Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. A Note on Design: What's Fine-tuning Got to Do With It?Jonathan Weisberg - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):431-438.
    We have known for a long time that there is complex, intelligent life. More recently we have discovered that the physics of our universe is fine-tuned so as to allow for the existence of such life. Call these two observations the Old Datum and the New Datum, respectively. Our question here is: once we know the Old Datum, does the New Datum provide additional evidence for the design hypothesis? I argue that it does not. Thus, there is an important sense (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Knowledge on Trust.Paul Faulkner - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Paul Faulkner presents a new theory of testimony - the basis of much of what we know. He addresses the questions of what makes it reasonable to accept a piece of testimony, and what warrants belief formed on that basis. He rejects rival theories and argues that testimonial knowledge and testimonially warranted belief are based on trust.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   118 citations  
  • What fine-tuning's got to do with it: a reply to Weisberg.R. White - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):676-679.
    The Fine-tuning argument takes the existence of life as evidence that an agent had a hand in making the universe. The argument is thought to hinge on the claim that ‘fine-tuning’ of various parameters is required for life to evolve. Jonathan Weisberg argues that even granting that life can provide evidence for design, further data about the fine-tuning required add nothing to the case. Weisberg charges the argument rests on unsupported assumptions about a designer’s preference for a fine-tuned universe (over (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Learning from words: testimony as a source of knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Testimony is an invaluable source of knowledge. We rely on the reports of those around us for everything from the ingredients in our food and medicine to the identity of our family members. Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the epistemology of testimony. Despite the multitude of views offered, a single thesis is nearly universally accepted: testimonial knowledge is acquired through the process of transmission from speaker to hearer. In this book, Jennifer Lackey shows that this thesis (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   237 citations  
  • (1 other version)Knowing and asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.
    This paper aims to identify the constitutive rule of assertion, conceived by analogy with the rules of a game. That assertion has such rules is by no means obvious; perhaps it is more like a natural phenomenon than it seems. One way to find out is by supposing that it has such rules, in order to see where the hypothesis leads and what it explains. That will be done here. The hypothesis is not perfectly clear, of course, but we have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   331 citations  
  • Knowledge and certainty.Jason Stanley - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.
    This paper is a companion piece to my earlier paper “Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions”. There are two intuitive charges against fallibilism. One is that it countenances the truth (and presumably acceptability) of utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, though it might be that he is not a Republican”. The second is that it countenances the truth (and presumably acceptability) of utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, even though (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   111 citations  
  • (1 other version)Getting told and being believed.Richard Moran - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-29.
    The paper argues for the centrality of believing the speaker (as distinct from believing the statement) in the epistemology of testimony, and develops a line of thought from Angus Ross which claims that in telling someone something, the kind of reason for belief that a speaker presents is of an essentially different kind from ordinary evidence. Investigating the nature of the audience's dependence on the speaker's free assurance leads to a discussion of Grice's formulation of non-natural meaning in an epistemological (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   204 citations  
  • Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   343 citations  
  • On Telling and Trusting.Paul Faulkner - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):875-902.
    A key debate in the epistemology of testimony concerns when it is reasonable to acquire belief through accepting what a speaker says. This debate has been largely understood as the debate over how much, or little, assessment and monitoring an audience must engage in. When it is understood in this way the debate simply ignores the relationship speaker and audience can have. Interlocutors rarely adopt the detached approach to communication implied by talk of assessment and monitoring. Audiences trust speakers to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   94 citations  
  • Content preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   598 citations  
  • Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. [REVIEW]Jennifer Lackey - 2012 - Philosophy Now 88:44-45.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   257 citations  
  • Problems With the Argument From Fine Tuning.Mark Colyvan, Jay L. Garfield & Graham Priest - 2005 - Synthese 145 (3):325-338.
    The argument from fine tuning is supposed to establish the existence of God from the fact that the evolution of carbon-based life requires the laws of physics and the boundary conditions of the universe to be more or less as they are. We demonstrate that this argument fails. In particular, we focus on problems associated with the role probabilities play in the argument. We show that, even granting the fine tuning of the universe, it does not follow that the universe (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
    In this book Jonathan Adler offers a strengthened version of evidentialism, arguing that the ethics of belief should be rooted in the concept of belief--that...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   339 citations  
  • Belief's Own Ethics.[author unknown] - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.
    The fundamental question of the ethics of belief is "What ought one to believe?" According to the traditional view of evidentialism, the strength of one's beliefs should be proportionate to the evidence. Conventional ways of defending and challenging evidentialism rely on the idea that what one ought to believe is a matter of what it is rational, prudent, ethical, or personally fulfilling to believe. Common to all these approaches is that they look outside of belief itself to determine what one (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   204 citations