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  1. Social mechanisms and causal inference.Daniel Steel - 2004 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (1):55-78.
    Several authors have claimed that mechanisms play a vital role in distinguishing between causation and mere correlation in the social sciences. Such claims are sometimes interpreted to mean that without mechanisms, causal inference in social science is impossible. The author agrees with critics of this proposition but explains how the account of how mechanisms aid causal inference can be interpreted in a way that does not depend on it. Nevertheless, he shows that this more charitable version of the account is (...)
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  • Review of Daniel Little: Varieties of social explanation: an introduction to the philosophy of social science[REVIEW]Daniel Little - 1993 - Ethics 103 (2):404-406.
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  • Varieties of social explanation: an introduction to the philosophy of social science.Daniel Little - 1991 - Boulder: Westview Press.
    Professor Little presents an introduction to the philosophy of social science with an emphasis on the central forms of explanation in social science: rational-intentional, causal, functional, structural, materialist, statistical and interpretive. The book is very strong on recent developments, particularly in its treatment of rational choice theory, microfoundations for social explanation, the idea of supervenience, functionalism, and current discussions of relativism.Of special interest is Professor Littleā€™s insight that, like the philosophy of natural science, the philosophy of social science can profit (...)
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  • Explanation And Thought Experiments In History.Tim De Mey & Erik Weber - 2003 - History and Theory 42 (1):28-38.
    Although interest in them is clearly growing, most professional historians do not accept thought experiments as appropriate tools. Advocates of the deliberate use of thought experiments in history argue that without counterfactuals, causal attributions in history do not make sense. Whereas such arguments play upon the meaning of causation in history, this article focuses on the reasoning processes by which historians arrive at causal explanations. First, we discuss the roles thought experiments play in arriving at explanations of both facts and (...)
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