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  1. Occasions of Identity: A Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness.André Gallois - 1998 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Occasions of Identity is an exploration of timeless philosophical issues about persistence, change, time, and sameness. Andre Gallois offers a critical survey of various rival views about the nature of identity and change, and puts forward his own original theory. He supports the idea of occasional identities, arguing that it is coherent and helpful to suppose that things can be identical at one time but distinct at another. Gallois defends this view, demonstrating how it can solve puzzles about persistence dating (...)
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  • Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
    Persistence through time is like extension through space. A road has spatial parts in the subregions of the region of space it occupies; likewise, an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the various subregions of the total region of time it occupies. This view — known variously as four dimensionalism, the doctrine of temporal parts, and the theory that objects “perdure” — is opposed to “three dimensionalism”, the doctrine that things “endure”, or are “wholly present”.1 I will (...)
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  • Against Vague Existence.Theodore Sider - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):135 - 146.
    In my book Four-dimensionalism (chapter 4, section 9), I argued that fourdimensionalism – the doctrine of temporal parts – follows from several other premises, chief among which is the premise that existence is never vague. Kathrin Koslicki (preceding article) claims that the argument fails since its crucial premise is unsupported, and is dialectically inappropriate to assume in the context of arguing for four-dimensionalism. Since the relationship between four-dimensionalism and the non-vagueness of existence is not perfectly transparent, I think the argument (...)
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  • Constitution and Similarity.Kathrin Koslicki - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (3):327-363.
    Whenever an object constitutes, makes up or composes another object, the objects in question share a striking number of properties. This paper is addressed to the question of what might account for the intimate relation and striking similarity between constitutionally related objects. According to my account, the similarities between constitutionally related objects are captured at least in part by means of a principle akin to that of strong supervenience. My paper addresses two main issues. First, I propose independently plausible principles (...)
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  • On What There Are.Sydney Shoemaker - 1988 - Philosophical Topics 16 (1):201-223.
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  • The Statue and the Clay.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1998 - Noûs 32 (2):149-173.
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  • The 3d/4d Controversy: A Storm in a Teacup.Storrs McCall & E. J. Lowe - 2006 - Noûs 40 (3):570–578.
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  • Sameness and Substance.David Wiggins - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
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  • On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time.David Wiggins - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (1):90-95.
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  • More Fuss About Formulation: Sider on Three‐ and Four‐Dimensionalism.Christopher Hughes - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (4):463-480.
    Sider has argued that four‐dimensionalism can be given a clear and coherent formulation, and has attempted to provide one. He has also argued that three‐dimensionalism resists adequate formulation. I argue that Sider's worries about whether there is an adequate formulation of three‐dimensionalism are misplaced, and suggest a formulation of three‐dimensionalism different from the ones considered and rejected by Sider. I then give a ‘matching’ formulation of four‐dimensionalism, and argue that it captures four‐dimensionalism better than Sider's own formulation of that doctrine.
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  • The Ontology of Physical Objects. [REVIEW]William R. Carter - 1990 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):122-126.
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  • The Metaphysical Equivalence Of Three And Four Dimensionalism.Kristie Miller - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (1):91-117.
    I argue that two competing accounts of persistence, three and four dimensionalism, are in fact metaphysically equivalent. I begin by clearly defining three and four dimensionalism, and then I show that the two theories are intertranslatable and equally simple. Through consideration of a number of different cases where intuitions about persistence are contradictory, I then go on to show that both theories describe these cases in the same manner. Further consideration of some empirical issues arising from the theory of special (...)
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  • 3D/4D Equivalence, the Twins Paradox and Absolute Time.Storrs McCall & E. J. Lowe - 2002 - Analysis 63 (2):114–123.
    The thesis of 3D/4D equivalence states that every three-dimensional description of the world is translatable without remainder into a four-dimensional description, and vice versa. In representing an object in 3D or in 4D terms we are giving alternative descriptions of one and the same thing, and debates over whether the ontology of the physical world is "really" 3D or 4D are pointless. The twins paradox is shown to rest, in relativistic 4D geometry, on a reversed law of triangle inequality. But (...)
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  • Change, Temporal Parts, and the Argument From Vagueness.Achille C. Varzi - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (4):485-498.
    The so‐called ‘argument from vagueness’ is among the most powerful and innovative arguments offered in support of the view that objects are four‐dimensional perdurants. The argument is defective – I submit – and in a number of ways that are worth looking into. But each ‘defect’, each gap in the argument, corresponds to a model of change that is independently problematic and that can hardly be built into the common‐sense picture of the world. So once all the gaps of the (...)
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  • Blocking the Path From Vagueness to Four Dimensionalism.Kristie Miller - 2005 - Ratio 18 (3):317–331.
    There is a general form of an argument which I call the ‘argument from vagueness’ which attempts to show that objects persist by perduring, via the claim that vagueness is never ontological in nature and thus that composition is unrestricted. I argue that even if we grant that vagueness is always the result of semantic indeterminacy rather than ontological vagueness, and thus also grant that composition is unrestricted, it does not follow that objects persist by perduring. Unrestricted mereological composition lacks (...)
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  • Non-Mereological Universalism.Kristie Miller - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):404–422.
    In this paper I develop a version of universalism that is non-mereological. Broadly speaking, non-mereological universalism is the thesis that for any arbitrary set of objects and times, there is a persisting object which, at each of those times, will be constituted by those of the objects that exist at that time. I consider two general versions of non-mereological universalism, one which takes basic simples to be enduring objects, and the other which takes simples to be instantaneous objects. This yields (...)
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  • Vagueness and Endurance.E. J. Lowe - 2005 - Analysis 65 (2):104-112.
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  • Instantiation, Identity and Constitution.E. J. Lowe - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (1):45 - 59.
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  • The Crooked Path From Vagueness to Four-Dimensionalism.Kathrin Koslicki - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):107 - 134.
    In his excellent recent book, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time (Sider, 2001), Theodore Sider defends a version of four-dimensionalism which he calls the ‘stage-theory’: according to this view, ordinary persisting objects are analyzed as being identical to momentary stages; they persist by having temporal counterparts at other times. Despite all of its many significant virtues, however, Sider’s case for four-dimensionalism is troubling in certain crucial respects, both philosophically and meta-philosophically. My purpose in this paper is to show that, (...)
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  • Sameness and substance.David Wiggins - 1980 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 174 (1):125-128.
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  • Change, Temporal Parts, and the Argument From Vagueness.Achille C. Varzi - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (4):485–498.
    The so-called "argument from vagueness", the clearest formulation of which is to be found in Ted Sider’s book Four-dimensionalism, is arguably the most powerful and innovative argument recently offered in support of the view that objects are four-dimensional perdurants. The argument is defective--I submit--and in a number of ways that is worth looking into. But each "defect" corresponds to a model of change that is independently problematic and that can hardly be built into the common-sense picture of the world. So (...)
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  • .A. Gallois - 2002 - Ruch Filozoficzny 3 (3).
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  • Continuants and Continuity.Robin Le Poidevin - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):381 - 398.
    Are we the people we were? If we are continuants, then the answer to this question is an affirmative one. But it is a moot point whether anything is a continuant. The debate over this issue—of whether there are such things as continuants—is often conducted in the context of theories concerning the apparent passage of time. Thus it has been argued that the tenseless theory of time, according to which time does not really pass, forces us to tear down part (...)
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  • The Problem of the Many and the Vagueness of Constitution.E. J. Lowe - 1995 - Analysis 55 (3):179-182.
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  • Comments on Varzi.Fabrice Correia - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (4):499-502.
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