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  1. How to do things with words.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
    For this second edition, the editors have returned to Austin's original lecture notes, amending the printed text where it seemed necessary.
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  • Conversational Exercitives and the Force of Pornography.Mary Kate Mcgowan - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2):155-189.
    This paper criticizes Langton's speech act account of MacKinnon's claim about (the subordinating force of) pornography and offers a different account of how speech might enact harmful norms and thus constitute harm.
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  • Speech acts and unspeakable acts.Rae Langton - 1993 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (4):293-330.
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  • Free speech and illocution.Rae Langton & Jennifer Hornsby - 1998 - Legal Theory 4 (1):21-37.
    We defend the view of some feminist writers that the notion of silencing has to be taken seriously in discussions of free speech. We assume that what ought to be meant by ‘speech’, in the context ‘free speech’, is whatever it is that a correct justification of the right to free speech justifies one in protecting. And we argue that what one ought to mean includes illocution, in the sense of J.L. Austin.
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  • Communication and convention.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Synthese 59 (1):3 - 17.
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  • Illocutionary silencing.Alexander Bird - 2002 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (1):1–15.
    Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby have argued that pornography might create a climate whereby a woman’s ability to refuse sex is literally silenced or removed. Their central argument is that a failure of ‘uptake’ of the woman’s intention means that the illocutionary speech act of refusal has not taken place. In this paper, I challenge the claims from the Austinian philosophy of language which feature in this argument. I argue that uptake is not in general required for illocution, nor is (...)
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  • Intention and convention in speech acts.Peter F. Strawson - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (4):439-460.
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  • Speech and action.Daniel Jacobson - 2001 - Legal Theory 7 (2):179-201.
    The fundamental tenet of the liberal conception of free speech is the principle of content neutrality, which Mill espoused in claiming that 1 On this view, the immorality, the falsity, and even the harmfulness of an opinion are not good reasons to censor it. s persuasion may be, not only of the falsity but of the pernicious consequenceslose their immunitys justification can be doubted. But I will not discuss these issues, on which there is already an immense literature, any further (...)
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  • Freedom of Speech Acts? A Response to Langton.Daniel Jacobson - 1995 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (1):64-78.
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  • Meaning and uselessness: How to think about derogatory words.Jennifer Hornsby - 2001 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):128–141.
    Williams explains why there might have been some point to a linguistic approach in ethics. I suggest that there might be some point to paying attention to an ethical dimension in philosophy of language. I shall consider words that I label ‘derogatory’, and questions they raise about linguistic meaning.
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