Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. On the functionalization of pluralist approaches to truth.Cory Wright - 2005 - Synthese 145 (1):1–28.
    Traditional inflationary approaches that specify the nature of truth are attractive in certain ways; yet, while many of these theories successfully explain why propositions in certain domains of discourse are true, they fail to adequately specify the nature of truth because they run up against counterexamples when attempting to generalize across all domains. One popular consequence is skepticism about the efficaciousness of inflationary approaches altogether. Yet, by recognizing that the failure to explain the truth of disparate propositions often stems from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • The Folly of Trying to Define Truth.Donald Davidson - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   87 citations  
  • Introduction to mathematical philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1919 - New York: Dover Publications.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   391 citations  
  • On the possibility of a substantive theory of truth.Gila Sher - 1998 - Synthese 117 (1):133-172.
    The paper offers a new analysis of the difficulties involved in the construction of a general and substantive correspondence theory of truth and delineates a solution to these difficulties in the form of a new methodology. The central argument is inspired by Kant, and the proposed methodology is explained and justified both in general philosophical terms and by reference to a particular variant of Tarski's theory. The paper begins with general considerations on truth and correspondence and concludes with a brief (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  • In Search of a Substantive Theory of Truth.Gila Sher - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):5-36.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  • A Corrective to the Ramsey-Lewis Account of Theoretical Terms.John O'Leary-Hawthorne - 1994 - Analysis 54 (2):105 - 110.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • "Truth" as Conceived by Those Who Are Not Professional Philosophers. [REVIEW]E. N. - 1939 - Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):78-80.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Coherence: The price of the ticket.Elijah Millgram - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):82-93.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • On theoretical constructs and Ramsey constants.R. M. Martin - 1966 - Philosophy of Science 33 (1/2):1-13.
    The method of Ramsey sentences has been proposed for handling theoretical constructs within a scientific system. Essentially it consists of constructing a certain "monolithic" sentence for an entire theory. In this present paper several improvements are suggested which help to overcome some of the awkward features of the method. In particular we have here many Ramsey sentences rather than just one, each erstwhile primitive theoretical term giving rise to a Ramsey sentence. Such a sentence in effect defines what we call (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Truth and multiple realizability.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.
    Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this position faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralism's key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • Truth as one and many.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - New York : Clarendon Press,: Clarendon Press.
    What is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories of truth hold that truth has only a single uniform nature. All truths are true in the same way. More recent deflationary theories claim that truth has no nature at all; the concept of truth is of no real philosophical importance. In this concise and clearly written book, Lynch argues that we should reject both these extremes and hold that truth is a functional property. To (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   151 citations  
  • Truth as One and Many * By Michael Lynch. [REVIEW]Michael Lynch - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):191-193.
    In Truth as One and Many, Michael Lynch offers a new theory of truth. There are two kinds of theory of truth in the literature. On the one hand, we have logical theories, which seek to construct formal systems that are consistent, while also containing a predicate which have as many as possible of the properties which we ordinarily take the English predicate ‘is true’ to have; salient examples include Tarski’s and Kripke’s theories of truth. On the other hand, we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   143 citations  
  • Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth: A Reply to Cory Wright.Michael P. Lynch - 2005 - Synthese 145 (1):29-43.
    According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the views main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes true as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • How to define theoretical terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   560 citations  
  • How to Define Theoretical Terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (2):321-321.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   326 citations  
  • A corrective to the Ramsey-Lewis account of theoretical terms.John O' Leary-Hawthorne - 1994 - Analysis 54 (2):105.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Epistemological functionalism.Laurence J. Lafleur - 1941 - Philosophical Review 50 (5):471-482.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Implicit definition, analytic truth, and aprior knowledge.Paul Horwich - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):423-440.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Functional pluralism.Gila Sher - 2005 - Philosophical Books 46 (4):311-330.
    This is a critique of Michael P. Lynch’s functional pluralism with respect to truth. The paper is sympathetic to Lynch’s overall approach to truth, but is critical of (i) his platitudinous characterization of the general principles of truth, (ii) his excessive pluralism with respect to the “realizers” of truth, (iii) his treatment of atomic truth, and (iv) his analysis of “mixed” logical inferences. The paper concludes with a proposal for a functional pluralism that puts greater emphasis on the unity of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Theory change and the indeterminacy of reference.Hartry Field - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):462-481.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   223 citations  
  • An argument for an error theory of truth.John Devlin - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):51–82.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • The Folly of Trying to Define Truth.Donald Davidson - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (6):263-278.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   140 citations  
  • On axiomatizability within a system.William Craig - 1953 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 18 (1):30-32.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   102 citations  
  • Communication by Ramsey-sentence clause.Herbert G. Bohnert - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (4):341-347.
    F. P. Ramsey pointed out in Theories that the observational content of a theory expressed partly in non-observational terms is retained in the sentence resulting from existentially generalizing the conjunction of all sentences of the theory with respect to all nonobservational terms. Such terms are thus avoidable in principle, but only at the cost of forming a single "monolithic" sentence. This paper suggests that communication may be thought of as occurring not only by sentence but by clause, a sentential formula (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Partial denotations of theoretical terms.Katherine Bedard - 1993 - Noûs 27 (4):499-511.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The Architecture of Language.Noam Chomsky - 2000 - Oxford University Press. Edited by Nirmalangshu Mukherji, Bibudhendra Narayan Patnaik & Rama Kant Agnihotri.
    In this book, Noam Chomsky reflects on the history of 'generative enterprise' - his approach to the study of languages that revolutionized our understanding of human languages and other cognitive systems.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Realism and Truth: A Comment on Crispin Wright’s Truth and Objectivity.Philip Pettit - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):883-890.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Coherence.Elijah Millgram - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):82-93.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • The folly of trying to define truth.Donald Davidson - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (6):263-278.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   98 citations  
  • Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1919 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 89:465-466.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   474 citations  
  • Minimalism and the Facts About Truth.Marian David - 2002 - In R. Schantz (ed.), What is Truth?
    Minimalism, Paul Horwich’s deflationary conception of truth, has recently received a makeover in form of the second edition of Horwich’s highly stimulating book Truth1. I wish to use this occasion to explore a thesis vital to Minimalism: that the minimal theory of truth provides an adequate explanation of the facts about truth. I will indicate why the thesis is vital to Minimalism. Then I will argue that it can be saved from objections only by tampering with the standards of adequate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • What can the problem of mixed inferences teach us about alethic pluralism?Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2006 - The Monist 89 (1):103-117.
    Here is a well-known thought about truth: Truth consists in correspondence with reality. A sentence is true just in case what it says corresponds with how the world is. Theories of truth that incorporate this thought are naturally regarded as robust or “heavyweight”. Truth is to be understood in a realist fashion. The world decides what is true and what is not. A recent incarnation of the correspondence view is found in truth-maker theories, whose adherents maintain that truths are true (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations