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  1. Probability Theory. The Logic of Science.Edwin T. Jaynes - 2002 - Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Edited by G. Larry Bretthorst.
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  • Inference, Method and Decision.David Miller - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (120):264.
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  • The continuum of inductive methods.Rudolf Carnap - 1952 - [Chicago]: University of Chicago Press.
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  • Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference.Judea Pearl - 1988 - Morgan Kaufmann.
    The book can also be used as an excellent text for graduate-level courses in AI, operations research, or applied probability.
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  • Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
    Scientific reasoning is—and ought to be—conducted in accordance with the axioms of probability. This Bayesian view—so called because of the central role it accords to a theorem first proved by Thomas Bayes in the late eighteenth ...
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  • Maximising entropy efficiently.Jon Williamson - 2002
    Recommended citation: . . Link¨ oping Electronic Articles in Computer and Information Science, Vol. 7(2002): nr 0. http://www.ep.liu.se/ea/cis/2002/00/. September 18, 2002. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://philarchive.org/archive/WILMEE"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WILMEE" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILMEE')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WILMEE" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILMEE','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/WILMEE"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 3 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILMEE"></span></div></div></li> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr id="WILII-WILMOB-2"> <td> <li id='eWILMOB-2' onclick="ee('click','WILMOB-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILMOB-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILMOB-2')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="/rec/WILMOB-2"><span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Motivating objective bayesianism: From empirical constraints to objective probabilities.</span></a><a class='discreet' title="View other works by Jon Williamson" href="/s/Jon%20Williamson"><span class='name'>Jon Williamson</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class='toggle' style='display:none' data-target='extras'>details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">Kyburg goes half-way towards objective Bayesianism. He accepts that frequencies constrain rational belief to an interval but stops short of isolating an optimal degree of belief within this interval. I examine the case for going the whole hog. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://philarchive.org/archive/WILMOB-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WILMOB-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILMOB-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WILMOB-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILMOB-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/WILMOB-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 25 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILMOB-2"></span></div></div></li> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr id="WILII-JOHPTD"> <td> <li id='eJOHPTD' onclick="ee('click','JOHPTD')" onmouseover="ee('over','JOHPTD')" onmouseout="ee('out','JOHPTD')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="/rec/JOHPTD"><span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Probability: The deductive and inductive problems.</span></a><a class='discreet' title="View other works by W. E. Johnson" href="/s/W. E.%20Johnson"><span class='name'>W. E. Johnson</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1932</span> - <span class='pubInfo'> <i class='pubName'>Mind</i> 41 (164):409-423.</span></span><span class='toggle' style='display:none' data-target='extras'>details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://philarchive.org/archive/JOHPTD"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-JOHPTD" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('JOHPTD')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-JOHPTD" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('JOHPTD','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/JOHPTD"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 47 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-JOHPTD"></span></div></div></li> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr id="WILII-CARTCO-87"> <td> <li id='eCARTCO-87' onclick="ee('click','CARTCO-87')" onmouseover="ee('over','CARTCO-87')" onmouseout="ee('out','CARTCO-87')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="/rec/CARTCO-87"><span class='articleTitle recTitle'>The Continuum of Inductive Methods.</span></a><a class='discreet' title="View other works by Rudolf Carnap" href="/s/Rudolf%20Carnap"><span class='name'>Rudolf Carnap</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1953</span> - <span class='pubInfo'> <i class='pubName'>Philosophy</i> 28 (106):272-273.