It is a well-known fact that mathematics plays a crucial role in physics; in fact, it is virtually impossible to imagine contemporary physics without it. But it is questionable whether mathematical concepts could ever play such a role in psychology or philosophy. In this paper, we set out to examine a rather unobvious example of the application of topology, in the form of the theory of persons proposed by Kurt Lewin in hisPrinciples of Topological Psychology. Our aim is to show (...) that this branch of mathematics can furnish a natural conceptual system for Gestalt psychology, in that it provides effective tools for describing global qualitative aspects of the latter’s object of investigation. We distinguish three possible ways in which mathematics can contribute to this: explanation, explication (construed in the spirit of Carnap) and metaphor. We hold that all three of these can be usefully characterized asthrowing light ontheir subject matter, and argue that in each case this contrasts with the role of explanations in physics. Mathematics itself, we argue, provides something different from such explanations when applied in the field of psychology, and this is nevertheless still cognitively fruitful. (shrink)

part, whole, ideal quality, foundation, unity, space, topoontology, topophilosophy, formal ontology, topology, mathematical philosophy, topology, topology of the person, topology of mind, mathematics in philosophy, mereology, mereotopology, phenomenology, Benedict Bornstein, Edmund Husserl, Roman Ingarden, Kurt Lewin, René Thom.