality (chapter 3), and the dogmatic infrastructure underlying Buddhist epistemology (chapter 4). It argues that Buddhist "Tantrism" and Buddhist "logic," two roughly contemporary phenomena that can be regarded as the main literary outcomes of the "early medieval" period, (...) share interesting features in terms of polemical targets and self-understanding. Since the end of the fifth century, intra-Buddhist polemics have become less relevant (at least in the form it had had heretofore) and partly receded into the background in favor of inter- or cross-confessional controversies. Departing from Abhidharma and addressing new, predominantly non-Buddhist targets resulted in the abandonment of scholastic, confession-specific terminology and methods as well as the development of new models of theoretical and apologetical rationality: first, the construction of a clear-cut concept of reason(ing) as opposed to scripture; second, the gradual constitution of a concept of practical rationality that served the apologetic purpose of defending the very possibility, or rationality, of the Buddhist path. Finally, the book examines the extent to which Buddhist epistemology can be said to be Buddhist at all as regards its deeper doctrinal structure. It attempts to interpret the foundations of Buddhist epistemology - the apoha theory, the doctrine of the pramanas, etc. - as a rationalization and an apologetically updated version of Buddhist dogmas on the structure of ultimate and conventional realities, on the cognitive bases of error and its elimination, and on the cintamayi prajna ("insight born of reflection") as a salvific means of a predominantly inferential order. (shrink)