</span></span><span class='toggle' style='display:none' data-target='extras'>details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://philarchive.org/archive/CARTCO-87"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-CARTCO-87" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('CARTCO-87')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-CARTCO-87" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('CARTCO-87','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/CARTCO-87"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 142 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-CARTCO-87"></span></div></div></li> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr id="WILII-ROSIMA-4"> <td> <li id='eROSIMA-4' onclick="ee('click','ROSIMA-4')" onmouseover="ee('over','ROSIMA-4')" onmouseout="ee('out','ROSIMA-4')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="/rec/ROSIMA-4"><span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Inference, Method and Decision.</span></a><a class='discreet' title="View other works by R. D. Rosenkrantz" href="/s/R. D.%20Rosenkrantz"><span class='name'>R. D. Rosenkrantz</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1978</span> - <span class='pubInfo'> <i class='pubName'>British Journal for the Philosophy of Science</i> 29 (3):301-304.</span></span><span class='toggle' style='display:none' data-target='extras'>details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://philarchive.org/archive/ROSIMA-4"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ROSIMA-4" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ROSIMA-4')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ROSIMA-4" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ROSIMA-4','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/ROSIMA-4"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 39 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ROSIMA-4"></span></div></div></li> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr id="WILII-PARTUR-2"> <td> <li id='ePARTUR-2' onclick="ee('click','PARTUR-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','PARTUR-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','PARTUR-2')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="/rec/PARTUR-2"><span class='articleTitle recTitle'>The Uncertain Reasoner’s Companion. <span class='hint'>[REVIEW]</span></span></a><a class='discreet' title="View other works by J. B. Paris" href="/s/J. B.%20Paris"><span class='name'>J. B. Paris</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1997</span> - <span class='pubInfo'> <i class='pubName'>Erkenntnis</i> 46 (3):397-400.</span></span><span class='toggle' style='display:none' data-target='extras'>details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://philarchive.org/archive/PARTUR-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-PARTUR-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PARTUR-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PARTUR-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PARTUR-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/PARTUR-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 56 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PARTUR-2"></span></div></div></li> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr id="WILII-PARTEO-21"> <td> <li id='ePARTEO-21' onclick="ee('click','PARTEO-21')" onmouseover="ee('over','PARTEO-21')" onmouseout="ee('out','PARTEO-21')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="/rec/PARTEO-21"><span class='articleTitle recTitle'>The emergence of reasons conjecture.</span></a><a class='discreet' title="View other works by J. B. Paris" href="/s/J. B.%20Paris"><span class='name'>J. B. Paris</span></a> & <a class='discreet' title="View other works by A. Vencovská" href="/s/A.%20Vencovská"><span class='name'>A. Vencovská</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2003</span> - <span class='pubInfo'> <i class='pubName'>Journal of Applied Logic</i> 1 (3-4):167-195.</span></span><span class='toggle' style='display:none' data-target='extras'>details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://philarchive.org/archive/PARTEO-21"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-PARTEO-21" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('PARTEO-21')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-PARTEO-21" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('PARTEO-21','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/PARTEO-21"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 4 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-PARTEO-21"></span></div></div></li> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr id="WILII-GOOTEO-14"> <td> <li id='eGOOTEO-14' onclick="ee('click','GOOTEO-14')" onmouseover="ee('over','GOOTEO-14')" onmouseout="ee('out','GOOTEO-14')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="/rec/GOOTEO-14"><span class='articleTitle recTitle'>The Estimation of Probabilities: An Essay on Modern Bayesian Methods.</span></a><a class='discreet' title="View other works by I. J. Good" href="/s/I. J.%20Good"><span class='name'>I. J. Good</span></a>, <a class='discreet' title="View other works by Ian Hacking" href="/s/Ian%20Hacking"><span class='name'>Ian Hacking</span></a>, <a class='discreet' title="View other works by R. C. Jeffrey" href="/s/R. C.%20Jeffrey"><span class='name'>R. C. Jeffrey</span></a> & <a class='discreet' title="View other works by Håkan Törnebohm" href="/s/Håkan%20Törnebohm"><span class='name'>Håkan Törnebohm</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1966</span> - <span class='pubInfo'> <i class='pubName'>Synthese</i> 16 (2):234-244.</span></span><span class='toggle' style='display:none' data-target='extras'>details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://philarchive.org/archive/GOOTEO-14"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-GOOTEO-14" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('GOOTEO-14')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-GOOTEO-14" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('GOOTEO-14','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/GOOTEO-14"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 26 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-GOOTEO-14"></span></div></div></li> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr id="WILII-HAYTCO-11"> <td> <li id='eHAYTCO-11' onclick="ee('click','HAYTCO-11')" onmouseover="ee('over','HAYTCO-11')" onmouseout="ee('out','HAYTCO-11')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="/rec/HAYTCO-11"><span class='articleTitle recTitle'>The Continuum of Inductive Methods.