Order:
  1. Nominalism and the Infinite Knowledge It Implies.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    Being able to apply grue-like predicates would allow one to instantly solve an infinite number of mysteries (historical, scientific, etc.). In this paper I’ll give a couple of examples. It is still a mystery whether George Mallory and Andrew Irvine managed to reach the summit of Mount Everest in 1924. The predicate “greverest” applies to an object if either the object is green and Mount Everest was scaled in 1924, or the object is not green and Mount Everest was not (...)
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  2. An Asymmetry in the Raven Paradox.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    Peter Godfrey-Smith writes in the section 3.3 “The Ravens Problem” of his book “Theory and Reality” [chapter “Induction and Confirmation”]: “First, the logical empiricists were concerned to deal with the case where generalizations cover an infinite number of instances. In that case, as we see each raven we are not reducing the number of ways in which the hypothesis might fail”. Infinite sets and finite sets have different properties and follow different rules. For example: let’s call “bag X” a specific (...)
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  3. Occam's Razor and Brain in a Vat.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    Let’s consider the skeptical example of the brain in a vat. It has been pointed out by Crispin Wright (1994) that Putnam's argument does not affect certain cases such as my brain being removed from my skull by a mad scientist and hooked up to a computer. Since Putnam's argument falls flat at least in cases where the brain is first removed from a human body and then hooked up to a computer, I consider the skeptical aspects of the brain-in-a-vat (...)
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  4. A Note on Logical Paradoxes and Aristotelian Square of Opposition.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    According to Aristotle if a universal proposition (for example: “All men are white”) is true, its contrary proposition (“All men are not white”) must be false; and, according to Aristotle, if a universal proposition (for example: “All men are white”) is true, its contradictory proposition (“Not all men are white”) must be false. I agree with what Aristotle wrote about universal propositions, but there are universal propositions which have no contrary proposition and have no contradictory proposition. The proposition X “All (...)
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  5. (1 other version)Goodman’s Paradox, Hume’s Problem, Goodman-Kripke Paradox: Three Different Issues.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    On page 14 of "Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences" (section 4 of chapter 1) by Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin is written: “Since ‘blue’ and ‘green’ are interdefinable with ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’, the question of which pair is basic and which pair derived is entirely a question of which pair we start with”. This paper points out that an example of interdefinability is also that one about the predicate “grueb”, which is a predicate that applies to (...)
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