In 1898, Peirce delivered a series of lectures titled Reasoning and the Logic of Things. Peirce scholars have found the first of those lectures—titled “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life”—especially perplexing.Some scholars have a decidedly negative assessment of Peirce’s lecture. Cornelis de Waal, for example, maintains that Peirce’s claims in the lecture are doubtful. He states that “Peirce... takes a radical stance, arguing emphatically that science should stay away from ‘matters of vital importance,’ moral problems among them, thereby denying the (...) validity of a science of ethics”. He goes on to say that “on Peirce’s account, the ethics of inquiry seems to preclude ethical inquiry. The scientific.. (shrink)

En 1984, Michel Foucault met toutes ses recherches sous le signe de l’histoire de la vérité qui, à l’époque de ses premiers cours, avait pour cible la volonté de vérité « comme formidable machinerie destinée à exclure ». Il nous invite ainsi à comparer les deux versants, critique et positif, de cette histoire. Sont-ils seulement complémentaires? De la critique de la volonté de vérité à la parrêsia, y a-t-il continuité ou rupture?

A central criticism of William James’s “The Will to Believe” is that it gives individuals a license for wishful thinking. There may be insufficient evidence with respect to the existence of God, but our willing to believe that God exists does not make it the case. Simply put, wanting something to be true does not make it true. Accordingly, some of James’s early critics proposed that the essay would have been more accurately titled “The Will to Deceive” or “The Will (...) to Make Believe.” More recently, a number of scholars have defended James’s essay from these charges of wishful thinking. According... (shrink)

This article investigates the history of the relation between idealism and pragmatism by examining the importance of the French idealist Charles Renouvier for the development of William James's ‘Will to Believe’. By focusing on French idealism, we obtain a broader understanding of the kinds of idealism on offer in the nineteenth century. First, I show that Renouvier's unique methodological idealism led to distinctively pragmatist doctrines and that his theory of certitude and its connection to freedom is worthy of reconsideration. Second, (...) I argue that the technical vocabulary and main structure of the argument from the ‘Will to Believe’ depend upon Renouvier's idealist theory of knowledge and psychology of belief, and that taking account of this line of influence is of crucial importance for establishing the correct interpretation of James's work. (shrink)