</span></a><a class='discreet' title="View other works by William H. Hay" href="/s/William H.%20Hay"><span class='name'>William H. Hay</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1953</span> - <span class='pubInfo'> <i class='pubName'>Philosophical Review</i> 62 (3):468.</span></span><span class='toggle' style='display:none' data-target='extras'>details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://philarchive.org/archive/HAYTCO-11"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-HAYTCO-11" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('HAYTCO-11')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-HAYTCO-11" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('HAYTCO-11','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/HAYTCO-11"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 51 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-HAYTCO-11"></span></div></div></li> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr id="WILII-WILOBN"> <td> <li id='eWILOBN' onclick="ee('click','WILOBN')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILOBN')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILOBN')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="/rec/WILOBN"><span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Objective bayesian nets.</span></a><a class='discreet' title="View other works by Jon Williamson" href="/s/Jon%20Williamson"><span class='name'>Jon Williamson</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class='toggle' style='display:none' data-target='extras'>details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">I present a formalism that combines two methodologies: objective Bayesianism and Bayesian nets. According to objective Bayesianism, an agent’s degrees of belief (i) ought to satisfy the axioms of probability, (ii) ought to satisfy constraints imposed by background knowledge, and (iii) should otherwise be as non-committal as possible (i.e. have maximum entropy). Bayesian nets offer an efficient way of representing and updating probability functions. An objective Bayesian net is a Bayesian net representation of the maximum entropy probability function. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://philarchive.org/archive/WILOBN"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WILOBN" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILOBN')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WILOBN" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILOBN','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/WILOBN"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 7 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILOBN"></span></div></div></li> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr id="WILII-WILBNA-2"> <td> <li id='eWILBNA-2' onclick="ee('click','WILBNA-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','WILBNA-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','WILBNA-2')" class='entry'><a href="/rec/WILBNA-2#versions" style='float:right; margin-right:3px;' class='subtle'>(1 other version)</a><span class="citation"><a href="/rec/WILBNA-2"><span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Bayesian nets and causality.</span></a><a class='discreet' title="View other works by Jon Williamson" href="/s/Jon%20Williamson"><span class='name'>Jon Williamson</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">manuscript</span></span><span class='toggle' style='display:none' data-target='extras'>details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">How should we reason with causal relationships? Much recent work on this question has been devoted to the theses (i) that Bayesian nets provide a calculus for causal reasoning and (ii) that we can learn causal relationships by the automated learning of Bayesian nets from observational data. The aim of this book is to.. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://philarchive.org/archive/WILBNA-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-WILBNA-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('WILBNA-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-WILBNA-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('WILBNA-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/WILBNA-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 37 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-WILBNA-2"></span></div></div></li> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr id="WILII-ROSIMA"> <td> <li id='eROSIMA' onclick="ee('click','ROSIMA')" onmouseover="ee('over','ROSIMA')" onmouseout="ee('out','ROSIMA')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="/rec/ROSIMA"><span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Inference, Method and Decision: Towards a Bayesian Philosophy of Science by Roger D. Rosenkrantz. <span class='hint'>[REVIEW]</span></span></a><a class='discreet' title="View other works by Stephen Spielman" href="/s/Stephen%20Spielman"><span class='name'>Stephen Spielman</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1981</span> - <span class='pubInfo'> <i class='pubName'>Journal of Philosophy</i> 78 (6):356-367.