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Works by Albert Halliday
7 found
Order:
- On Consciousness.Albert Halliday - manuscriptThis essay positions consciousness in the content field--also known as the visual field; it is an initial essay, providing a general overview of my thinking on this problem.
- Four Thoughts on Perception.Albert Halliday - manuscriptThis essay includes four general thoughts on perception that I have not approached separately. It adds to my thinking on perception and marks a shift into philosophy of mind.
- On Properties.Albert Halliday - manuscriptIn this paper I will argue that ‘colour’ is not in real objects. I will then go beyond that to argue that properties of real objects – if they have properties – cannot be emitted to the perceiver. It becomes necessary, therefore, to hold that all that is ‘known’, via the senses, of the world be inferred from the Representation only.
- On Reference Theory.Albert Halliday - manuscriptThis is my initial look at Reference Theory. It argues that the speaker does not have the same knowledge as the listener. The speaker has an intimate point of view, but the listener's is general.
- First Thoughts on Space and Time.Albert Halliday - manuscriptThis is my first thoughts on Space and time. It is general, taking a broad view only.
- Drawing the Representation.Albert Halliday - manuscriptThis article argues that the Representation is drawn by the perceiver: that it does not arrive at the visual cortex fully-formed. Rather, colour arrives at the visual cortex and the Representation is drawn from that.
- Towards a pre-Representation.Albert Halliday - manuscriptIn this paper I will argue that what is perceived as the Representation is not formed out of sensory-data1 directly. Instead, I will argue that a more fundamental structure, that I have named the pre-Representation, precedes the Representation and it is formed out of sensory-data.
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