Materialism can be defined both historically and philosophically as a type of thinking that began in 1745 with La Mettrie, Helvétius, Diderot, and d’Holbach. This type of materialism is characterized by three shared principles. The first principle relates to the establishment of an explicitly anti-religious and atheistic philosophical system. Such a topic is not a theme of Canguilhem’s philosophy. The second principle pertains to the material unity of the world; it is often termed ‘materialistic monism’. Canguilhem, however, does not grant (...) matter the status of a first principle; moreover, he does not treat the distinction between inanimate and animate matter as secondary. A natural history of life is not to be confused with a natural history of matter. The third principle addresses the autonomy of the mode of construction of the real with regard to thinking. This autonomy is such that intellectual faculties are themselves dependent on the properties of sensible matter. This latter point is also not retained by Canguilhem. Not only does the border between animate, living nature and material nature exclude the ability to understand animate, living nature solely in terms of matter, but furthermore, life itself cannot be explained by the organization of matter alone. (shrink)