- Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2011 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.details
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Clifford, William Kingdon.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2021 - In Stewart Goetz & Charles Taliaferro (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Disagreement and the value of self-trust.Robert Pasnau - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2315-2339.details
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What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.details
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How We Choose Our Beliefs.Gregory Salmieri & Benjamin Bayer - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):41–53.details
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Alienated Belief.David Hunter - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (2):221-240.details
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Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.details
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Equal treatment for belief.Susanna Rinard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1923-1950.details
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Epistemic Vigilance.Dan Sperber, Fabrice Clément, Christophe Heintz, Olivier Mascaro, Hugo Mercier, Gloria Origgi & Deirdre Wilson - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (4):359-393.details
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Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis.Philip J. Nickel - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):312-334.details
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Moore's Paradox and Assertion.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - In Goldberg Sanford (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
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Fictional Persuasion and the Nature of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2017 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Art and Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 174-193.details
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Knowledge and normativity.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Markos Valaris & Stephen Hetherington (eds.), Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing.details
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The Right in the Good: A Defense of Teleological Non-Consequentialism in Epistemology.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 23-47.details
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Trust, authority and epistemic responsibility.Gloria Origgi - 2008 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 23 (1):35-44.details
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Two notions of epistemic normativity.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2009 - Theoria 75 (3):161-178.details
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The Counterfactual Theory of Free Will: A Genuinely Deterministic Form of Soft Determinism.Rick Repetti - 2010 - Saarbrücken, Germany: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing.details
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Sincerity and Transmission.Stephen Wright - 2016 - Ratio 29 (1):42-56.details
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Why There are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review 46 (1):115-136.details
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Why There Are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (1):115-136.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.details
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Moore’s Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):10-23.details
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Moore-paradoxical Assertion, Fully Conscious Belief and the Transparency of Belief.John N. Williams - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (1):9-12.details
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Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
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The argument from divine indifference.Jonathan Weisberg - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):707-714.details
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Systematic Epistemic Rights Violations in the Media: A Brexit Case Study.Lani Watson - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (2):88-102.details
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Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori.Lisa Warenski - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403-426.details
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Begging the Question in Arguments Based on Testimony.Douglas Walton - 2005 - Argumentation 19 (1):85-113.details
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A Reverse Interpretation Model of Testimony.Hamid Vahid - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):85-102.details
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Reasons for action and reasons for belief.Christopher Tollefsen - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):55 – 65.details
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The Level-Splitting View and the Non-Akrasia Constraint.Marco Tiozzo - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):917-923.details
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Is panpsychism simple?Henry Taylor - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):265-275.details
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Truth promoting non-evidential reasons for belief.Brian Talbot - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):599-618.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.details
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An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1071-1094.details
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A Bayesian Approach to Absent Evidence Reasoning.Christopher Lee Stephens - 2011 - Informal Logic 31 (1):56-65.details
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Epistemic duties and failure to understand one’s evidence.Scott Stapleford - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):147-177.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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Knowledge, Justification and Normative Coincidence1.Martin Smith - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):273-295.details
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Saying and believing: the norm commonality assumption.Mona Simion - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-16.details
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Epistemic Norm Correspondence and the Belief–Assertion Parallel.Mona Simion - 2018 - Analysis:any048.details
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Truth, Thinking, Testimony and Trust: Alvin Goldman on Epistemology and Education.Harvey Siegel - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):345-366.details
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Epistemology and Education: An Incomplete Guide to the Social-Epistemological Issues.Harvey Siegel - 2004 - Episteme 1 (2):129-137.details
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Pseudoscience and Idiosyncratic Theories of Rational Belief.Nicholas Shackel - 2013 - In M. Pigliucci & M. Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. University of Chicago Press. pp. 417-438.details
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Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):343-361.details
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The will and evidence toward belief: A critical essay on Jonathan E. Adler's belief's own ethics.Nathan Segars - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):79 – 91.details
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Können wir uns entscheiden, etwas zu glauben? Zur Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit eines doxastischen Willens.Sebastian Schmidt - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):571-582.details
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