Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265–283 (2010)
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Abstract
Functionalists about truth employ Ramsification to produce an implicit definition of the theoretical term _true_, but doing so requires determining that the theory introducing that term is itself true. A variety of putative dissolutions to this problem of epistemic circularity are shown to be unsatisfactory. One solution is offered on functionalists' behalf, though it has the upshot that they must tread on their anti-pluralist commitments
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