9 found
Order:
See also
Benjamin Kozuch
University of Alabama
  1. Dislocation, Not Dissociation: The Neuroanatomical Argument Against Visual Experience Driving Motor Action.Benjamin Kozuch - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):572-602.
    Common sense suggests that visual consciousness is essential to skilled motor action, but Andy Clark—inspired by Milner and Goodale's dual visual systems theory—has appealed to a wide range of experimental dissociations to argue that such an assumption is false. Critics of Clark's argument contend that the content driving motor action is actually within subjects' experience, just not easily discovered. In this article, I argue that even if such content exists, it cannot be guiding motor action, since a review of current (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  2. Prefrontal Lesion Evidence Against Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):721-746.
    According to higher-order theories of consciousness, a mental state is conscious only when represented by another mental state. Higher-order theories must predict there to be some brain areas (or networks of areas) such that, because they produce (the right kind of) higher-order states, the disabling of them brings about deficits in consciousness. It is commonly thought that the prefrontal cortex produces these kinds of higher-order states. In this paper, I first argue that this is likely correct, meaning that, if some (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  3.  41
    No Pain, No Gain (in Darwinian Fitness): A Representational Account of Affective Experience.Benjamin Kozuch - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):693-714.
    Reductive representationalist theories of consciousness are yet to produce a satisfying account of pain’s affective component, the part that makes it painful. The paramount problem here is that that there seems to be no suitable candidate for what affective experience represents. This article suggests that affective experience represents the Darwinian fitness effects of events. I argue that, because of affective experience’s close association with motivation, natural selection will work to bring affect into covariance with the average fitness effects of types (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  4.  49
    Conscious Vision Guides Motor Action—Rarely.Benjamin Kozuch - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-34.
    According to Milner and Goodale’s dual visual systems (DVS) theory, a division obtains between visual consciousness and motor action, in that the visual system producing conscious vision (the ventral stream) is distinct from the one guiding action (the dorsal stream). That there would be this division is often taken (by Andy Clark and others) to undermine the folk view on how consciousness and action relate. However, even if this division obtains, this leaves open the possibility that con- scious ventral information (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Correlation, Causation, Constitution: On the Interplay Between the Science and Philosophy of Consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In S. M. Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness. John Benjamins. pp. 400-417.
    Consciousness is a natural phenomenon, the object of a flourishing area of research in the natural sciences – research whose primary goal is to identify the neural correlates of consciousness. This raises the question: why is there need for a philosophy of consciousness? As we see things, the need for a philosophy of consciousness arises for two reasons. First, as a young and energetic science operating as yet under no guiding paradigm, the science of consciousness has been subject to considerable (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6.  46
    Underwhelming Force: Evaluating the Neuropsychological Evidence for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - 2021 - Mind and Language 1 (1).
    Proponents of the higher-order (HO) theory of consciousness (e.g., Lau and Rosenthal) have recently appealed to brain lesion evidence to support their thesis that mental states are conscious when and only when represented by other mental states. This article argues that this evidence fails to support HO theory, doing this by first determining what kinds of conscious deficit should result when HO state-producing areas are damaged, then arguing that these kinds of deficit do not occur in the studies to which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. The Received Method for Ruling Out Brain Areas From Being NCC Undermines Itself.Benjamin Kozuch - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (9-10):145-69.
    Research into the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) aims to identify not just those brain areas that are NCC, but also those that are not. In the received method for ruling out a brain area from being an NCC, this is accomplished by showing a brain area’s content to be consistently absent from subjects’ reports about what they are experiencing. This paper points out how this same absence can be used to infer that the brain area’s content is cognitively inaccessible, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Elizabeth Irvine, Consciousness as a Scientific Concept: A Philosophy of Science Perspective. [REVIEW]Benjamin Kozuch - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):651-655.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Consciousness and Mental Causation: Contemporary Empirical Cases for Epiphenomenalism, in Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch (ed.) - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
    In its classical form, epiphenomenalism is the view that conscious mental events have no physical effects: while physical events cause mental events, the opposite is never true. Unlike classical epiphenomenalism, contemporary forms do not hold that conscious men­ tal states always lack causal efficacy, only that they are epiphenomenal relative to certain kinds of action, ones we pre-theoretically would have thought consciousness to causally contribute to. Two of these contemporary, empirically based challenges to the efficacy of the mental are the (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark