Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265–283 (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Functionalists about truth employ Ramsification to produce an implicit definition of the theoretical term _true_, but doing so requires determining that the theory introducing that term is itself true. A variety of putative dissolutions to this problem of epistemic circularity are shown to be unsatisfactory. One solution is offered on functionalists' behalf, though it has the upshot that they must tread on their anti-pluralist commitments
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
WRITRA
Revision history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-21)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Truth as One and Many.Lynch, Michael P.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-12-16

Total views
295 ( #8,977 of 38,039 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #9,894 of 38,039 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.