Philosophical accounts of forgiveness ordinarily emphasize three components: i) the overcoming of hostile emotions toward the wrongdoer; ii) a change of heart toward the wrongdoer, which goes beyond the cessation of hostile emotions and involves the acquisition of a more positive attitude toward him or her; iii) a willingness to restore the relationship and proceed toward reconciliation. In this paper, I examine these three presumed components, endorsing the first but rejecting the second and the third as unnecessary features of forgiveness. (...) I thus argue that forgiveness is, first and foremost, a unilateral, intra-psychic process that does not necessarily lead to reconciliation or to the fostering of friendly relations. The paper has three parts. In the first part, I argue that overcoming resentment toward one’s assailant by coming to view oneself more favourably lies at the core of forgiveness. In the second part, I show that one need not be able to view one’s assailant in a different and more favourable light to be able to overcome one’s resentment and forgive one’s assailant. Furthermore, in the third part, I argue that a wholly negative view of the wrongdoer, moral hatred and a refusal to be reconciled with him or her are compatible with forgiving him or her. (shrink)

It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the (...) first order," which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires. (shrink)

This paper has three main aims. The first is to provide a critical assessment of two rival concepts of suffering, that proposed by Cassell and that proposed in this journal by van Hooft. The second aim of the paper is to sketch a more plausible concept of suffering, one which derives from a Wittgensteinian view of linguistic meaning. This more plausible concept is labeled an ‘intuitive concept’. The third aim is to assess the prospects for scientific understanding of suffering.

This analysis presents an epistemological and moral examination of suffering. It addresses the specific questions: (1) What is suffering? (2) Can one's suffering be assessed by another? and (3) What is the moral significance of suffering? The epistemological analysis is orientated by Peter Hacker's framework for the investigation of emotions, demonstrating that suffering is an emotion. This leads to a discussion of whether suffering is a phenomenon that can be evaluated objectively by another person who is not experiencing the suffering, (...) questioning the validity of some decisional models for limiting life-sustaining therapies with the aim of preventing suffering. This analysis highlights that understandings of suffering are value laden. It is conventionally implied that suffering is `bad' and that it should be eliminated. Suffering is commonly regarded as a moral wrong that needs to be made right by health care. This article concludes with a recommendation for a paradigm shift in how suffering can be better understood, through the practice of empathic attunement. (shrink)