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  1. (1 other version)God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom.John Martin Fischer - 1991 - Religious Studies 27 (2):278-280.
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  • Against Limited Foreknowledge.Patrick Todd - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):523-538.
    Theological fatalists contend that if God knows everything, then no human action is free, and that since God does know everything, no human action is free. One reply to such arguments that has become popular recently— a way favored by William Hasker and Peter van Inwagen—agrees that if God knows everything, no human action is free. The distinctive response of these philosophers is simply to say that therefore God does not know everything. On this view, what the fatalist arguments in (...)
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  • Soft facts and ontological dependence.Patrick Todd - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):829-844.
    In the literature on free will, fatalism, and determinism, a distinction is commonly made between temporally intrinsic (‘hard’) and temporally relational (‘soft’) facts at times; determinism, for instance, is the thesis that the temporally intrinsic state of the world at some given past time, together with the laws, entails a unique future (relative to that time). Further, it is commonly supposed by incompatibilists that only the ‘hard facts’ about the past are fixed and beyond our control, whereas the ‘soft facts’ (...)
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  • The compatibility of divine foreknowledge and freewill.J. Westphal - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):246-252.
    On Friday God knew everything, including f, a proposition about what Jones would do on Monday; we can write the time-indexed proposition that on Friday God believed f as Bgf. If Jones does not do the thing that makes f true, then the resulting state of affairs will be ∼f. So on Monday, before a certain time – ‘ t time’ – Jones has it in his power to bring it about that ∼f. It seems to follow that on Monday (...)
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  • God, Time, and Knowledge.William Hasker - 1989 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    ... or engenders a tradition of philosophical reflection, questions will arise about the relation between divine knowledge and power and human freedom. ...
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  • Truth and freedom.Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):29-57.
    Suppose that time t is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does not. It also argues that Jones even now has a choice about the thousand-years-ago truth of that Jones sits at t . Those arguments do not require the complex machinery (...)
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  • (1 other version)Divine omniscience and voluntary action.Nelson Pike - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):27-46.
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  • (1 other version)Freedom and foreknowledge.John Martin Fischer - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):67-79.
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  • On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Mind 100 (3):390-394.
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  • On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
    This book deals with foundational issues in the theory of the nature of action, the intentionality of action, the compatibility of freedom of action with determinism, and the explantion of action. Ginet's is a volitional view: that every action has as its core a 'simple' mental action. He develops a sophisticated account of the individuation of actions and also propounds a challenging version of the view that freedom of action is incompatible with determinism.
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  • Facts, Freedom and Foreknowledge.E. M. Zemach & D. Winderker - 1987 - Religious Studies 23 (1):19 - 28.
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  • (1 other version)The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control. [REVIEW]Randolph Clarke & John Martin Fischer - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (3):450.
    The first, the Transfer Version, employs an inference principle concerning the transfer of one's powerlessness with respect to certain facts. The principle says, roughly, "If a person is powerless over one thing, and powerless over that thing's leading to another, then the person is powerless over the second thing". The key premises are the Fixity of the Past and the Fixity of the Laws. Fischer defends the transfer principle against objections that have been raised by Anthony Kenny and Michael Slote.
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  • (1 other version)God, foreknowledge and freedom.John Martin Fischer - 1990 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 180 (4):728-729.
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  • (1 other version)Facts, freedom and foreknowledge: E. M. Zemach and D. Widerker.E. M. Zemach - 1987 - Religious Studies 23 (1):19-28.
    Is God's foreknowledge compatible with human freedom? One of the most attractive attempts to reconcile the two is the Ockhamistic view, which subscribes not only to human freedom and divine omniscience, but retains our most fundamental intuitions concerning God and time: that the past is immutable, that God exists and acts in time, and that there is no backward causation. In order to achieve all that, Ockhamists distinguish ‘hard facts’ about the past which cannot possibly be altered from ‘soft facts’ (...)
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  • (1 other version)``Freedom and Foreknowledge".John Martin Fischer - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):67-79.
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  • The supervenience of truth: freewill and omniscience.Storrs McCall - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):501-506.
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  • (1 other version)``Facts, Freedom, and Foreknowledge".Eddy M. Zemach & David Widerker - 1987 - Religious Studies 23 (1):19-28.
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  • Hasker on Omniscience.William Hasker - 1987 - Faith and Philosophy 4 (1):86-92.
    I contend that William Hasker’s argument to show omniscience incompatible with human freedom trades on an ambiguity between altering and bringing about the past, and that it is the latter only which is invoked by one who thinks they are compatible. I then use his notion of precluding circumstances to suggest that what gives the appearance of our inability to freely bring about the future (and hence that omniscience is incompatible with freedom) is that, from God’s perspective of foreknowledge, it (...)
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  • (1 other version)Freedom and Foreknowledge.Michael Tooley - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):212-224.
    In her book, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, Linda Zagzebski suggests that among the strongest ways of supporting the thesis that libertarian free will is incompatible with divine foreknowledge is what she refers to as the Accidental Necessity argument. Zagzebski contends, however, that at least three satisfactory responses to that argument are available.I argue that two of the proposed solutions are open to strong objections, and that the third, although it may very well handle the specific versions of the (...)
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  • (1 other version)``Freedom and Foreknowledge".Michael Tooley - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):212-224.
    In her book, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, Linda Zagzebski suggests that among the strongest ways of supporting the thesis that libertarian free will is incompatible with divine foreknowledge is what she refers to as the Accidental Necessity argument. Zagzebski contends, however, that at least three satisfactory responses to that argument are available.I argue that two of the proposed solutions are open to strong objections, and that the third, although it may very well handle the specific versions of the (...)
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  • A latter-day look at the foreknowledge problem.Nelson Pike - 1993 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 33 (3):129-164.
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