Basant (Spring) is a time of dawning light, new life, new birth, and new hope — a time of warmth, vitality, dancing, and blossoming. Every year she comes out of the cold darkness and captivatingly dances around us. She embraces us with her warmth, intoxicates us with her aroma. Like a potent elixir, spring revitalizes our hope. She breathes life into the dead and teaches us the lessons of renewal and rebirth [1]. The dawn of Basant has well (...) appreciated in Gurbani as; "Among the months, blessed is the month when spring always comes."[Mehl First, SGGS: 1168]; "The delightful season of spring has come." [Mehl First, SGGS: 1168] Every year, the vernal equinox occurs on the 21st of March. It indicates the starting of long, brighter days. The birds trill, bees buzz, and the buds of plants and trees burst forth. Humans stroll with a bit more spring in their step and sparkle in their eyes. Gurbani appreciates the blooming of Spring as; "The season of spring has come. It blossoms forth luxuriantly." [Mehl Fifth, SGGS: 1185] Feeling good in spring is more than psychological. The more extended light period of spring days has the power to change our biochemistry in positive ways. The increased sunlight exposure affects hormonal and metabolic functions. We feel more optimistic and resilient; even our reproductive patterns are affected by the light of spring. (shrink)

R.C. Pradhan claims in Language, Reality, and Transcendence that, in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, “[i]n no case is Wittgenstein interested in the empirical facts regarding language, as for him philosophy does not undertake any scientific study of language” (Pradhan 2009, xiv). I consider Ludwig Wittgenstein’s purportedly anti-scientific and anti-empirical approach to language in light of advances by philosophers and linguists in the latter half of the 20th century. I distinguish between various ways of understanding Wittgenstein’s (...) stance against scientism. Due to the success of more recent work on language, I argue that Wittgenstein’s critique, as interpreted by Pradhan in Language, Reality, and Transcendence, does not undermine the formal study of language. Nevertheless, I argue, the contention of Wittgenstein and Pradhan that language, through grammar (in Wittgenstein’s sense), serves a variety of functions still sheds light on the differences in meaning across different discourses. I argue that a synthesis of Wittgenstein’s pluralist theory of meaning with elements of a theoretical study of language offers the best comprehensive account of natural language. I will argue that this conception of language is consistent with elements of Pradhan’s interpretation. As Pradhan notes, “The aim here is not to project one kind of grammatical determination but keep options open for many such grammatical determinations such that the grammatical nuances are not papered over in the name of the unity of grammar” (Pradhan 2009, 28). (shrink)

Based on a close reading of the debate between Rawls and Sen on primary goods versus capabilities, I argue that liberal theory cannot adequately respond to Sen’s critique within a conventionally neutralist framework. In support of the capability approach, I explain why and how it defends a more robust conception of opportunity and freedom, along with public debate on substantive questions about well-being and the good life. My aims are: to show that Sen’s capability approach is at odds with Rawls’s (...) political liberal version of neutrality; to carve out a third space in the neutrality debate; and to begin to develop, from Sen’s approach, the idea of public value liberalism as a position that falls within that third space.En me basant sur une lecture attentive du débat entre Rawls et Sen sur les biens premiers versus les capabilités, je soutiendrai que la théorie libérale est incapable, dans un cadre neutraliste conventionnel, de répondre adéquatement à des injustices dans le domaine de la santé. À partir de l’approche des capabilités, j’explique pourquoi et comment cette approche permet de défendre une conception plus robuste de l’opportunité et de la liberté, de même qu’un débat public sur des questions substantielles concernant le bien-être et la vie bonne. Mes objectifs sont : de clarifier le rapport entre le neutralisme de Rawls et sa défense des biens premiers,, de démontrer les implications de la critique des capabilités de Sen, et, d’esquisser une troisième position dans le débat sur la neutralité versus le perfectionnisme – à savoir, celle d’un perfectionnisme motivé par des considérations de légitimité. (shrink)