Switch to: Citations

References in:

New Grounds for Naive Truth Theory

In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 312-330 (2003)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. The logic of paradox.Graham Priest - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219 - 241.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   459 citations  
  • The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity.Vann McGee - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (3):472.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • On representing ‘true-in-L’ in L.Robert L. Martin - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):213-217.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  • The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity.Jon Barwise & John Etchemendy - 1987 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press USA. Edited by John Etchemendy.
    Bringing together powerful new tools from set theory and the philosophy of language, this book proposes a solution to one of the few unresolved paradoxes from antiquity, the Paradox of the Liar. Treating truth as a property of propositions, not sentences, the authors model two distinct conceptions of propositions: one based on the standard notion used by Bertrand Russell, among others, and the other based on J.L. Austin's work on truth. Comparing these two accounts, the authors show that while the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   125 citations  
  • Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
    A formal theory of truth, alternative to tarski's 'orthodox' theory, based on truth-value gaps, is presented. the theory is proposed as a fairly plausible model for natural language and as one which allows rigorous definitions to be given for various intuitive concepts, such as those of 'grounded' and 'paradoxical' sentences.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   884 citations  
  • Notes on naive semantics.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):61 - 102.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   117 citations  
  • (1 other version)Truth and paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   154 citations  
  • The Consistency of The Naive Theory of Properties.Hartry Field - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):78-104.
    If properties are to play a useful role in semantics, it is hard to avoid assuming the naïve theory of properties: for any predicate Θ(x), there is a property such that an object o has it if and only if Θ(o). Yet this appears to lead to various paradoxes. I show that no paradoxes arise as long as the logic is weakened appropriately; the main difficulty is finding a semantics that can handle a conditional obeying reasonable laws without engendering paradox. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Saving the truth schema from paradox.Hartry Field - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):1-27.
    The paper shows how we can add a truth predicate to arithmetic (or formalized syntactic theory), and keep the usual truth schema Tr( ) ↔ A (understood as the conjunction of Tr( ) → A and A → Tr( )). We also keep the full intersubstitutivity of Tr(>A>)) with A in all contexts, even inside of an →. Keeping these things requires a weakening of classical logic; I suggest a logic based on the strong Kleene truth tables, but with → (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • A revenge-immune solution to the semantic paradoxes.Hartry Field - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):139-177.
    The paper offers a solution to the semantic paradoxes, one in which (1) we keep the unrestricted truth schema “True(A)↔A”, and (2) the object language can include its own metalanguage. Because of the first feature, classical logic must be restricted, but full classical reasoning applies in “ordinary” contexts, including standard set theory. The more general logic that replaces classical logic includes a principle of substitutivity of equivalents, which with the truth schema leads to the general intersubstitutivity of True(A) with A (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   58 citations  
  • Toward useful type-free theories. I.Solomon Feferman - 1984 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (1):75-111.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   115 citations  
  • The concept of truth in formalized languages.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - In Logic, semantics, metamathematics. Oxford,: Clarendon Press. pp. 152--278.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   597 citations  
  • Hop, Skip and jump: The agonistic conception of truth.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:371-396.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Truth and reflection.Stephen Yablo - 1985 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (3):297 - 349.
    Many topics have not been covered, in most cases because I don't know quite what to say about them. Would it be possible to add a decidability predicate to the language? What about stronger connectives, like exclusion negation or Lukasiewicz implication? Would an expanded language do better at expressing its own semantics? Would it contain new and more terrible paradoxes? Can the account be supplemented with a workable notion of inherent truth (see note 36)? In what sense does stage semantics (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  • Semantical paradox.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):169-198.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   137 citations  
  • Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent.Graham Priest, Richard Routley & Jean Norman (eds.) - 1989 - Philosophia Verlag.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   105 citations  
  • Intensional aspects of semantical self-reference.Brian Skyrms - 1984 - In Robert Lazarus Martin (ed.), Recent essays on truth and the liar paradox. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 119--31.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • .Brian Skyrms - 1980 - In The Role of Causal Factors in Rational Decision. Yale University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   196 citations  
  • Recent essays on truth and the liar paradox.Robert Lazarus Martin (ed.) - 1984 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   115 citations  
  • On Representing True-in-L'in L Robert L. Martin and Peter W. Woodruff.Robert L. Martin - 1984 - In Robert Lazarus Martin (ed.), Recent essays on truth and the liar paradox. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 47.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  • The non-triviality of dialectical set theory.Ross T. Brady - 1989 - In Graham Priest, Richard Routley & Jean Norman (eds.), Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent. Philosophia Verlag. pp. 437--470.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Liar. An Essay in Truth and Circularity.Jon Barwise & John Etchemendy - 1989 - Mind 98 (391):451-453.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  • The Semantic Paradoxes and the Paradoxes of Vagueness.Hartry Field - 2003 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 262-311.
    Both in dealing with the semantic paradoxes and in dealing with vagueness and indeterminacy, there is some temptation to weaken classical logic: in particular, to restrict the law of excluded middle. The reasons for doing this are somewhat different in the two cases. In the case of the semantic paradoxes, a weakening of classical logic (presumably involving a restriction of excluded middle) is required if we are to preserve the naive theory of truth without inconsistency. In the case of vagueness (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations