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Alisabeth Ayars [5]Alisabeth A. Ayars [1]
  1. Deciding for Others: An Expressivist Theory of Normative Judgment.Alisabeth Ayars - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):42-61.
    This paper develops a new form of metaethical expressivism according to which the normative judgment that X should Φ consists in a decision that X Φ. When the judgment is first-personal—e.g., my judgment that I should Φ—the view is similar to Gibbard’s plan expressivism, though the state I call “decision” differs somewhat from a Gibbard-style plan. The deep difference between the views shows in the account of third-personal judgments. Gibbard construes the judgment that Mary should Φ as a de se (...)
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  2. Blaming for Unreasonableness: Accountability without Ill Will.Alisabeth A. Ayars - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 19 (1).
    Quality of will accounts of moral responsibility hold that ill will is necessary for blameworthiness. But all such accounts are false to ordinary moral practice, which licenses blame for agents who act wrongly from epistemically unreasonable ignorance even if the act is not ill willed. This should be especially concerning to Strawsonians about moral responsibility, who think the genuine conditions of blameworthiness are derived from the standards internal to our practice. In response, I provide a theory of moral blameworthiness on (...)
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  3. Noncognitivism and agent-centered norms.Alisabeth Ayars & Gideon Rosen - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1019-1038.
    This paper takes up a neglected problem for metaethical noncognitivism: the characterization of the acceptance states for agent-centered normative theories like Rational Egoism. If Egoism is a coherent view, the non-cognitivist needs a coherent acceptance state for it. This can be provided, as Dreier and Gibbard have shown. But those accounts fail when generalized, assigning the same acceptance state to normative theories that are clearly distinct, or assigning no acceptance state to theories that look to be intelligible. The paper makes (...)
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  4. Attraction, Aversion, and Meaning in Life.Alisabeth Ayars - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 28 (3).
    Desire comes in two kinds: attraction and aversion. But contemporary theories of desire have paid little attention to the distinction, and some philosophers doubt that it is psychologically real. I argue that one reason to think there is a difference between the attitudes, and to care about it, is that attractions and aversions contribute in radically different ways to our well-being. Attraction-motivated activity adds to the good life in a way that aversion-driven activity does not. I argue further that the (...)
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  5. An Explanation of the Essential Publicity of Practical Reasons.Alisabeth Ayars - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    This paper argues that practical reasons are essentially “public” in the following sense: If R is a reason for X to Φ, then R is also a reason for other people not to interfere with X’s Φ-ing. The paper derives the Publicity Thesis from an independently motivated non-cognitivist account of normative judgment that covers both should-judgments and judgments about reasons. This account “explains” the publicity thesis in the sense if the non-cognitivist view is correct, anyone who judges that R is (...)
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