We analyze extensive games as interactive process models, using modallanguages plus matching notions of bisimulation as varieties of gameequivalences. Our technical results show how to fit existing modalnotions into this new setting.

Argues for the humean theory of motivation on the grounds that rejecting it requires rejecting decision theory.

This is a survey paper. Contents: 1 Introduction -- 2 The representation of belief -- 3 Kinds of belief change -- 4 Coherence constraints for belief revision -- 5 Different modes of belief change -- 6 Two strategies for characterizing rational changes of belief - 6.1 The postulates strategy - 6.2 The constructive strategy -- 7 An abstract view of the elements of belief change -- 8 Iterated changes of belief -- 9 Further developments - 9.1 Variants and extensions of (...) belief revision - 9.2 Updates - 9.3 Default inferences as expectation revision - 9.4 Belief merging -- 10 Concluding remarks. (shrink)

Logic is not just about single-agent notions like reasoning, or zero-agent notions like truth, but also about communication between two or more people. What we tell and ask each other can be just as 'logical' as what we infer in Olympic solitude. We show how such interactive phenomena can be studied systematically by merging epistemic and dynamic logic.

Statements not only update our current knowledge, but also have other dynamic effects. In particular, suggestions or commands ?upgrade' our preferences by changing the current order among worlds. We present a complete logic of knowledge update plus preference upgrade that works with dynamic-epistemic-style reduction axioms. This system can model changing obligations, conflicting commands, or ?regret'. We then show how to derive reduction axioms from arbitrary definable relation changes. This style of analysis also has a product update version with preferences between (...) actions, as well as worlds. Some illustrations are presented involving defaults and obligations. We conclude that our dynamic framework is viable, while admitting a further extension to more numerical ?utility update'. (shrink)

Current dynamic epistemic logics for analyzing effects of informational events often become cumbersome and opaque when common knowledge is added for groups of agents. Still, postconditions involving common knowledge are essential to successful multi-agent communication. We propose new systems that extend the epistemic base language with a new notion of ‘relativized common knowledge’, in such a way that the resulting full dynamic logic of information flow allows for a compositional analysis of all epistemic postconditions via perspicuous ‘reduction axioms’. We also (...) show how such systems can deal with factual alteration, rather than just information change, making them cover a much wider range of realistic events. After a warm-up stage of analyzing logics for public announcements, our main technical results are expressivity and completeness theorems for a much richer logic that we call LCC. This is a dynamic epistemic logic whose static base is propositional dynamic logic (PDL), interpreted epistemically. This system is capable of expressing all model-shifting operations with finite action models, while providing a compositional analysis for a wide range of informational events. This makes LCC a serious candidate for a standard in dynamic epistemic logic, as we illustrate by analyzing some complex communication scenarios, including sending successive emails with both ‘cc’ and ‘bcc’ lines, and other private announcements to subgroups. Our proofs involve standard modal techniques, combined with a new application of Kleene’s theorem on finite automata, as well as new Ehrenfeucht games of model comparison. (shrink)

Here is an important new theory of human action, a theory that assumes actions are founded on choices made by agents who face an open future.

Counterfactuals is David Lewis' forceful presentation of and sustained argument for a particular view about propositions which express contrary to fact conditionals, including his famous defense of realism about possible worlds and his theory of laws of nature.

Coherent, well organized text familiarizes readers with complete theory of logical inference and its applications to math and the empirical sciences. Part I deals with formal principles of inference and definition; Part II explores elementary intuitive set theory, with separate chapters on sets, relations, and functions. Last section introduces numerous examples of axiomatically formulated theories in both discussion and exercises. Ideal for undergraduates; no background in math or philosophy required.

We show how belief revision can be treated systematically in the format of dynamicepistemic logic, when operators of conditional belief are added. The core engine consists of definable update rules for changing plausibility relations between worlds, which have been proposed independently in the dynamic-epistemic literature on preference change. Our analysis yields two new types of modal result. First, we obtain complete logics for concrete mechanisms of belief revision, based on compositional reduction axioms. Next, we show how various abstract postulates for (...) belief revision can be analyzed by standard modal frame correspondences for model-changing operations. (shrink)

Preference is a basic notion in human behaviour, underlying such varied phenomena as individual rationality in the philosophy of action and game theory, obligations in deontic logic (we should aim for the best of all possible worlds), or collective decisions in social choice theory. Also, in a more abstract sense, preference orderings are used in conditional logic or non-monotonic reasoning as a way of arranging worlds into more or less plausible ones. The field of preference logic (cf. Hansson [10]) studies (...) formal systems that can express and analyze notions of preference between various sorts of entities: worlds, actions, or propositions. The art is of course to design a language that combines perspicuity and low complexity with reasonable expressive power. In this paper, we take a particularly simple approach. As preferences are binary relations between worlds, they naturally support standard unary modalities. In particular, our key modality ♦ϕ will just say that is ϕ true in some world which is at least as good as the current one. Of course, this notion can also be indexed to separate agents. The essence of this language is already in [4], but our semantics is more general, and so are our applications and later language extensions. Our modal language can express a variety of preference notions between propositions. Moreover, as already suggested in [9], it can “deconstruct” standard conditionals, providing an embedding of conditional logic into more standard modal logics. Next, we take the language to the analysis of games, where some sort of preference logic is evidently needed ([23] has a binary modal analysis different from ours). We show how a qualitative unary preference modality suffices for defining Nash Equilibrium in strategic games, and also the Backward Induction solution for finite extensive games. Finally, from a technical perspective, our treatment adds a new twist. Each application considered in this paper suggests the need for some additional access to worlds before the preference modality can unfold its true power.. (shrink)

Dependence is a common phenomenon, wherever one looks: ecological systems, astronomy, human history, stock markets - but what is the logic of dependence? This book is the first to carry out a systematic logical study of this important concept, giving on the way a precise mathematical treatment of Hintikka’s independence friendly logic. Dependence logic adds the concept of dependence to first order logic. Here the syntax and semantics of dependence logic are studied, dependence logic is given an alternative game theoretic (...) semantics, and results about its complexity are proven. This is a graduate textbook suitable for a special course in logic in mathematics, philosophy and computer science departments, and contains over 200 exercises, many of which have a full solution at the end of the book. It is also accessible to readers, with a basic knowledge of logic, interested in new phenomena in logic. (shrink)

Understanding human behaviour involves "why"'s as well as "how"'s. Rational people have good reasons for acting, but it can be hard to find out what these were and how they worked. In this Note, we discuss a few ways in which actions, preferences, and expectations are intermingled. This mixture is especially clear with the well-known solution procedure for extensive games called 'Backward Induction'. In particular, we discuss three scenarios for analyzing behaviour in a game. One can rationalize given moves as (...) revealing agents' preferences, one can also rationalize them as revealing agents' beliefs about others, but one can also change a predicted pattern of behaviour by making promises. All three scenarios transform given games to new ones, and we prove some results about their scope. A more general view of relevant game transformations would involve dynamic and epistemic game logics. Finally, our analysis describes and disentangles matters: but it will not tell you what to do! (shrink)