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  1. Inference, Method and Decision: Towards a Bayesian Philosophy of Science by Roger D. Rosenkrantz. [REVIEW]Stephen Spielman - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (6):356-367.
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  • History of science journals: ‘to be useful, and to the living’?I. Grattan-Guinness - 1977 - Annals of Science 34 (2):193-202.
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  • Decline, Then Recovery: An Overview of Activity in the History of Mathematics during the Twentieth Century.I. Grattan-Guinness - 2004 - History of Science 42 (3):279-312.
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  • Probability Theory. The Logic of Science.Edwin T. Jaynes - 2002 - Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Edited by G. Larry Bretthorst.
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  • In Defence of Objective Bayesianism.Jon Williamson - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Objective Bayesianism is a methodological theory that is currently applied in statistics, philosophy, artificial intelligence, physics and other sciences. This book develops the formal and philosophical foundations of the theory, at a level accessible to a graduate student with some familiarity with mathematical notation.
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  • Achilles Is Still Running.I. Grattan-Guinness - 1974 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 10 (1):8 - 16.
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  • Countable additivity and subjective probability.Jon Williamson - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):401-416.
    While there are several arguments on either side, it is far from clear as to whether or not countable additivity is an acceptable axiom of subjective probability. I focus here on de Finetti's central argument against countable additivity and provide a new Dutch book proof of the principle, To argue that if we accept the Dutch book foundations of subjective probability, countable additivity is an unavoidable constraint.
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