This study is an attempt to analyze the factors that have contributed towards the success of the Democratic Party of Albania. It seeks to introduce new dimensions in measuring the success of a political party. The study rejects the elements of ‘office-holding’ and ‘policy – or performance-based’ measures of success, because they are determined by a complex array of economic, political, social and institutional factors. The concept of “party success” is defined in terms of: ‘breadth’ and ‘durability’. At the same (...) time the study aims at ‘emancipating’ the political parties from the past and macro-institutional factors, to which very often are ascribed the reasons for the perceived failure of politics in Albania. The approach used in this study has regarded the political parties as the real political actors that as such should assume the responsibility for the perceived failures. Neither the lack of political culture, nor the communist system, are the main factors to shape the activity and development of political parties in Albania. Both macro-institutional and historical structural approach has limited explanatory power for the success of the Democratic Party. Its success is a direct consequence of the decisions that the political parties themselves, including Democratic Party as one of the key actors, have taken. The research showed that the Democratic Party of Albania has been successful because and when its elite have been able to craft inclusive ideological programs and because of its extensive penetration in the country, which it owes to its structure as a mass party. The party has established patronage linkages with its sympathizers, the rank and file and militants and consequently has ensured their loyalty and maintained an extensive electoral penetration in country. (shrink)

The paper aims to explore the relationships that exist between party structure, party system, patronage, and the appointments of the political elites. It is focused on the extent to which political parties can control the allocation of jobs as well as find out which are the institutions over whom the political parties can exercise power; the extent to which historical legacies influence patronage patterns; the extent to which party patronage is exercised in a ‘majoritarian’ as opposed to a more ‘consensual’ (...) manner across the spectrum of political parties; and the relationship that exist between the structure of the party, the appointment of political elites and patronage. The conclusion is that the party in public office and its allies in the coalition cabinet control the post of ministers and vice-ministers. While these last ones control the posts of their subordinates, it is hard to understand whether they select the employees from the party pool or from their personal networks. The other finding is that the structure of the party creates strong links between patronage and appointment, these last ones done with the scope of having control over government resources and distribution of resources. On the other hand, the research didn’t prove any link between historical legacies and patronage and party system and patronage. (shrink)