Authors have written of antitrust’s demise in the face of blockchain technology which, supposedly, achieves the goals of the law, through private ordering, without a need for the law. Most importantly of all, public permissionless blockchains offer the vision of disintermediation – the end of the platform economy troubling many scholars today. At the same time, blockchain technology presents challenges to the doctrine and enforcement of antitrust. Finally, blockchain community governance allows for private ordering of antitrust, i.e., (...) enforcement of rules attempting to protect competition, which are at the same time illegal, not coming from the courts or agencies they constitute competition wrongs themselves. -/- I argue that all three claims are overstated and propose a synthesis of the law and code. The legal doctrine can be modified to tackle the novel technological landscape quite easily, with adoption of novel legal fictions. This is necessary since blockchains – both public and even more so private ones – while ingenious, do not remove a need for the law to protect the market from anti-competitive conduct. Indeed, even public ledgers have power structures allowing for abuse, while private blockchains may, in fact, allow for its proliferation. The law, thus, needs to find a regulatory access point to the ledgers. This is not an easy task: however, cooperation of blockchains with the law, and encoding of antitrust rules on the ledgers themselves, offers a possibility of a reconciliation between the law and the code. At the same time, this lends legitimacy to pro-competitive actions of those cyberspace communities and ensures a preservation of the rule of law. This is the blockchain antitrust synthesis. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to provide an alternative antitrust model to the mainstream model that is used in competition policy. I call it the InstitutionalEvolutionary Antitrust Model. In order to construct an antitrust model one needs both empirical knowledge and considerations of how to adequately deal with norms. The analysis of competition as an evolutionary process that unfolds within legal rules provides the empirical foundation for the model. The development of the normative dimension involves the (...) elaboration of a comparative approach. Building on those foundations the main features of the Institutional-Evolutionary Model are sketched out and it is shown that its use leads to systematically different outcomes and conclusions than the dominant antitrust ideals. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that it is impossible to trust the Big Tech companies, in an ethically important sense of trust. The argument is not that these companies are untrustworthy. Rather, I argue that the power to hold the trustee accountable is a necessary component of this sense of trust, and, because these companies are so powerful, they are immune to our attempts, as individuals or nation-states, to hold them to account. It is, therefore, literally impossible to trust Big (...) Tech. After introducing the accounts of trust and power that I deploy, I argue that Big Tech companies have four kinds of power that render them unaccountable: fiscal power, political power, data power, and cognitive power. I conclude by reflecting on recent calls to break up the Big Tech firms, suggesting a new antitrust test in the light of my arguments. (shrink)

Mark White has developed a provocative skepticism about antitrust law. I first argue against three claims that are essential to his argument: the state may legitimately constrain or punish only conduct that violates someone’s rights, the market’s purpose is coordinating and maximizing individual autonomy, and property rights should be completely insulated from democratic deliberation. I then sketch a case that persons might have a right to a competitive market. If so, antitrust law does deal with conduct that violates (...) rights. The main thread running throughout the article is that what counts as a legitimate exercise of property rights is dynamic, sensitive to various external conditions, and is the proper object of democratic deliberation. (shrink)

Dieter Schmidtchen hat mein institutionenökonomisch-evolutionäres Wettbewerbsleitbild einer kritischen Würdigung unterzogen. In dieser Replik werden drei Arten von Argumenten zugunsten meines Wettbewerbsleitbildes vorgetragen. Zunächst wird mit Hilfe von wissenschaftstheoretischen Argumenten gezeigt, dass die Konkurrenz von Erkenntnisprogrammen auch im Fall der Wettbewerbstheorie durchaus wünscheswert ist. Dann werden die normativen Grundlagen des Leitbildes erläutert und gezeigt, wie das Prinzip der kritischen Prüfung zum Tragen kommt. Schließlich wird für eine regelgeleitete Wettbewerbspolitik plädiert, die den Schutz des Wettbewerbs als minimalistisches Ziel anstrebt.

In diesem Aufsatz wird ein Wettbewerbsleitbild vorgeschlagen, das auf den Ergebnissen der Neuen Institutionenökonomik und der Evolutorischen Ökonomik aufbaut. Um ein Leitbild zu gewinnen, braucht man zweierlei, d.h. erfahrungswissenschaftliche Grundlagen und Überlegungen zur Behandlung von Normen. Es werden zunächst die erfahrungswissenschaftlichen Grundlagen erläutert und es stellt sich heraus, dass der Wettbewerb als ein evolutionärer Prozess zu analysieren ist, der innerhalb von Regeln abläuft. Danach wird die Frage nach der zweckmäßigen Behandlung von Normen behandelt und die Schwächen der gängigen normativen Konzeptionen (...) innerhalb der Volkswirtschaftslehre, d.h. der Wohlfahrtsökonomie und der Konstitutioneökonomie, aufgezeigt und stattdessen die Anwendung des Prinzips der kritischen Prüfung vorgeschlagen. Darauf aufbauend wird das institutionenökonomisch-evolutionäre Wettbewerbsleitbild in seinen Grundzügen skizziert und für eine regelgeleitete Wettbewerbspolitik, die sich hauptsächlich auf per se Verbote stützt, plädiert. (shrink)