Can we trust robots? Responding to the literature on trust and e-trust, this paper asks if the question of trust is applicable to robots, discusses different approaches to trust, and analyses some preconditions for trust. In the course of the paper a phenomenological-social approach to trust is articulated, which provides a way of thinking about trust that puts less emphasis on individual choice and control than the contractarian-individualist approach. In addition, the argument is made that while robots are neither human (...) nor mere tools, we have sufficient functional, agency-based, appearance-based, social-relational, and existential criteria left to evaluate trust in robots. It is also argued that such evaluations must be sensitive to cultural differences, which impact on how we interpret the criteria and how we think of trust in robots. Finally, it is suggested that when it comes to shaping conditions under which humans can trust robots, fine-tuning human expectations and robotic appearances is advisable. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 64 Heft: 1 Seiten: 103-118.

Debates about the regulatory requirements surrounding the introduction of nanotechnology products have, at least in Australia, remained largely within disciplinary boundaries and industry and academic circles. This paper argues for a more interdisciplinary and inclusive upstream debate about the introduction of ethical, regulatory and legal frameworks that may avoid the loss of public trust that has characterised the introduction of many new technologies in the past. Insights from risk-perception theory and research are used to introduce the notion of risk as (...) narrative as a framework for action. This paper suggests three main strategies for moving forward; drawing insights from the “trust gap” experiences of other new technologies; the application of the active form of the precautionary principle; and, the creation of nano-futures that meet both community and industry values through effective public engagement. (shrink)

Trust is valuable when placed in trustworthy agents and activities, but damaging or costly when placed in untrustworthy agents and activities. So it is puzzling that much contemporary work on trust – such as that based on polling evidence – studies generic attitudes of trust in types of agent, institution or activity in complete abstraction from any account of trustworthiness. Information about others’ generic attitudes of trust or mistrust that take no account of evidence whether those attitudes are well or (...) ill placed can offer little or no help for those who aim to place or refuse trust well. Information about attitudes is evidently useful to those who aim to influence those who hold them, which explains why polls about attitudes are popular with political parties, advertisers and other campaigning organisations. But where we aim not to influence others, but to place and refuse trust intelligently we must link trust to trustworthiness, and must focus on evidence of honesty, competence and r... (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the ethics of e - trust and e - trustworthiness in the context of health care, looking at direct computer-patient interfaces (DCPIs), information systems that provide medical information, diagnosis, advice, consenting and/or treatment directly to patients without clinicians as intermediaries. Designers, manufacturers and deployers of such systems have an ethical obligation to provide evidence of their trustworthiness to users. My argument for this claim is based on evidentialism about trust and trustworthiness: the idea that trust (...) should be based on sound evidence of trustworthiness. Evidence of trustworthiness is a broader notion than one might suppose, including not just information about the risks and performance of the system, but also interactional and context-based information. I suggest some sources of evidence in this broader sense that make it plausible that designers, manufacturers and deployers of DCPIs can provide evidence to users that is cognitively simple, easy to communicate, yet rationally connected with actual trustworthiness. (shrink)

As use of the Internet has increased, many issues of trust have arisen. Users wonder: will may privacy be protected if I provide information to this Internet vendor? Will my credit card remain secure? Should I trust that this party will deliver the goods? Will the goods be as described? These questions are not merely academic. A recent Boston Consulting Group study revealed that one out of ten consumers have ordered and paid for items online that never were delivered (Williams, (...) 2001). This year consumers filed around 11 000 complaints with the Federal Trade Commission alleging auction fraud, a figure up from the 107 lodged in 1997. It is no wonder that people are increasingly worried about whom to trust in online interactions. This paper explores the conditions under which online trust thrives and looks at examples of best and worst corporate practices. Online trust issues arise in a wide array of forums - chat rooms, news postings, e-catalogues, and retail transactions, to name a few. This paper focuses primarily on the online retail market, but the analysis applies to informational and entertainment sites as well. (shrink)

I present and defend an account of three-place trustworthiness according to which B is trustworthy with respect to A in domain of interaction D, if and only if she is competent with respect to that domain, and she would take the fact that A is counting on her, were A to do so in this domain, to be a compelling reason for acting as counted on. This is not the whole story of trustworthiness, however, for we want those we can (...) count on to identify themselves so that we can place our trust wisely. (shrink)