A continuing challenge for researchers and practitioners alike is the lack of data on the effectiveness of corporate–community investment programmes. The focus of this article is on the minerals industry, where companies currently face the challenge of matching corporate drivers for strategic partnership with community needs for programmes that contribute to local and regional sustainability. While many global mining companies advocate a strategic approach to partnerships, there is no evidence currently available that suggests companies are monitoring these partnerships to see (...) if they do, in fact, represent ‘strategic’ investments. This article argues that applying the management concept of ‘investment performance’ to corporate–community partnerships requires questioning traditional evaluation methods that focus on the results of programmes or activities. We adopt a case study approach to introduce an evaluation framework that considers performance from both corporate and community perspectives and that conceptualises partnership performance as comprising four aspects: (1) the contribution of the partnership to the overall portfolio of a company’s community investment programmes, (2) the appropriateness of the partnership model, (3) the effectiveness of the partnering relationship and (4) the ability of the partners to achieve programme goals. The application of this evaluation framework to an established corporate–community partnership programme provided some useful insights as to how partnership performance can be improved. (shrink)

It has been argued by disability advocates that supported decision-making must replace surrogate, or substituted, decision-making for people with cognitive disabilities. From a moral perspective surrogate decision-making it is said to be an indefensible form of paternalism. At the heart of this argument against surrogate decision-making is the belief that such paternalistic action expresses something fundamentally disrespectful about those upon whom it is imposed: that they are inferior, deficient or child-like in some way. Contrary to this widespread belief, I will (...) argue that surrogate decision-making sometimes expresses more respect for people with life-long, ‘severe’ or ‘profound’ cognitive disabilities than does the adoption of supported decision-making.. Specifically, I argue that in some cases supported decision-making can arguably express that people with severe or profound cognitive disabilities lack equal moral value. I also argue that supported decision-making for people with profound cognitive disabilities can arguably express that they lack complex and rich inner lives. If our aim is to ensure our behaviour and practices express respect for people with life-long ‘severe’ or ‘profound’ cognitive disabilities, then sometimes surrogate rather than supportive decision-making will be a better option. (shrink)

Individuals with ‘severe’ cognitive disabilities are primarily discussed in philosophy and bioethics to determine their moral status. In this paper it is argued that theories of moral status have limited relevance to the unjust ways in which people with cognitive disabilities are routinely treated in the actual world, which largely concerns their relegation to an inferior social status. I discuss three possible relationships between moral and social status, demonstrating that determinate answers about the moral status of individuals with ‘severe’ cognitive (...) disabilities are neither necessary nor sufficient for defending the imperative that they be treated as our social equals. (shrink)

Many people deny that their disabilities make them worse off than others, or worse off than they would themselves be without the disabilities. Elizabeth Barnes has suggested that there is nothing odd about these claims as disability is a mere difference. Opponents of the mere difference view are often concerned about the unacceptable implications of the view. If it were true that disability is a mere difference, they suggest, then it would be permissible to cause disability, and permissible to refrain (...) from preventing disability. These implications are absurd, or so we are invited to concur, and therefore disability cannot be a mere difference. Barnes has argued at length that the unacceptable implications argument is a weak objection to the mere difference view. Her main argument is that there are a number of reasons for why it may be wrong to cause disability, even if disability is a mere difference. One such reason is because of transition costs. According to this claim, causing a person who is nondisabled to become disabled is wrong because of the heavy transition costs associated with acquiring disability, even if the person is not made worse off in the long run. -/- This paper analyses the nature of transition costs in much more detail than is found in the existing literature. Our detailed analysis of the nature of transition costs is then used to argue for two main conclusions. Firstly, we provide considerable additional weight to Barnes’ argument that even if disability is a mere difference, transition costs entail that it can be wrong to cause disability. Furthermore, we strengthen Barnes argument by showing that transition costs entail that it can be wrong to remove disability (cause a disabled person to become nondisabled). Secondly, our detailed analysis of the nature of transition costs provides reason to doubt that well-being, including transitory impacts on well-being, is the only thing that should determine the wrongness of causing or removing disability. Maximising well-being is not the only thing we do or should care about. The upshot of this analysis is that even if it is true that some disabilities do make people somewhat worse off, non-welfare considerations still defeat the claim that it is always wrong to cause disability. (shrink)

Distributive justice decision making tends to require a trade off between different valued outcomes. The present study tracked computer mouse cursor movements in a forced-choice paradigm to examine for tension between different parameters of distributive justice during the decision-making process. Participants chose between set meal distributions, to third parties, that maximised either equality (the evenness of the distribution) or efficiency (the total number of meals distributed). Across different formulations of these dilemmas, responding was consistent with the notion that individuals tend (...) to base decisions in part on the magnitude of these parameters. In addition, dilemmas associated with inconsistent responding across the sample tended to elicit the greatest spatial deviation of the cursor, potentially reflecting dilemma difficulty. One interpretation of these results is that individuals value equality and efficiency in such a way that moral dilemmas are resolved by comparing the perceived value of these qualitatively different parameters, consistent with a value pluralistic framework of decision making. A post-hoc analysis indicated that individuals also incorporated sufficiency concerns during distributive justice decision making. The results are discussed in relation to political philosophy. (shrink)