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  1. (1 other version)Color for Philosophers.C. L. Hardin & David R. Hilbert - 1991 - Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):83-85.
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  • The Emergence of the Macroworld: A Study of Intertheory Relations in Classical and Quantum Mechanics.Malcolm R. Forster & Alexey Kryukov - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1039-1051.
    Classical mechanics is empirically successful because the probabilistic mean values of quantum mechanical observables follow the classical equations of motion to a good approximation (Messiah 1970, 215). We examine this claim for the one-dimensional motion of a particle in a box, and extend the idea by deriving a special case of the ideal gas law in terms of the mean value of a generalized force used to define "pressure." The examples illustrate the importance of probabilistic averaging as a method of (...)
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  • The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
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  • An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics: Locality, Fields, Energy, and Mass.Marc Lange - 2002 - Blackwell.
    This book combines physics, history, and philosophy in a radical new approach to introducing the philosophy of physics.
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  • A System of Logic.John Stuart Mill - 1829/2002 - Longman.
    Reprint of the original, first published in 1869.
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  • (1 other version)Non-reductive physicalism and degrees of freedom.Jessica Wilson - 2010 - British Journal for Philosophy of Science 61 (2):279-311.
    Some claim that Non- reductive Physicalism is an unstable position, on grounds that NRP either collapses into reductive physicalism, or expands into emergentism of a robust or ‘strong’ variety. I argue that this claim is unfounded, by attention to the notion of a degree of freedom—roughly, an independent parameter needed to characterize an entity as being in a state functionally relevant to its law-governed properties and behavior. I start by distinguishing three relations that may hold between the degrees of freedom (...)
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  • Mental causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
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  • Mental causation: What? Me worry?Jaegwon Kim - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:123-151.
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  • Making sense of emergence.Jaegwon Kim - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):3-36.
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  • The nonreductivist’s troubles with mental causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1995 - In Pascal Engel (ed.), Mental causation. Oxford University Press.
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  • Causal powers, forces, and superdupervenience.Jessica M. Wilson - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):53-77.
    Horgan (1993) proposed that "superdupervenience" - supervenience preserving physicalistic acceptability - is a matter of robust explanation. I argued against him (1999) that (as nearly all physicalist and emergentist accounts reflect) superdupervenience is a matter of Condition on Causal Powers (CCP): every causal power bestowed by the supervenient property is identical with a causal power bestowed by its base property. Here I show that CCP is, as it stands, unsatisfactory,for on the usual understandings of causal power bestowal, it is trivially (...)
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  • An Introduction to the Philosophy of Physics: Locality, Fields, Energy and Mass.James Ladyman - 2004 - Mind 113 (451):562-565.
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  • Concepts of Force.Max Jammer - 1959 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20 (1):132-132.
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  • (1 other version)Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow.Color and Color Perception: A Study in Anthropocentric Realism.Clyde L. Hardin - 1988 - Hackett.
    This expanded edition of C L Hardin's ground-breaking work on colour features a new chapter, 'Further Thoughts: 1993', in which the author revisits the dispute ...
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  • Forces.John Bigelow, Brian Ellis & Robert Pargetter - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (4):614-630.
    Traditionally, forces are causes of a special sort. Forces have been conceived to be the direct or immediate causes of things. Other sorts of causes act indirectly by producing forces which are transmitted in various ways to produce various effects. However, forces are supposed to act directly without the mediation of anything else. But forces, so conceived, appear to be occult. They are mysterious, because we have no clear conception of what they are, as opposed to what they are postulated (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Realization and mental causation.Sydney Shoemaker - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 23-33.
    A common conception of what it is for one property to “realize” another suggests that it is the realizer property that does the causal work, and that the realized property is epiphenomenal. The same conception underlies George Bealer’s argument that functionalism leads to the absurd conclusion that what we take to be self-ascriptions of a mental state are really self-ascriptions of “first-order” properties that realize that state. This paper argues for a different concept of realization. A property realizes another if (...)
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  • Concepts of Force: A Study in the Foundations of Dynamics.Max Jammer - 1957 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):69-73.
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  • The Works of George Berkeley.J. E. C., George Berkeley & Alexander Campbell Fraser - 1902 - Philosophical Review 11:97.
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  • (2 other versions)De Motu.George Berkeley & Mariapaola Fimiani - 1991 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 181 (1):119-119.
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  • Opticks.Isaac Newton - 1704 - Dover Press.
    Reproduces the text of Newton's dissertation on the nature and properties of light.
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  • Color for Philosophers.Joseph Mendola - 1992 - Noûs 26 (4):504-507.
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  • (2 other versions)De motu [On motion or the principle and nature of motion and the causa of communication of motion].George Berkeley - 2006 - Scientiae Studia 4 (1):115-137.
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  • (2 other versions)Realization and Mental Causation.Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:23-33.
    A common conception of what it is for one property to “realize” another suggests that it is the realizer property that does the causal work, and that the realized property is epiphenomenal. The same conception underlies George Bealer’s argument that functionalism leads to the absurd conclusion that what we take to be self-ascriptions of a mental state are really self-ascriptions of “first-order” properties that realize that state. This paper argues for a different concept of realization. A property realizes another if (...)
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  • The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory.D. Bohm, B. J. Hiley & J. S. Bell - 1993 - Synthese 107 (1):145-165.
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  • (1 other version)Non-reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom.Jessica Wilson - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):279-311.
    Some claim that Non-reductive Physicalism is an unstable position, on grounds that NRP either collapses into reductive physicalism, or expands into emergentism of a robust or ‘strong’ variety. I argue that this claim is unfounded, by attention to the notion of a degree of freedom—roughly, an independent parameter needed to characterize an entity as being in a state functionally relevant to its law-governed properties and behavior. I start by distinguishing three relations that may hold between the degrees of freedom needed (...)
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  • Between laws and models: Some philosophical morals of lagrangian mechanics.Jeremy Butterfield - unknown
    I extract some philosophical morals from some aspects of Lagrangian mechanics. One main moral concerns methodology: Lagrangian mechanics provides a level of description of phenomena which has been largely ignored by philosophers, since it falls between their accustomed levels---``laws of nature'' and ``models''. Another main moral concerns ontology: the ontology of Lagrangian mechanics is both more subtle and more problematic than philosophers often realize. The treatment of Lagrangian mechanics provides an introduction to the subject for philosophers, and is technically elementary. (...)
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  • The Six Core Theories of Modern Physics.Charles F. Stevens - 1995 - Bradford.
    " -- Dr. Daniel Gardner, Cornell University Medical College Charles Stevens, a prominent neurobiologist who originally trained as a biophysicist (with George Uhlenbeck and Mark Kac), wrote this book almost by accident.
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