The ArugmentThis essay answers a single question: what was Robert Hooke, the Royal Society's curator of experiments, doing in his well-known 1665 work,Micrographia?Hooke was articulating a “universal cure of the mind” capable of bringing about a “reformation in Philosophy,” a change in philosophy's interpretive practices and organization. The work explicated the interpretive and political foundations for a community of optical instrument users coextensive with the struggling Royal Society. Standard observational practices would overcome the problem of using nonstandard instruments, while inherent (...) inrepresentation– the interpretive practice championed in the text – were important theological and political meanings. Hooke's kind of experimental philosophy undermined the claims made by “atheists” and “enthusiasts” – the enemies of the restored church and state – while also producing useful knowledge. Equally important, Hooke modeled the community described inMicrographiaupon the classicalres publica, but his community made important concessions to Restoration political realities, especially the growing role of commercial or transactional relationships. (shrink)

The ArgumentThe article deals with the interrelation between Galileo and the visual arts. It presents a couple of drawings from the hand of Galileo and confronts them with Viviani's report that Galileo had not only wanted to become an artist in his youth but stayed close to the field of visual arts throughout his lifetime. In the ambiance of these drawings the famous moon watercolors are not in the dark. They represent a very acute and reasonable tool to convince the (...) people who trusted images more than words. The article ends with Panofsky's argument that it was Galileo's anti-Mannerist notion of art that evoked a repulsion of Kepler's ellipses. It tries to show that it was again an aesthetical prejudice that hindered Einstein from accepting Panofsky's theory. (shrink)

At first glance botanical illustrations of the eighteenth century might be interpreted as being naturalistic portraits of living plants. A more detailed investigation, however, reveals that the pictures were meant to communicate typical features of plant species in the way of a model. To this end, botanists of the period gave botanical draughtsmen specialist training; copying earlier examples and standardised motives from drawing books was a common part of this training. The practice of copying elements of previously published drawings and (...) integrating them into new pictures was also widespread. However, only carefully selected elements were taken over, and even these were improved in terms of their correctness and appropriateness to the new context. This procedure was a strategy that eighteenth-century botanists used so that they would present an illustration that met their own requirements more satisfactorily than existing depictions. From this perspective, botanical illustrations can serve as historical sources on the working practices of eighteenth-century botanists and draughtsmen, which are usually not mentioned in textual sources. (shrink)

In the 19th and early 20th century the history of sciences was characterized by a constant increaseing of scientific illustration connected with a broad discussion about the function and the status of these pictures. In respect of the success of photography this dispute entered into questioning the importance of drawing for the perception and the scientific knowledge. The history of drawing-lessons and of the scientific drawers at German universities reflects the idea of the unique value of drawing for sciences: for (...) visual communication and understanding. The different qualities of photography and drawing have been discussed as well by human as by natural scientists. In this context drawing was considered to be a tool in its own right besides photography. The present text reconstructs this discussion in regard of the drawers und design-teachers at the universities presenting material of several archives. (shrink)

The view that species are individuals, as developed by Ghiselinand Hull, has been touted as explaining the role of type specimens intaxonomy. The kinship of this explanation with the Kripke-Putnam theoryof names has long been recognized. In light of this kinship, however,Hull's account of type specimens can be seen to entail two relatedinscrutability problems – unreasonable limits placed on the natureand extent of biological knowledge. An appreciation for these problemsinvites us to consider the proper relation between metaphysical andepistemological inquires in (...) the philosophy of science. (shrink)