I argue against two popular claims. The first is a descriptive, empirical thesis about the nature of ordinary human experience: ‘each of us constructs and lives a “narrative” . . . this narrative is us, our identities’ (Oliver Sacks); ‘self is a perpetually rewritten story . . . in the end, we become the autobiographical narratives by which we “tell about” our lives’ (Jerry Bruner); ‘we are all virtuoso novelists. . . . We try to make all of our material (...) cohere into a single good story. And that story is our autobiography. The chief fictional char- acter . . . of that autobiography is one’s self’ (Dan Dennett). The second is a normative, ethical claim: we ought to live our lives narratively, or as a story; a ‘basic condition of making sense of ourselves is that we grasp our lives in a narrative’ and have an understanding of our lives ‘as an unfolding story’ (Charles Taylor). A person ‘creates his identity [only] by forming an autobiographical narrative – a story of his life’, and must be in possession of a full and ‘explicit narrative [of his life] to develop fully as a person’ (Marya Schechtman). (shrink)

Sidgwick's theses that "if I judge any action to be right for myself, I implicitly judge it to be right for any other person whose nature and circumstances do not differ from my own in certain important respects" fails to differentiate moral judgments of importantly different kinds and, In particular, Overlooks peculiarities of a kind of judgment, Made by a prospective agent, About what "he" ought to do. The court-Martial in melville's "billy budd" is closely examined as an example. Although (...) we can speak of such an agent "finding out" what he ought to do, He is not finding out what "anyone" ought to do in such a situation, But something "about himself": something, However, Which can only be expressed in moral categories. (shrink)

Samuel Guttenplan; V*—Moral Realism and Moral Dilemmas, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 80, Issue 1, 1 June 1980, Pages 61–80, https://doi.org/1.

Joseph Raz presents a penetrating exploration of the interdependence of value, reason, and the will. These essays illuminate a wide range of questions concerning fundamental aspects of human thought and action. Engaging Reason is a summation of many years of original, compelling, and influential work by a major contemporary philosopher.

Anyone familiar with Nelson Goodman’s philosophical career knows that to have quarreled with him was a hazardous enterprise. For aside from his creative brilliance and analytical subtlety, he was also one of the foremost dialecticians of the age. Seeing through the flaws of rival views and rebutting putative counterarguments to his own came as easily to him as breathing. To recall his rejoinders to a long list of would-be rebuttals of his paper, “On Likeness of Meaning”, or the acute series (...) of counterexamples to received views of scientific law in his pioneering paper, “The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals”, or his replies to criticisms of his nominalism in “A World of Individuals”, or again, his replies to confident attacks on his theory of projection is to find ample evidence of an intimidating intellectual presence. To take issue with him was in fact to take one’s philosophical life in one’s hands and many are those over the course of his career who rued the venture. (shrink)

This article queries Winch's view that moral issues are particular, subjective, context-dependent and not open to generalizations. Drawing on examples from film and literature, Winch believes he can prove first, that the universalisability principle is idle and second, that morality is wrongly conceived as a guide to moral conduct. Yet, neither example proves his point. Quite the contrary, they show that we face moral dilemmas only when moral theory fails to provide an answer to moral problems. Therfore, it is not (...) the case, as Winch suggests, that moral issues have a force independent of moral theory. The article questions a general trend in contemporary moral theory that argues that abstract principles are inconsistent with the actual way we live our lives. Footnotes1 In memory of Irving Velody 1936–2000. (shrink)

Anyone familiar with Nelson Goodman’s philosophical career knows that to have quarreled with him was a hazardous enterprise. For aside from his creative brilliance and analytical subtlety, he was also one of the foremost dialecticians of the age. Seeing through the flaws of rival views and rebutting putative counterarguments to his own came as easily to him as breathing. To recall his rejoinders to a long list of would-be rebuttals of his paper, “On Likeness of Meaning”, or the acute series (...) of counterexamples to received views of scientific law in his pioneering paper, “The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals”, or his replies to criticisms of his nominalism in “A World of Individuals”, or again, his replies to confident attacks on his theory of projection is to find ample evidence of an intimidating intellectual presence. To take issue with him was in fact to take one’s philosophical life in one’s hands and many are those over the course of his career who rued the venture. (shrink)