</span></span><span class='toggle' style='display:none' data-target='extras'>details</span><div class="extras"><div class="options"><a href="https://philarchive.org/archive/ROSIMA"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-ROSIMA" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('ROSIMA')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-ROSIMA" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('ROSIMA','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/ROSIMA"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 27 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-ROSIMA"></span></div></div></li> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr id="WILII-HILSOO"> <td> <li id='eHILSOO' onclick="ee('click','HILSOO')" onmouseover="ee('over','HILSOO')" onmouseout="ee('out','HILSOO')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="/rec/HILSOO"><span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Some observations on induction in predicate probabilistic reasoning.</span></a><a class='discreet' title="View other works by M. J. Hill" href="/s/M. J.%20Hill"><span class='name'>M. J. Hill</span></a>, <a class='discreet' title="View other works by J. B. Paris" href="/s/J. B.%20Paris"><span class='name'>J. B. Paris</span></a> & <a class='discreet' title="View other works by G. M. Wilmers" href="/s/G. M.%20Wilmers"><span class='name'>G. M. Wilmers</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2002</span> - <span class='pubInfo'> <i class='pubName'>Journal of Philosophical Logic</i> 31 (1):43-75.</span></span><span class='toggle' style='display:none' data-target='extras'>details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">We consider the desirability, or otherwise, of various forms of induction in the light of certain principles and inductive methods within predicate uncertain reasoning. Our general conclusion is that there remain conflicts within the area whose resolution will require a deeper understanding of the fundamental relationship between individuals and properties. </div><div class="options"><a href="https://philarchive.org/archive/HILSOO"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-HILSOO" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('HILSOO')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-HILSOO" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('HILSOO','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/HILSOO"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 16 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-HILSOO"></span></div></div></li> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr id="WILII-POPPMO"> <td> <li id='ePOPPMO' onclick="ee('click','POPPMO')" onmouseover="ee('over','POPPMO')" onmouseout="ee('out','POPPMO')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="/rec/POPPMO"><span class='articleTitle recTitle'>Probability magic or knowledge out of ignorance.</span></a><a class='discreet' title="View other works by Karl R. Popper" href="/s/Karl R.%20Popper"><span class='name'>Karl R. Popper</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">1957</span> - <span class='pubInfo'> <i class='pubName'>Dialectica</i> 11 (3‐4):354-374.</span></span><span class='toggle' style='display:none' data-target='extras'>details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">We express here the statement » The probability of a given b equals r « symbolically by » p = r «. A formal axiomatic calculus can be constructed comprising all the well‐known laws of probability theory. This calculus can be interpreted in various ways. The present paper is a criticism of the subjective interpretation; that is to say, of any interpretation which assumes that probability expresses degrees of incomplete knowledge: a is the statement incompletely known, b is our total<span id="POPPMO-absexp"> (<span class="ll" onclick='$("POPPMO-abstract2").show();$("POPPMO-absexp").hide()'>...</span>)</span><span id="POPPMO-abstract2" style="display:none"> knowledge, and p is the degree to which a is entailed by b. The subjective interpretation has often been proposed as an explanation and even a sharpening of the various objective theories . It is shown in the paper that this proposal cannot be realised because the subjective theory cannot lead to results which are compatible with the objective theory. This is due to various reasons, the most important of which is that the objective theory interprets » b « in » p « as a statement of the objective conditions of an experiment and » a « as one of its possible results. The subjective theory on the other hand interprets » b « as our total relevant knowledge which will in general include some knowledge of previous results of the experiment. It is shown that this must lead to incompatibility owing to the fact that this knowledge of previous results must influence the value of the probability.It is shown, in this way, that any probabilistic theory of the process of learning from experience—that is to say, any probabilistic theory of induction—must lead to contradictions.RésuméL'énoncé: » La probabilité de a, si b est donné, est égale à r « est ici exprimé symboliquement par » p = r «. On peut construire un système axiomatique formel qui contient toutes les règles bien connues du calcul des probabilités. Ce calcul formel peut ětre interprété de manières très différentes. L'article contient une critique des interprétations subjectives, c'est‐à‐dire des interprétations qui admettent que la probabilité exprime des degrés de connaissance incomplète: a est un énoncé qu'on ne connaǐt que partiellement, b est notre connaissance totale, et p exprime le degré auquel a est implicitement contenu dans b. L'interprétation subjective a souvent été proposée comme une explication et un renforcement des différentes théories objectives . Dans cet article, l'auteur montre que ce projet n'est pas réalisable, car la théorie subjective mène à des résultats qui contredisent la théorie objective. Plusieurs