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B. Scot Rousse
University of California, Berkeley
  1. Heidegger, Sociality, and Human Agency.B. Scot Rousse - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):417-451.
    According to Heidegger's Being and Time, social relations are constitutive of the core features of human agency. On this view, which I call a ‘strong conception’ of sociality, the core features of human agency cannot obtain in an individual subject independently of social relations to others. I explain the strong conception of sociality captured by Heidegger's underdeveloped notion of ‘being-with’ by reconstructing Heidegger's critique of the ‘weak conception’ of sociality characteristic of Kant's theory of agency. According to a weak conception, (...)
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  2. Self‐Awareness and Self‐Understanding.B. Scot Rousse - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):162-186.
    In this paper, I critically examine Dan Zahavi’s multidimensional account of the self and show how the distinction he makes among ‘pre-reflective minimal’, ‘interpersonal’, and ‘normative’ dimensions of selfhood needs to be refined in order to accommodate what I call ‘pre-reflective self-understanding’. The latter is a normative dimension of selfhood manifest not in reflection and deliberation, but in the habits and style of a person’s pre-reflective absorption in the world. After reviewing Zahavi's multidimensional account and revealing this gap in his (...)
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  3.  71
    Care, Death, and Time in Heidegger and Frankfurt.B. Scot Rousse - 2016 - In Roman Altshuler & Michael Sigrist (eds.), Time and the Philosophy of Action. New York: Routledge. pp. 225-241.
    Both Martin Heidegger and Harry Frankfurt have argued that the fundamental feature of human identity is care. Both contend that caring is bound up with the fact that we are finite beings related to our own impending death, and both argue that caring has a distinctive, circular and non-instantaneous, temporal structure. In this paper, I explore the way Heidegger and Frankfurt each understand the relations among care, death, and time, and I argue for the superiority of Heideggerian version of this (...)
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  4. Ecological Finitude as Ontological Finitude: Radical Hope in the Anthropocene.B. Scot Rousse & Fernando Flores - 2018 - In Richard Polt & Jon Wittrock (eds.), The Task of Philosophy in the Anthropocene: Axial Echoes in Global Space. New York: Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 175-192.
    The proposal that the earth has entered a new epoch called “the Anthropocene” has touched a nerve . One unsettling part of having our ecological finitude thrust upon us with the term “Anthropocene” is that, as Nietzsche said of the death of God, we ourselves are supposed to be the collective doer responsible here, yet this is a deed which no one individual meant to do and whose implications no one fully comprehends. For the pessimists about humanity, the implications seem (...)
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  5. Merleau-Ponty and Carroll on the Power of Movies.B. Scot Rousse - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (1):45-73.
    Movies have a striking aesthetic power: they can draw us in and induce a peculiar mode of involvement in their images – they absorb us. While absorbed in a movie, we lose track both of the passage of time and of the fact that we are sitting in a dark room with other people watching the play of light upon a screen. What is the source of the power of movies? Noël Carroll, who cites Maurice Merleau-Ponty as an influence on (...)
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  6.  59
    Demythologizing the Third Realm: Frege on Grasping Thoughts.B. Scot Rousse - 2015 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (1).
    In this paper, I address some puzzles about Frege’s conception of how we “grasp” thoughts. I focus on an enigmatic passage that appears near the end of Frege’s great essay “The Thought.” In this passage Frege refers to a “non-sensible something” without which “everyone would remain shut up in his inner world.” I consider and criticize Wolfgang Malzkorn’s interpretation of the passage. According to Malzkorn, Frege’s view is that ideas [Vorstellungen] are the means by which we grasp thoughts. My counter-proposal (...)
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