- Bertrand’s Paradox and the Principle of Indifference.Nicholas Shackel - 2024 - Abingdon: Routledge.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis: A Hybrid Approach.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Sussexdetails
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Why Subjectivism?Chloé de Canson - manuscriptdetails
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Likelihoodism and Guidance for Belief.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (4):501-517.details
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Epistemic Probabilities are Degrees of Support, not Degrees of (Rational) Belief.Nevin Climenhaga - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):153-176.details
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Conceptualising morally permissible risk imposition without quantified individual risks.Susanne Burri - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-22.details
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Hybrid Impermissivism and the Diachronic Coordination Problem.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2021 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):267-285.details
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How to be an imprecise impermissivist.Seamus Bradley - manuscriptdetails
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Infinite frequency principles of direct inference.Lennart B. Ackermans - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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One philosopher's modus ponens is another's modus tollens: Pantomemes and nisowir.Jon Williamson - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (2-3):284-304.details
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Uncertain Values: An Axiomatic Approach to Axiological Uncertainty.Stefan Riedener - 2021 - Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.details
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EXTREME PERMISSIVISM REVISITED.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A1)5-26.details
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How should your beliefs change when your awareness grows?Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - Episteme:1-25.details
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David Makinson on Classical Methods for Non-Classical Problems.Sven Ove Hansson (ed.) - 2013 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Aggregating agents with opinions about different propositions.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-25.details
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The key to the knowledge norm of action is ambiguity.Patricia Rich - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9669-9698.details
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Are non-accidental regularities a cosmic coincidence? Revisiting a central threat to Humean laws.Aldo Filomeno - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5205-5227.details
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Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Perception and probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):1-21.details
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How to be imprecise and yet immune to sure loss.Katie Steele - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):427-444.details
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Indifference to Anti-Humean Chances.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):485-501.details
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Evil and the god of indifference.László Bernáth & Daniel Kodaj - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 88 (3):259-272.details
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E.T. Jaynes’s Solution to the Problem of Countable Additivity.Colin Elliot - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):287-308.details
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Objectivity and the Method of Arbitrary Functions.Chloé de Canson - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (3):663-684.details
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The structure of epistemic probabilities.Nevin Climenhaga - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3213-3242.details
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(1 other version)The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.details
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Calibration for epistemic causality.Jon Williamson - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):941-960.details
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Interpretations of Probability and Bayesian Inference—an Overview.Peter Lukan - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (1):129-146.details
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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
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Bertrand's Paradox and the Maximum Entropy Principle.Nicholas Shackel & Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):505-523.details
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Perspectival Plurality, Relativism, and Multiple Indexing.Dan Zeman - 2018 - In Rob Truswell, Chris Cummins, Caroline Heycock, Brian Rabern & Hannah Rohde (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 21. Semantics Archives. pp. 1353-1370.details
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Bayesian Variations: Essays on the Structure, Object, and Dynamics of Credence.Aron Vallinder - 2018 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.details
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(1 other version)The Modal Logic of Bayesian Belief Revision.Zalán Gyenis, Miklós Rédei & William Brown - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (5):809-824.details
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Subjective Probability and its Dynamics.Alan Hajek & Julia Staffel - 2021 - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), The Handbook of Rationality. London: MIT Press.details
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The objectivity of Subjective Bayesianism.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):539-558.details
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(1 other version)What's Wrong With Our Theories of Evidence?Julian Reiss - 2014 - Theoria 29 (2):283-306.details
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Imprecise probability in epistemology.Elkin Lee - 2017 - Dissertation, Ludwig–Maximilians–Universitatdetails
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Evidence amalgamation, plausibility, and cancer research.Marta Bertolaso & Fabio Sterpetti - 2019 - Synthese 196 (8):3279-3317.details
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Almost Ideal: Computational Epistemology and the Limits of Rationality for Finite Reasoners.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2016 - Dissertation, University of California, Davisdetails
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(1 other version)Goals and the Informativeness of Prior Probabilities.Olav Benjamin Vassend - 2017 - Erkenntnis:1-24.details
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Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):342-370.details
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Evidentielle Einzigkeit in klassischer und formaler Erkenntnistheorie.Jochen Briesen - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 71 (2):183-222.details
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Bayesianism and Information.Michael Wilde & Jon Williamson - unknowndetails
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From Bayesian epistemology to inductive logic.Jon Williamson - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):468-486.details
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Invariant Equivocation.Jürgen Landes & George Masterton - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):141-167.details
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Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End.Peter Brössel & Franz Huber - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):737-749.details
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Can there be a Bayesian explanationism? On the prospects of a productive partnership.Frank Cabrera - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1245–1272.details
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Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference.Jan Sprenger - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (2):319-335.details
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