circonstances sont responsables de cette situation; la plus importante, c'est que la théorie interprète le » b « dans » p « comme une description des conditions objectives d'une expérience . D'autre part, la théorie subjective interprète » b « comme notre savoir total , et ce savoir inclura en général des informations sur les résultats obtenus antérieurement pour cette expérience. L'auteur montre que ce fait conduit à une contradiction entre les deux interprétations, car cette connaissance doit avoir une influence sur la valeur subjective de la probabilité.A l'aide de ce raisonnement, on peut montrer que la théorie des probabilités appliquée au processus inductif tirant une expérience du domaine expérimental conduit à des contradictions.ZusammenfassungDie Aussage » Die Wahrscheinlichkeit von a, wenn b gegeben ist, ist gleich r « wird hier symbolisch durch » p = r « ausgedrückt. Ein formales Axiomensystem kann konstruiert werden, das alle die wohlbekannten Regeln der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung enthält. Dieser formale Kalkül kann in sehr verschiedener Weise interpretiert werden. Der Artikel enthält eine Kritik der subjektiven Interpretationen; das heisst, jener Interpretationen die annehmen, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit Grade von unvollständigem Wissen ausdrückt: a ist ein Satz der unvollständig gewusst wird, b ist unser Gesamtwissen, und p drückt den Grad aus zu dem a in b implizit enthalten ist. Die subjektive Interpretation wurde oft als eine Erklärung und Verschärfung der verschiedenen objektiven Theorien vorgeschlagen. In dem Artikel wird gezeigt, dass der Vorschlag undurchführbar ist, da die subjektive Theorie zu Resultaten führt, die der objektiven Theorie widersprechen. Verschiedene Umstände tragen zu dieser Situation bei. Der wichtigste dieser Umstände ist, dass die objektive Theorie das » b « in » p « als eine Beschreibung der objektiven Bedingungen eines Experimentes interpretiert . Andererseits interpretiert die subjektive Theorie » b « als unser Gesamtwissen , und dieses wird im allgemeinen Informationen bezüglich früherer Resultate dieses Experiments einschliessen. Es wird gezeigt, dass das zu einem Widerspruch zwischen den Interpretationen führt, da dieses Wissen Einfluss auf den subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeitswert haben muss.Mit Hilfe dieses Gedankenganges wird gezeigt, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie des induktiven Lernens aus der Erfahrung zu Widersprüchen führt. (<span class="ll" onclick='$("POPPMO-abstract2").hide();$("POPPMO-absexp").show();'>shrink</span>)</span></div><div class="options"><a href="https://philarchive.org/archive/POPPMO"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-POPPMO" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('POPPMO')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-POPPMO" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('POPPMO','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/POPPMO"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 8 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-POPPMO"></span></div></div></li> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr id="WILII-NIXACO-2"> <td> <li id='eNIXACO-2' onclick="ee('click','NIXACO-2')" onmouseover="ee('over','NIXACO-2')" onmouseout="ee('out','NIXACO-2')" class='entry'><span class="citation"><a href="/rec/NIXACO-2"><span class='articleTitle recTitle'>A Continuum of Inductive Methods Arising from a Generalized Principle of Instantial Relevance.</span></a><a class='discreet' title="View other works by C. J. Nix" href="/s/C. J.%20Nix"><span class='name'>C. J. Nix</span></a> & <a class='discreet' title="View other works by J. B. Paris" href="/s/J. B.%20Paris"><span class='name'>J. B. Paris</span></a> - <span class="pubYear">2006</span> - <span class='pubInfo'> <i class='pubName'>Journal of Philosophical Logic</i> 35 (1):83-115.</span></span><span class='toggle' style='display:none' data-target='extras'>details</span><div class="extras"><div class="abstract">In this paper we consider a natural generalization of the Principle of Instantial Relevance and give a complete characterization of the probabilistic belief functions satisfying this principle as a family of discrete probability functions parameterized by a single real δ ∊ [0, 1). </div><div class="options"><a href="https://philarchive.org/archive/NIXACO-2"><i class="fa fa-download"></i> Download</a>   <div id="la-NIXACO-2" title="Export to another format" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span class="ll" onclick="showExports('NIXACO-2')"><i class="fa fa-external-link"></i> Export citation<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>   <div id="ml-NIXACO-2" class="yui-skin-sam ldiv"> </div><span title="Bookmark this publication" class="ll" onclick="showLists('NIXACO-2','')"><i class="fa fa-bookmark"></i> Bookmark<img src="/assets/raw/subind.gif"></span>  <a href="/citations/NIXACO-2"><i class="fa fa-share-alt"></i> 14 citations</a>   <span class="eMsg" id="msg-NIXACO-2"></span></div></div></li> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table> <div class='flex' style="justify-content: center"> <ul class="pagination"> <li class="active"><a class="is-current pagination-link" href="?proOnly=off&sqc=off&direction=references&newWindow=off&hideAbstracts=off&eId=WILII&filterByAreas=off&total=20&offset=0&showCategories=off&freeOnly=&categorizerOn=off&langFilter=off&onlineOnly=&page_size=50&publishedOnly=off&url=">1</a></li> </ul> </div> <script> function removeCitation(args) { if (confirm('Are you sure you want to remove this reference?')) { ppAct('removeCitation', args, function() { $j('#' + args['fromId'] + '-' + args['toId']).fadeOut(); 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