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Anna Strasser
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
  1.  72
    Distributed responsibility in human–machine interactions.Anna Strasser - 2021 - AI and Ethics.
    Artificial agents have become increasingly prevalent in human social life. In light of the diversity of new human–machine interactions, we face renewed questions about the distribution of moral responsibility. Besides positions denying the mere possibility of attributing moral responsibility to artificial systems, recent approaches discuss the circumstances under which artificial agents may qualify as moral agents. This paper revisits the discussion of how responsibility might be distributed between artificial agents and human interaction partners (including producers of artificial agents) and raises (...)
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  2. How far can we get in creating a digital replica of a philosopher?Anna Strasser, Eric Schwitzgebel & Matthew Crosby - 2023 - In Raul Hakli, Pekka Mäkelä & Johanna Seibt (eds.), Social Robots in Social Institutions. Proceedings of Robophilosophy 2022. Amsterdam: IOS PRESS. pp. 371-380.
    Can we build machines with which we can have interesting conversations? Observing the new optimism of AI regarding deep learning and new language models, we set ourselves an ambitious goal: We want to find out how far we can get in creating a digital replica of a philosopher. This project has two aims; one more technical, investigating of how the best model can be built. The other one, more philosophical, explores the limits and risks which are accompanied by the creation (...)
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  3. The AI-Stance: Crossing the Terra Incognita of Human-Machine Interactions?Anna Strasser & Michael Wilby - 2023 - In Raul Hakli, Pekka Mäkelä & Johanna Seibt (eds.), Social Robots in Social Institutions. Amsterdam: IOS Press. pp. 286-295.
    Although even very advanced artificial systems do not meet the demanding conditions which are required for humans to be a proper participant in a social interaction, we argue that not all human-machine interactions (HMIs) can appropriately be reduced to mere tool-use. By criticizing the far too demanding conditions of standard construals of intentional agency we suggest a minimal approach that ascribes minimal agency to some artificial systems resulting in the proposal of taking minimal joint actions as a case of a (...)
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